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Abstract
Despite an increase in governments’ demand for private participation in infrastructure, Public–
Private Partnerships (PPPs) have received low engagement from the private sector in the task
of bridging infrastructure gaps in emerging markets. Previous literature in the field mainly
focuses on the effects of PPPs from the governments’ perspective and it is inconclusive in its
examination of the advantages and disadvantages of the private sector’s participation. This
thesis addresses these issues by answering three main research questions: (i) Do PPPs benefit
partnering private sector firms? (ii) Does higher reliance on the government in PPPs benefit
partnering private sector firms? and (iii) Does the relationship between institutional quality
and PPP projects benefit partnering private sector firms?
Based on corporate finance and incomplete contract theories, PPPs, with their readily
costless pledgeable government assets and government guarantee, are hypothesized to reduce
capital constraints faced by private sector firms compared to their non-PPP counterparts. My
study analyzes firm market valuation, investment–cash flow sensitivity, bank lending and their
determinants for partnering private sector firms.
My main findings are as follows: (i) PPP announcements create positive abnormal return
for partnering private sector firms in China and India. In the long run, PPP involvement
reduces investment–cash flow sensitivity in both countries’ private sector firms. Especially,
PPP private sector firms with political connections can achieve better bank financing in both
economies, and this situation is even more robust under the effects of the election event in India;
(ii) high reliance on government through government equity participation, political connections
and contract mechanisms are more beneficial in China compared to those in India in terms
of reducing capital constraints. This aligns with the evidence of increasing overinvestment
problems in PPP politically connected firms in India; and (iii) the benefits of lower capital
constraints and increased firm value through PPP investments are more pronounced in mature
economies with high institutional quality.
To my best knowledge, the study is the first comprehensive study on the effects of PPPs
on partnering private sector firms using the corporate finance dimension. It contributes to the
extant debatable literature on the role of PPPs, reliance on governments, contract mechanisms
and institutional quality on private sector firms. It provides insights on the possible benefits
of these unique contractual agreements and attempts to answer the question of whether the
1
intended purpose of reducing underinvestment in the private sector can be fulfilled through
PPP contracts. It also contributes to the extant literature on corporate investment decisions
and investment efficiency. Moreover, it sheds light on the extant debate on social lending
objectives, political corruption views and the role of political connection and institutions. My
study provides important guidance on the direction and viability of PPPs in China and India
and is extensively applicable to other economies, depending on their PPP market maturity and
institutional quality
2
Chapter 1
Introduction
Countries around the world are facing a serious infrastructure gap that hinders global de-
velopment. It has been estimated that if infrastructure investment is less than US$ 57 trillion
in the years from 2013 to 2030, the world economy will not able to keep up with the projected
global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (Dobbs et al., 2013). This amount is 60% more
than all the value of investment in infrastructure over the past 18 years. Given the increas-
ing public deficit and the constraints on commercial debts owing to recent financial crises,
Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) have an increasingly important role to play in alleviating
the deficiencies in infrastructure. In recent times, China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative
has been a massive example of PPPs aiming to mobilize public and private sectors jointly to
create close economic ties through multiple infrastructure projects between China and Europe
via countries in Eurasia and the Indian Ocean. However, the low engagement of the private
sector, especially in emerging markets, provoke the question of whether partnering private sec-
tor firms have enough appetite for engaging in PPPs. Existing literature focuses on the effects
of PPPs on the public sector. In the remaining less-explored side of these partnerships, there is
inconclusive evidence on the gains and losses of the private sector. The main aim of my thesis
is to understand whether and how such contractual agreements benefit PPP partnering private
sector firms.
1.1 Research Motivation
The increasing significance of PPPs around the world provokes a substantial body of literature
on PPPs. The specific literature in business, economics and finance focuses on three main
features of PPPs. These include (i) the contract design (Bennett and Iossa, 2004; Dewatripont
and Legros, 2005; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 2003), (ii) ownership and risk transfer (Bing
et al., 2005; Besley and Ghatak, 2001; Cooper, 2005; Grimsey and Lewis, 2007; Roumboutsos
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and Anagnostopoulos, 2008), and (iii) financing (Engel et al., 2010; Yescombe, 2011, e.g). The
main aim of the literature is to illustrate that under certain conditions, PPPs, by nature of
their unique contract agreements, can bring more benefits than conventional public procurement
mechanisms. Therefore, most of the literature on PPPs comes from the government perspective,
and there have been increasingly inconclusive findings on the gains and losses of private sector
involvement in PPPs (Bennett and Iossa, 2004; Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011; Davies and
Eustice, 2005; Dheret et al., 2012; Engel et al., 2008; Hart, 2003; Maskin and Tirole, 2008;
Tang et al., 2010; UNESCAP, 2011). More importantly, to my best knowledge, there is virtually
no research that examines the corporate finance side of these financial contracts. Meanwhile,
understanding the corporate finance side of PPPs can allow us to shed light on whether these
unique contractual agreements can reduce the unmet demand for capital in emerging markets.
The evidence of such low private sector interest in PPPs motivates me to understand a less-
explored rationale for private sector participation in PPP investments.
The literature on the role of government support on firm value is still inconclusive. Espe-
cially, it has been increasingly controversial in emerging markets, given the weak institutional
environment and the high level of corruption and manipulation that can offset the benefits of
government support at the expense of private sector firms (Engel et al., 2010; Ke et al., 2013;
UNESCAP, 2011). In this circumstance, private sector firms may pursue political connections
for better access to external finance. Social lending is not only one of the ideal forms of prefer-
ential treatment to politically connected firms but it also secures the mutual benefits between
government and partnering private firms. However, the earlier literature in the field does not
justify this motive. The literature supports the political corruption view that social lending
leads to social loss since the preferential treatment may only fulfil the mutual benefits between
private sector firms and connected politicians (for example, in terms of increasing votes and fi-
nancial support for election events) (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Cole, 2009; Dinc¸, 2005; Sapienza,
2004). More importantly, existing empirical literature uses general corporate lending for testing
the social lending view; however, general corporate lending may not be clearly aligned with so-
cial objectives. Also, PPP contract mechanisms are considered as the other indirect methods to
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secure government reliance and its related benefits; however, the previous literature primarily
investigates factors driving the choices of contracts, little attention has been given to the effects
of contract mechanisms on firm value (Besley and Ghatak, 2001; Engel et al., 2010; Ke et al.,
2013; Iossa and Martimort, 2012; Maskin and Tirole, 2008; UNESCAP, 2011).
In relation to the effects of institutional quality, earlier literature finds it difficult to tease
out whether the variations in private firms’ benefits across economies are led by the “law–
finance–growth” nexus1 (Porta et al., 1997; Lo´pez de Silanes et al., 1998) or the “political-tie”
explanation2 (Pistor et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2008; Cull and Xu, 2005; Faccio et al.,
2006; Faccio, 2010; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Moreover, when it comes to PPPs, the previous
literature attempts to explore the factors in institutional quality that are driving the choice of
PPP projects and which increase their success rate in macro-level (country-level) analyses. In
the literature, there is less discussion at a micro level that explores how institutional quality
influences partnering private sector firms.
China and India command a lion’s share in infrastructure projects with active private sector
participation. PPP investments in China and India account for about 30% of the total number
of PPP projects and 21% of total investments in developing countries in 2016 (World Bank
Group, 2016b). However, the emergence of PPPs in China and India cannot bridge the infras-
tructure gap. While each country demanded a huge amount of more than $US one billion for
infrastructure until 2015, only about 15% and 40% of the funding for infrastructure came from
private investors in China and India, respectively in around 2012 (Bellier, 2003; Hongyan, 2010;
Lakshmanan, 2008; High Level Committee on Financing Infrastructure, 2012; Wilkins et al.,
2014). The shortage of private commitment in infrastructure motivates research on discovering
the possible benefits of private sector firms through PPP investments in China and India. How-
ever, the empirical literature on PPPs focuses more on project-level analyses, and there has
been scant comprehensive empirical research on how PPP influence partnering private sector
firms in separate country, or more systematically, cross-country analyses. Additionally, most
1This nexus implies that the effectiveness of legal institutions and financial systems, which focus on strong
protection of private properties, help to increase external financing.
2This explanation suggests that political connections work as an alternative channel to help firms secure
their external financing.
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of the empirical research on PPPs uses qualitative methods, including interviews, surveys and
case studies with a small sample size, so it is difficult to encounter problem generalization. Few
studies have been conducted using quantitative methods (Tang et al., 2010). The low level of
interest shown by the private sector to PPPs in the reality and the low level of research devoted
to the corporate finance side of PPP-invested private sector firms motivates the focus of my
study. I investigate the less-explored rationale for private firms participating in PPPs and more
importantly, their associated gains and losses in such a high risk social venture.
1.2 Research Objectives, Research Questions and Main
Findings
The main aim of this thesis is to provide robust empirical analyses on whether and how Public–
Private Partnerships benefit partnering private sector firms from the corporate finance perspec-
tive. The thesis is broken down into the following objectives:
The first objective is to evaluate the effects of PPPs on partnering private firms. This
is conducted by investigating the nature of private sector firms that opt for PPPs and the
associated benefits of these firms compared with their non-PPP competing counterparts. This
evaluation is conducted by using 169 and 215 PPP projects (1988–2013) for China and India,
respectively during the time that the firms engaged in PPP investments and during their long-
term post-PPP period.
The second objective is to assess the role of government support for PPP-partnering private
firms. My study examines whether and how government support can increase private sector
firms’ investment efficiency in the economies that face capital constraints due to low institutional
development. More importantly, my study tests the Social Lending Objectives to examine
whether such preferential treatment towards the private sector also enhances social welfare by
encouraging banks to efficiently allocate capital to those with high growth opportunities
The third objective is to identify how institutional quality influences PPP benefits for private
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sector firms. Initially, my study examines how institutional quality affects the Chinese and
Indian private sector firms. Furthermore, my study, by using 625 PPP projects (1980-2015),
extends to an inter-country analysis that straddles nine economies (namely the UK, Australia,
Canada, the US, Japan, Brazil, Russia, India and China) at varying degrees of economic and
PPP development. The aim here is to deeply understand how the variations in institutional
quality across economies can explain the cross-sectional variation related to the benefits of PPP
contracts.
To achieve these objectives, the main research questions are as follow:
Question 1. Do Public–Private Partnerships benefit partnering private firms?
1a. Do PPP announcements add value to partnering private firms?
1b. Do PPP investments reduce investment–cash flow sensitivity of partnering private firms?
1c. Do PPP investments increase partnering private firms’ access to bank loans?
Question 2. Does higher reliance on the government benefit private sector firms?
2a. Does higher government equity participation reduce capital constraints for private sector
firms?
2b. Do political connections reduce capital constraints for private sector firms?
2c. Do the variations in the contract mechanism explain the cross-sectional variation related
to the benefits of PPP contracts?
Question 3. Does the relationship between institutional quality and PPP projects
benefit partnering private sector firms
My main findings are as follows:
(i) PPP announcements create positive abnormal returns for partnering private sector firms
in China and India; however, the nature of firms that undertake PPP projects varies. In China,
older, matured, and better-valued firms with high cash inflows, compared to their non-PPP
counterparts, engage in PPPs while in India, younger and cash-constrained firms with higher
debt burdens engage in PPPs. This indicates that unlike in China, PPP investments in India
are mainly driven by the underinvestment problem. In the long run, PPP involvement reduces
investment–cash flow sensitivity in both countries’ private sector firms. Especially, PPP private
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sector firms with political connections can achieve better bank financing in both economies, and
this situation is even more robust under the effects of the election event in India;
(ii) High reliance on government through government equity participation, political con-
nections and contract mechanisms are more beneficial in China compared to those in India in
terms of reducing capital constraints. This aligns with the evidence of increasing overinvestment
problems in PPP politically connected firms in India;
(iii) The benefits of lower capital constraints and increased firm value through PPP invest-
ments are more pronounced in matured economies with better institutional quality.
1.3 Research Contributions
1.3.1 Theoretical Contributions
My thesis contributes to the following important theoretical streams of literature.
First, my study adds to the literature that investigates PPP benefits and associated partner-
ing parties. A growing body of literature compares the effects of PPPs with those of traditional
public procurement (UNESCAP, 2011; Maskin and Tirole, 2008), my study, from the private
sector’s perspective, evaluates how PPPs influence the partnering private sector firms. More
importantly, although the literature mentions several factors influencing partnering firms, such
as general political risk, transaction cost or the theory of project finance as in Engel et al.
(2013), Hwang et al. (2013) and Yescombe (2013), I contribute to the inconclusive literature on
the relationship between PPPs and their related private parties by stating an argument that
PPPs, with costless pledgeable government assets and guarantees, can reduce the dependence
on internal cash flow faced by private sector firms; by doing this, PPP partnering firms can
outperform their non-PPP counterparts in terms of investment efficiency. Therefore, my study
provides insights on the possible financial benefits of these unique contractual agreements in
addition to those explained by the project finance theory of Yescombe (2013) in the previous
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Figure 1.1: Research Framework
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literature.
Second, my study fills the gap in the corporate finance literature on the role of PPPs,
government reliance and contract mechanisms on partnering private sector firms. To my best
knowledge, this is the first study on how PPPs influence PPP-invested firms in the corporate
finance dimension. The previous literature on financial constraints indicate two possible chan-
nels, explained by the theory of information asymmetries between shareholders and debtholders
as in Myers and Majluf (1984) and the theory of agency problems between managers and share-
holders as in Jensen and Meckling (1976), that may distort firms’ behavior in financing for their
projects in terms of underinvestment or overinvestment in the context of market imperfection.
My study extends the corporate finance literature by making an argument that, in emerging
markets, there is every chance that cash-rich private sector firms with political connections can
influence and secure PPP contracts. Therefore, given increased dependence on internal cash
flow in the politically connected firms under the influence of PPPs, my study adds another
channel responsible for causing firms’ investment behavior distortion. That is, the dominance
of related politicians or state representatives in PPP firms may lead PPP firms to overuse their
free cash flow to pursue political/social goals at the expense of shareholders, which may reduce
investment efficiency and increase capital constraints.
Third, my study contributes to the debate in the literature on the role of government
support for firms’ financing conditions. The previous literature on government involvement
is inconclusive about which of the following is a better choice for private sector firms: high
reliance on the government (e.g. obtaining public investment, government loan guarantees or
securing political ties such as in Engel et al. (2010) and UNESCAP (2011)); or independence
on the government, which can prevent corruption and high transaction costs as discussed in
Ke et al. (2013). My study extends this literature by arguing that the effectiveness of such
financial benefits through government reliance depends on the political setup in the economies.
For example, the unitary polity with a stable centrally run state is proposed to let government
interference be more active and effective, while the federalism with a two-level hierarchy lessens
the chance of manipulation and of backing support for politically connected firms. As a result,
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the political setting is assumed to work as a mediator for the effects of government support for
PPPs.
Fourth, my study contributes to extant literature on the relationship between institutions,
contract mechanism and PPPs. Existing studies explore institutional factors driving the choice
of PPP contract mechanisms and increasing their success rate at the country level (e.g. Bajari
et al., 2008; Chan et al., 2010; Chong et al., 2012; Hovakimian, 2009; Hwang et al., 2013). In
contrast, my study aims at understanding how institutional quality and contract mechanisms
influence PPP partnering private sector firms’ performance. Hence, my study sheds light on
which given institutions and which kinds of contractual agreements can bring more benefits to
private sector firms.
1.3.2 Methodological Contributions
First, my study on PPPs provides a better setting, using robust methods to test the Social
Lending Hypothesis (SLH) under the effects of political connections by comparing PPP private
sector firms with their non-PPP competing counterparts. Existing studies use the general
corporate lending by banks as a sample to test SLH; however, the general corporate lending
may not be aligned with social objectives, resulting in a higher probability of SLH being rejected
and the “Political Corruption” hypothesis being supported, such as in Cole (2009) and Khwaja
and Mian (2005). These studies suggest that political connections may lead to the overall social
losses since related politicians focus on their own benefits. My study chooses for its sample
PPPs with a clear alignment to social values since the private sector may take over inefficient
government projects that are expected to result in higher overall social welfare. Therefore, this
allows me to shed light on whether the preferential treatment of politically connected firms can
align with social objectives or whether it serves only to pursue the rent-seeking and collusive
views of private sector firms and the politicians who support these firms.
Second, the previous literature finds it difficult to tease out whether the law–finance–growth
nexus, which aims at high protection of private properties and low public expropriation (e.g.
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Beck et al., 2003; Berkowitz et al., 2015; Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Porta et al., 1996) or
the political-tie hypothesis, which focuses on pursuing politically-backed support (e.g. Pistor
et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2014; Claessens et al., 2008; Cull et al., 2015; Faccio, 2010) is more
pronounced in explaining firms’ financial benefits. However, while the literature uses general
corporate investment as a sample; this kind of investment may not align with political pref-
erence. When testing the effects of the legal framework, PPPs provide a greater platform for
the activation of political connections since there is a direct cooperation for mutual benefits
between the government and private sector firms. Also, political connections are considered
as the mechanism to smoothen complex and high-risk PPP projects. Moreover, my analysis
on institutions has been conducted across nine countries at varying degrees of institutional
quality, whether this be a high level institution aiming to improve stability, accountability and
equality between the public and private sector or an institution based on political connections
or government-backed support for firms’ development. Therefore, my study provides a better
setting for testing whether the law–finance–growth nexus or the political-tie hypothesis is more
pronounced in explaining why private sector firms undertake PPP investments.
Finally, my study is one of the first comprehensive studies on PPPs using a unique firm-
level dataset on private sector firms from both the largest developed and the largest emerging
markets. While earlier studies focus on developed economies, my study contributes to the
extant PPP literature by providing important guidance on the direction and viability of PPPs
in emerging markets as well as being extensively applicable to other economies with a given
PPP market maturity and institutional quality. Moreover, owing to the variety of trends in
the development of PPPs around the world, the empirical literature on PPPs states that cross-
jurisdictional evaluation may be problematic due to different legal frameworks and tendering
processes; therefore, they may evaluate each country separately. I overcome these differences by
including in the baseline regressions some controlled variables for industry and country effects,
which enable me to conduct a comprehensive inter-country analysis on PPPs.
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1.3.3 Practical Contributions
First, my findings offer insights on the unique financial benefits and risks and their determi-
nants in relation to partnering private firms. This has implications for partnering firms when
evaluating corporate financial issues of each PPP investment, and thereby considering whether
they should engage in PPPs based on a given set of assessment criteria in the corporate finance
dimension. It should be highlighted from my study that the firms’ desire to eliminate financial
constraints and increase market valuation is far from straightforward. The firms depend much
more on the nature of private sector firms and the interference of government in given institu-
tional settings. Hence, my study suggests the kinds of support partnering firms should request
from governments to ensure the firms’ commitment and future success. For example, political
connections should be exercised with more caution. In the unitary polity that has one stable
centre party as in the Chinese markets, seeking for government investments or political ties
may help PPP-invested firms be less reliant on their internal cash flow and increase access to
bank lending. On the contrary, in the federal system as in the Indian economies, political con-
nections, in some cases, may not work well and may have an adverse affect on firms. Politically
connected firms may be even worse off in terms of investment–cash flow sensitivity since they
may suffer from overinvesting their free cash flow in the interest of the firms’ related politicians.
Second, since my findings offer important guidance on the direction and viability of PPPs
in given economies, my study has implications for investors who are considering investment in a
firm with PPP-related activities. Additionally, my findings offer guidance on how investors can
position themselves so as to seize PPP investment opportunities. My findings also focus on the
kinds of factors that constitute both the firms characteristics and governments’ involvement and
institutions. These are key factors that investors should take into account in their attempt to
fulfil investment goals. For example, in China, larger, more mature and better-valued private
sector firms with high government-backed support will have opportunities to achieve higher
PPP benefits, which may in turn generate more potential future return for their investors.
Whereas in India, there may still be the opportunity for investors to get long-term returns from
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high debt-burden firms who are willing to engage in PPPs since PPPs help them reduce their
underinvestment; however, these benefits may be viable for those firms with low government
involvement.
Finally, my study has implications for governments, given their attempts to attract more
private firms to participate in PPPs. My findings on the direction and viability of PPPs offer
guidance for governments on which private sector firms are most attracted to PPPs and what
added criteria governments should use to select these kinds of firms. Furthermore, my findings
suggest some institutional agendas and resources that the government may focus on when
establishing and adjusting their policies for PPP encouragement. For example, in the case of
the Chinese economy, the political stability and the high quality of regulation with its aim
of promoting private benefits are key issues for enhancing partnering private firms’ success in
gaining market return and reducing financial constraints. In contrast, for the Indian economy,
a democracy that is less reliant on the government and the improvement of accountability are
high priorities for the Indian government.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is comprised of six chapters.
Chapter 1 is an introduction that outlines the thesis’ research motivation, research objec-
tives and questions, research contributions, and the structure of my thesis.
Chapter 2 indicates the definitions, characteristics and background of PPPs and provides
a brief overview of the literature on the economics of PPPs (the economic-based theories for
PPP justification). It then reviews the PPP literature and emphasizes the effects of PPPs and
their associated factors in relation to partnering private sectors firms. This chapter aims to
generate the research gaps from the relevant PPP literature.
Chapter 3 forms the first major empirical chapter to investigate how PPPs and their
related factors influence the investment–cash flow sensitivity and market valuation of partnering
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private sector firms in China and India. The chapter presents an overview of the literature on
the relationship among investment decisions, investment efficiency, and market valuation, along
with the literature on the role of government reliance to develop hypotheses. It also provides
the data, methodology, empirical results and main highlighted findings.
Chapter 4 forms the second major empirical chapter to investigate how PPPs and their
related factors influence bank lending of partnering private sector firms in China and India.
This chapter especially focuses on the following issues: how political connections increase pri-
vate sector firms’ access to bank loans and the subsequent influence of these connections on
welfare. The chapter covers the literature review and hypothesis development on bank lending
in emerging markets under the political-connection influences, the methodology and data, the
main empirical results, and the discussion.
Chapter 5 forms the third major empirical chapter to investigate how institutional quality
moderates the benefits associated with PPP investments of partnering private sector firms. It is
conducted as a cross-country analysis for both developed and emerging economies (which also
includes the Chinese and Indian firms) with different institutional quality and PPP market
maturity. This chapter presents a brief overview of PPP development stages around the world,
the literature review on how institutional quality influence firm financing capabilities and firm
value, the methodology and data, the main empirical results, and the discussion.
Chapter 6 concludes with an overview of my thesis, the main findings, the contributions
to the literature, and the implications of my thesis along with its limitation and suggestions
for further studies.
1.5 Research Timeline
The participation in conferences during my PhD is as follows:
Chapters 1 and 2 are presented at the 15th International Business and Economy Confer-
ence, Nurtingen-Geislingen University, Nurtingen, Stuttgart Metropolitan Region, Germany.
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Chapter 3 is presented at the 28th Asian Finance Association (AsiaFA) Annual Meeting,
Bangkok, Thailand.
Chapter 3 is also presented at the 2016 Financial Management Association (FMA) Annual
Meeting, Las Vegas, Nevada, the United States.
Chapter 4 is presented at the 7th Conference on Emerging Markets Finance, Indira Gandhi
Institute of Development Research, Bombay, India.
Chapter 4 is also presented at the European Financial Management (EFM) Symposium:
Finance and Real Economy, Xiamen University, China.
Chapter 5 is presented at the 8th Financial Market and Corporate Governance, Victoria
University of Wellington, New Zealand.
Figure 1.2: Research Timeline
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review on
Public–Private Partnerships
2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the definitions and characteristics of Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs),
indicates the background on PPPs and provides a brief overview of the literature on the eco-
nomics of PPPs (the economic-based theories for PPP justification). It then reviews the PPP
literature and emphasizes the effects of PPPs and their associated factors on partnering private
sectors firms to generate the research gaps in the PPP literature.
2.2 Definitions and Characteristics of Public–Private Part-
nerships
There are many definitions of PPPs, depending on the form of the PPP contracts. PPP is a
form of cooperation between public authorities and economic operators which aims to ensure
the funding, construction, renovation, management or maintenance of an infrastructure or
the provision of a service (European Commission, 2004). The National Council for Public–
Private Partnerships of the United States of America defines a Public–Private Partnership
as a “contractual arrangement between a public sector agency and a for-profit private sector
developer, whereby resources and risks are shared for the purpose of delivery of a public service
or the development of public infrastructure”(Akintoye et al., 2008, p.4).
PPPs can be considered as the middle path between public procurements and privatization
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programs. Engel et al. (2010, 2008) emphasize the four main characters of PPPs, comprising
(i) the bundling of contracts, (ii) private temporary ownership of assets, (iii) inter-temporal
risk sharing, and (iv) project finance.
First, PPPs bundle contracts in a similar manner to private firms, which means that the
private sector is responsible for the financing, construction and operation of projects. PPPs
differ from traditional public procurement where separate contracting partners, constructors
and operators are employed to implement projects. Through bundling, PPPs are able to help
in the integration of investment expenditure and life-cycle costs to avoid cost overrun and
increase the efficiency of project delivery (Hart, 2003). The level of efficiency in these aspects
rises in infrastructure projects, where the levels of initial investment and design can determine
future operating and maintenance costs (Engel et al., 2008).
Second, temporary ownership means that the private sector usually takes over control of as-
sets from the government and retransfers them when the contract finishes. This results in more
innovation and better management in PPPs than is the case in traditional public procurements,
because ownership is granted by the party that has a higher stake in the projects (the private
sector) (Besley and Ghatak, 2001; Engel et al., 2010). However, different from privatization
programs, PPPs, with the appearance of government assets, allow greater government-backed
support, which can lend more credibility to PPP partnering private sector firms from their
creditors’ perspective.
Third, compared to public provision, where the public sector bears the majority of risks,
PPPs have a risk-sharing mechanism that usually ensures that project risk and life cycle cost
are transferred partially or wholly to the private sector. However, PPPs might be preferred to
fully privatized firms since government active intervention can help reduce demand risk.
Finally, in terms of project financing, PPP projects are developed on the basis of project
finance, where the cash flow generated from the projects is the primary source of debt and
dividend payments to sponsors (Yescombe, 2013). Therefore, according to Engel et al. (2010),
this allows resources not to be diverted from creditors compared to the case of a division in full
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privatized firms. To ensure this economically self-contained mechanism, PPPs are implemented
via the so-called Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) (Engel et al., 2010).
The structure of PPP projects and their relationships is presented in Figure 2.1. As illus-
trated in Figure 2.1, an SPV is set up, owned and operated by the initial sponsors (partnering
private firms), and the web of financiers, the government and customers. The private sponsors
provide long-term equity capital. The government issues contract agreements and decides on
revenue sharing or guarantees and other subsidies. Sometimes, the government also provide an
injection of capital to continue maintaining its interest. Under this circumstance, an SPV is
framed as a joint venture between the private firms and the government. Financiers provide
debt to the project company. The project company repays creditors directly or indirectly via
an escrow agent as a third party.
2.3 Background on Public–Private Partnerships
PPPs have a long history of development. PPPs originated early in France in the 17th century
via French concession models and continued in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United
States (US) in the 18th century via about 2500 private turnpikes (Grimsey and Lewis, 2007).
The mid-1990s experienced a surge in PPPs in Europe with two-thirds of projects coming from
the UK. Following this trend, some economies, such as those of the US, Australia and Canada,
have also emerged as the top PPP drivers in their areas (Kappeler and Nemoz, 2010; Grimsey
and Lewis, 2007). Recently, the PPP markets have been reporting more than 30% increases
in PPP deal flow in Australia and Canada in financial years between 2011 and 2014 compared
with those between 2006 and 2010 (KPMG, 2015). The North Americans have emerged as
one of the most attractive PPP markets with the US being projected as the next major global
PPP player. The US has high potential investments, with about US$4.59 trillion for total
infrastructure needs by 2025 in which a funding gap accounting for about US$2.064 trillion
is expected to be delivered by private financing (American Society of Civil Engineers, 2016).
It also receives strong political commitment through the new administration’s policy agenda
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Figure 2.1: Contractual Relationships in an SPV
Source: UNESCAP (2011)
confirming that infrastructure upgrades will depend principally on PPPs supported by the use
of federal tax credits (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016). On the contrary, European countries,
like the UK, Portugal and Germany, have witnessed a decline in PPP deal flow after several
decades of being the top PPP players. They are now being questioned about their effectiveness
by anti-private finance parties (KPMG, 2015). As the opportunities for PPPs in such mature
PPP markets decrease, seasonal investors may change their focus to developing economies with
their desire to achieve higher return despite the countries’ corresponding high risks.
In developing countries, as indicated in Figure 2.2, PPPs started later than those in devel-
oped economies, commencing from the 1990s and reaching a peak in both numbers of projects
and total investment in 1997 (World Bank Group, 2016b). After a considerable reduction in the
following five-year period, PPP investment value gradually increased before reaching an all-time
high in 2012. It should be noted that, at that time, the total value of projects were estimated
at approximately US$217.5 billion, accounting for an amount that was more than 17 times
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Figure 2.2: Public–Private Partnerships in Developing Countries
This figure summarizes PPP data on total projects, total investment and sectors in developing economies. It is sourced from the World Bank’s
Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) data visualization dashboard updated in 2016.
Source: World Bank Group (2016b)
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higher than those in 1990. After that, there was a plunge in total investment with a decline of
almost 40% in 2015 compared to 2012 (World Bank Group, 2016b). Regarding sector alloca-
tion, World Bank Group (2016b) reports that while Electricity was the sector with the largest
number of PPP projects, Information and Communication Technology was the sector with the
highest total investment between 1990 and 2015. This is completely different from those PPPs
started in 1990 when most PPP projects came from the transport industry. Additionally, per
type of PPPs, greenfield projects continued to comprise almost 60% of the total project value
(Public–Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, 2016). This reflects the low starting base of
infrastructure in developing countries in which PPPs create new infrastructure under greenfield
projects rather than rehabilitate existing infrastructure under concessions.
In developing economies, there is an enormous need for infrastructure investment in order
to address economic development and poverty reduction. For example, the Asian Development
Bank (2017) estimates that its 45 developing member countries need approximately US $ 26.2
trillion for 15 years from 2016 to 2030 (or US $ 1.7 trillion annually) to finance the infrastructure
needed for these countries to keep up with their economic growth momentum. Given that
the investment demand far exceeds limited public financing, private financing through PPPs
has emerged as a strong presence to fulfil the infrastructure gap. The Asian Development
Bank (2017) reports that the infrastructure gap is estimated to be equivalent to about 5%
of its projected GDP. The fiscal budget is expected to generate 40% of this gap, leaving the
remaining 60% for the private sector. More importantly, given the failures of traditional public
procurement and privatization programs, in terms of delays, cost overrun and poor government
management (Grimsey and Lewis, 2007), PPPs are more and more demanding. However,
compared to those in developed economies, the PPP market maturity in developing economies
is in the initial stage of building the market place, establishing legal frameworks, PPP policies
and administration. Therefore, this weak institutional environment leads the private sector
to suffer from high upfront investment and transaction costs (UNESCAP, 2011), and to deal
with more political risks in terms of corruption and expropriation (Sader, 2000). As a result,
despite their increase in demand, PPPs are not attractive enough for private investments in
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spite of governments’ encouragement. This situation has been even more severe after financial
crises because a high proportion of foreign investors has reduced their investment in developing
markets (Farquharson et al., 2011). This, again, hinders the private sector’s commitment and
poses more challenges for the development of PPPs in developing economies.
2.4 Public–Private Partnerships in China and India
PPPs in developing countries are mainly concentrated in the BRIC (i.e. Brazil, Russia, India,
and China) emerging markets, accounting for about 48% of the total number of projects and
approximately 45% of total investments (World Bank Group, 2016b). As indicated in Figure
2.3, China and India have the highest number of projects, 18% and 12%, respectively, compared
with 11% for Brazil and 6% for Russia. Also, PPP investments in China and India account for
about 21% of the total value of PPP projects in developing countries between 1990 and 2016
(World Bank Group, 2016b).
The emergence of PPPs is aimed to fill the huge infrastructure gap attributed to urbanization
and industrialization. Based on GDP in 2015, China and India are the two largest emerging
economies in the world, together accounting for approximately 18% of total global GDP (World
Bank Group, 2015). They are also the two biggest countries by population, constituting about
37% of the total world population (United Nation, 2015). To adapt with their economic growth
and population, urbanization, industrialization and infrastructure is essential. Projections from
China and India’s 12th Five-Year Plan indicate that US$1.03 trillion and US$1.025 trillion
should be invested to bridge the infrastructure gaps in the respective countries (Hongyan,
2010; India’s Planning Commission, 2012).
PPPs developed as a consequence of economic reforms in China and India. They were first
undertaken in the late 1980s and the early 1990s in China and India, respectively, as part of
the liberalization initiative when their markets for public facilities and services were opened. In
China, a dramatic development has occurred since 1988 when state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
were contracted out and privatization programs expanded massively (Urio, 2010). Likewise, in
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India, PPPs became popular after the Indian government announced a new industrial policy
to develop infrastructure sectors and open up the economy in 1991, which brought a greater
focus than before to the private sector contribution (Lakshmanan, 2008).
There are three primary rationales for the openness of the market for public facilities and the
development of PPPs. The first one is insufficient funding for public facilities and services. For
example, in China, spending on public facilities only accounts for a small amount of the GDP
(3.82% in 2003) with almost 80% of funding coming from the government, and the Chinese
public budget cannot afford to satisfy the increasing demand for urban infrastructure, given
the unprecedented rate of urbanization, with 20 million rural people coming into the cities
annually (Urio, 2010). Whereas in India, the state borrowings, that are capped by the Fiscal
Responsibility and Budgetary Management Act (along with the budget deficit, about 10% of the
GDP) hinders the government funding for infrastructure. Consequently, the government needs
to encourage the private sector’s contribution and PPPs to come in as a channel to raise funds
for infrastructure. Secondly, while the majority of public facilities are provided by state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), their poor provision raises the questions of how efficient the conventional
public procurement is. For example, in China in 2003, 80% of public transport firms operated at
loss. This situation opens room for the private sector participation to promote competition and
effectiveness of the public goods market. Finally, since governments have changed their priority
investment to soft infrastructure, such as schools, hospitals and security services, they really
need the private sector to be more responsible for their hard infrastructure (e.g. transport,
energy, water and sewerage). For example in India, it is estimated that about 30% of the
country’s hard infrastructure investments were financed by the private sector (Lakshmanan,
2008).
However, despite the urgent need for, and an increase in government support for private
participation in infrastructure in China and India, the enormous infrastructure gap still exists,
and it is questionable whether the private sector has enough appetite for engaging in PPPs.
According to Wilkins et al. (2014), only about 15% of the funding for infrastructure in China
came from private investors in 2012. Likewise, in India, under the 11th Five-Year Plan (2007-
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2011), private financing accounted for about 40% of total investment (High Level Committee
on Financing Infrastructure, 2012). This is because of regulatory challenges, political risks and
the failures of previous PPP projects (Urio, 2010). In China, the group of three risks (i.e.
corruption, government credibility and government intervention) are the primary obstacles for
Chinese firms participating in PPPs (Ke et al., 2013; Urio, 2010). For example, shareholders of
the Beijing Subway Line 4 project claim that their investment in this PPP project is running
at a loss, since the government has intervened and decided on all of the important criteria, such
as pricing, line extension and investment in their attempt to lower subway fares (Zhang et al.,
2015). Also, among developing economies, the number of canceled projects in China is second
to those in Argentina (World Bank Group, 2012b). Meanwhile, in India, PPP projects have
had to face numerous challenges in terms of an incomplete regulatory framework, a dispute over
risk sharing between the government and the private sector, and cost and time overruns. The
absence of detailed PPP legislation and specialized agencies, especially in the local governments
in India, allow government officials to implement PPPs at their own discretion. Subsequently,
PPP Indian firms have to face high transaction costs in the negotiation and execution of PPP
projects since they need approvals from several local bodies to move their projects forward
(Mahalingam, 2009). The risk-sharing mechanism is also inequitable since greater risks are
imposed on the private sector. For example, in the group of PPP land development projects
in India, the government renegotiated the initial contracts signed with the private sector, re-
fused to change zoning patterns on the land and left all related risks to their private partners
(Mahalingam, 2009). This in turn made the private sector reluctant to become involve in the
projects. In India, 231 in 491 projects were delayed in 2008, with cost overrun accounting for
51.8% and 13.9% of total costs in 2004 and 2008, respectively. India’s power sector experienced
technical and commercial losses of 40% in 2008 (Lakshmanan, 2008).
Owing to the paucity of private sector participation in infrastructure projects, it is necessary
to explore what motivates these firms to participate in PPPs. Private sector firms engage in
PPPs when they find sufficient incentives, and mainly when such projects can offset their
financial constraints associated with high risk projects like PPPs.
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Figure 2.3: Number of Projects and Total Investments in Public–Private Partnerships
Source: World Bank Group (2016b)
2.5 Economics of Public–Private Partnerships
The increasingly common use of PPPs to replace public conventional procurements is explained
in the literature. The main aim of this literature is to prove that under certain conditions,
PPPs, with their unique characteristics, can bring more efficiencies than public procurements.
My research follows Engel et al. (2010) and Dewatripont and Legros (2005) by reviewing the
literature on the outstanding features of PPPs in terms of economic benefits, namely contract
design, ownership, risk transfer and financing.
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2.5.1 Contract Design
PPPs are implemented by the bundling contracts, mentioned above, in which partnering private
sector firms conduct the construction and operation of these projects. There are two strands
of literature to illustrate the inherited benefits of PPPs from this hybrid contract mechanism.
The former draws from the theory of asymmetric information, and the latter originates from
the theory of contract incompleteness (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005).
The theory of information asymmetries indicates one type of asymmetric information,
namely hidden action, which may directly relate to the bundling of contracts in PPPs (De-
watripont and Legros, 2005). In a conventional project with a separated constructor and
operator, a builder may apply some methods to reduce the construction cost but at the ex-
pense of operators. In the context of PPPs, only one agent, a PPP partnering private firm, is
responsible for both construction and operation. Therefore, the probability of hidden action
happening is lessened since the private sector, here playing as the operator, also incurs a loss as
a consequence of its action in the construction stage. In the bundling PPP contracts, the pri-
vate sector may have more incentives to invest in the reduction of operating costs than that in
traditional projects. Moreover, the private sector might know early on during its construction
stage whether its investment in technology and innovation is useful for reducing operation costs
or not. However, the problem it must face is that the investment cost in some cases may offset
the private sector’s benefits from innovation, which can lead to inefficiencies (Dewatripont and
Legros, 2005). Therefore, if the investment cost is small relative to the achieved benefits of
lowering the operation cost, the bundle of PPP contracts may help partnering firms resolve
information asymmetries in their operation phase. In contrast, if overrunning investment costs
outweigh the benefits of operating cost savings, the traditional public procurement is preferable
over PPPs.
The theory of contract incompleteness is discussed by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart
(2003) and Bennett and Iossa (2004). In the context of a complete contract, everything is set
via detailed initial contractual agreements, and imperfection may arise from information asym-
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metries By contrast, in an incomplete contract, unexpected market conditions can cause some
contractual terms that have not been determined in advance, and consequently, renegotiation
may happen later. In this case, Grossman and Hart (1986) explore the influence of bundling on
the motivation for investing in cost savings or quality improvements. While the private sector
only focuses on cost cutting, the public sector is also concerned about how these investments
can increase social welfare. In PPPs, the bundling mechanism may induce the builder to be
involved in two types of non-contractible investment: One is to cut costs in the operating stage
at the expense of service quality, and the other is to lower operating costs along with improving
the quality of services (Hart, 2003). Hart (2003) gives an example of building a bridge. On
the one hand, if builders invest in a new technology that reduces the pressure on the beams,
they will lower their maintenance frequency, which in turn reduces traffic congestion and cor-
responds to social desire. On the other hand, if builders choose to invest in fewer traffic lanes,
this strategy can decrease the cost of maintaining the bridge but at the expense of increasing
traffic jams.
Therefore, in order to answer the question about which contract design is better (PPPs
or conventional public procurements), Hart (2003) indicates two alternative choices. If an
investment in cost cutting and quality improvement can be verified in advance, the traditional
public procurements, in which the government choose different builders and operators, dominate
PPPs. This is because the investment and efficient level can be set ex ante when contracting
with builders. By contrast, if investment in cost savings with corresponding quality erosion can
be verified, PPPs are more pronounced than traditional procurements in terms of contributing
to social welfare, since the consortium in PPPs has more motive than builders in conventional
projects to invest in quality improvements than do builders when it comes to conventional
projects (Hart, 2003). Similarly, Bennett and Iossa (2004) explore whether innovation at the
construction phase increases operating costs. PPP-partnering firms have less incentives to
innovate than the builders in conventional projects, since innovation may incur cost overrun.
By contrast, if innovation leads to lessening operating costs, PPPs are more profound than
conventional projects, since partnering firms can not only afford to internalize innovation into
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life-cycle cost but can also induce social gains.
Overall, the choice of contract design depends on the relationship among innovation, cost
savings and quality improvements and how they are verified in the ex ante contract agreements.
2.5.2 Ownership and Risk Transfer
According to Grimsey and Lewis (2007), along with the commercialization of infrastructure,
there are three ways to provide infrastructure projects , and these are associated with three
types of ownership. The most basic way is through a conventional public procurement in
which the public sector keeps its ownership of infrastructure and operates more closely to the
manner of the private sector in terms of market demand, revenue and cost. The second way is
through a PPP in which the level of the private sector’s involvement in infrastructure projects is
higher because of the PPP’s bundling responsibility, construction and operation and temporal
ownerships. The third way is through a privatization program in which the infrastructure
project is fully privatized with permanent private ownerships.
From the public sector’s perspective, the ownership transfer from the public sector to the
private sector can alleviate some of the failures of public procurements and achieve greater
efficiency in providing infrastructure services (Grimsey and Lewis, 2007). Private ownership
motivates the private sector to resolve agency conflicts between owners and operators of an
infrastructure as seen previously in conventional public procurements. Moreover, according to
Besley and Ghatak (2001), investment incentives are greater if the ownership is granted by
the private sector (who cares more about investment) rather than the public sector (who owns
investment technology). Besley and Ghatak (2001) also indicate that the private sector places
a higher value in human capital since it specializes in developing and managing projects; hence,
when the private sector obtains the ownership, this helps to maximize social surplus (Besley
and Ghatak, 2001).
By contrast, opponents claim that, in some cases, a permanent private ownership in in-
frastructure is not a political preference. Infrastructure is considered as an industry where a
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natural monopoly usually exists. Hence, if infrastructure is permanently owned by the private
sector, the lack of competition in this industry encourages the private sector to act on behalf
of its own benefits but at the expense of society. For example, the private sector can gradually
increase motorway tolls for increasing its revenue, but it also imposes more financial liabilities
for drivers, especially those who are frequently driving. As a result, the drivers may return to
the roads on which they originally travelled, even if travelling time takes more time and effort,
especially in the case of traffic congestion. Overall, some privatized infrastructure projects
have received numerous social objections since they are not aligned with social objectives. This
failure of privatization programs and permanent private ownership provokes the emergence of
temporary private ownership and the partial risk transfer in the PPP model. This is because
in this mechanism, governments are able to take more effort to control infrastructure projects
and channel them in the right direction in which there are mutual benefits between private
partners and social welfare.
Regarding risk-sharing mechanisms, Ke et al. (2010) summarize and categorize risk factors
into seven groups, consisting of political, construction, operation, legal, market, economic and
other risks. However, in relation to PPPs, the literature is still inconclusive about the kinds of
risk that should be allocated to the private sector. Cooper (2005) provides a primary principal
that risk should be allocated to the party who manages it better at a low cost, but it may
vary among economies. Bing et al. (2005), who conducted a survey of risk-preferred allocation
in PPP projects in the United Kingdom (UK), indicate that the project risks, including the
project financial risk, the design risk and the construction and operation risk should be allocated
to the private sector, while the political risk, land acquisition and permits should be referred
to the public sector. Roumboutsos and Anagnostopoulos (2008) conducted the same survey
in Greece and they offer similar findings to Bing et al. (2005) in terms of political risk or
project risk. Where Roumboutsos and Anagnostopoulos (2008) differ is in their discussion of
demand risk. They suggest that in Greece, it is better for this risk to be solely allocated to the
public sector. By contrast, Bing et al. (2005) state that in the UK, the demand risk should
be shared between the private and public sector. Likewise, according to Ke et al. (2010), the
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Chinese economies share some significant features with those countries above. For example,
risks related to governments and their actions should be allocated mainly to the public sector
while project-level risks should, for the most part, remain with the private sector. However, the
most distinctive risk allocation in China is that no risk is solely allocated to the private sector,
which reflects the government-controlled economy in China. At a general level, Dewatripont
and Legros (2005) develop a model to prove that an optimal risk-sharing mechanism needs to be
balanced between the marginal benefit and its corresponding marginal cost when transferring
risks from the public to the private sector. Accordingly, given the exogenous randomness in
performance of the private sector, its degree of risk aversion and its cost of effort will determine
how much risk should be borne by the private sector.
2.5.3 Financing
The literature on the financing side of PPPs emphasizes a common feature of financial sources
for PPPs: project finance. Yescombe (2011) illustrates some of the main characteristics of this
specialized form of finance, including the following: (i) project finance is based on project-
generated cash flow to repay lenders; (ii) lenders consider project contracts themselves as guar-
antees of the private sector’s repayment rather than its physical assets; (iii) project finance is
used to achieve higher leverage as a mean of reducing the cost of capital, and in turn, project-
level costs; (iv) projects must be legally and economically self-contained and be operated as an
SPV; and (v) projects have a finite life so they need to be fully repaid.
Engel et al. (2010) add more detail about the life cycle of project finance by stating that
financing sources change from bank loans and equity during the construction stage to bonds
during the operation stage. The rationale for this change comes from incentive problems and
the level of risk. In the construction stage, PPPs are subject to substantial risks in terms of
design changes and cost overrun as a consequence of moral hazard arising between sponsors and
contractors. In this circumstance, bank loans are appropriate since banks can provide strict
control over such changes in projects as well as the conflict between sponsors and contracts
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(Engel et al., 2010). After the construction stage, the major risk is eliminated and now mainly
depends on the certainty of future cash flow. Therefore, financing sources are now transferred
to bondholders, who care more about the security of cash flow than the management of PPP
projects.
While Engel et al. (2010) focus on the changes of financing sources throughout different
stages of PPP projects by stating which kinds of financial sources are more appropriate for
each corresponding stage, Dewatripont and Legros (2005) try to understand the relationship
between external financing and the private sector’s incentives. They investigate whether debt
or outside equity, which may be suitable for the construction stage as proved by Engel et al.
(2010), is able to encourage the private sector to exert socially optimal efforts. According to
Dewatripont and Legros (2005), PPPs differ from traditional public procurement is that their
bundle of construction and operation is employed by private sector firms. This bundle enables
these firms to exert efforts at the building stage and internalize their effects on the operation
stage for improving consumers’ willingness to pay. However, when private sector firms are
involved in external financing, this may lower the firms’ incentives to exert effort, since benefits
arising from these efforts have to be shared with external investors. However, among external
sources, debt is better than outside equity in terms of providing more incentives to the private
sector (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005). This is because while outside equity investors take
a constant portion of the return, regardless of whether its results are good or bad, creditors
take only a minimum fraction of the return that corresponds with a bad state of the results,
leaving the private sector in a good state with maximum benefits from its exertion of effort.
Overall, by choosing debt instead of outside equity, the private sector maximizes its gains. This
is a consequence of the private sector’s efforts at the building stage that enhance customers’
willingness to pay at the operation stage, which in turn maximizes social benefits.
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2.6 Effects of Public–Private Partnerships
The following section reviews the effects of PPPs on the two parties that comprise these part-
nerships, the public sector and the private sector.
2.6.1 Effects of Public–Private Partnerships on the Public Sector
The previous literature on PPPs mainly focuses on the effects of these partnerships on the
public sector. Taking a positive view, previous studies show that the cooperation between
governments and the private sector through PPPs can help governments resolve their problem of
insufficient budget financing for large and highly risky infrastructure projects (e.g. UNESCAP,
2011; Maskin and Tirole, 2008; Davies and Eustice, 2005). The private sector can use its own
equity or go through project finance, a special funding mechanism, to access external financing
from creditors, outside equity owners or bondholders (Engel et al., 2010). In these cases, the
private sector uses PPP projects themselves as plegeable assets and the cash flow generated from
these projects as a main source of capital repayment. As a result, compared to the traditional
public procurement that governments use their budget to finance, PPPs help to relieve public
budget deficit and ensure the viability of infrastructure projects. More importantly, by awarding
the private sector with a right to bundle construction and operation as well as temporary
ownership, the public sector, via PPPs, can exploit the private sector’s specialization in design
and professional project management to build up or rehabilitate government assets in a more
innovative manner than those in conventional procurement.
By contrast, PPPs can also have negative impacts on the public sector since the private
sector in prioritizing profit motive, can act in underhand way at the expense of social welfare
(Dheret et al., 2012; Engel et al., 2008; Bennett and Iossa, 2004; Hart, 2003). For instance,
the private sector can take advantage of bundling contracts by using a design in their attempt
to cut costs; however, this may align with quality erosion as well. Another example is that
the private sector, due to the incompleteness of its initial contract terms in infrastructure,
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its high potential risk and its work-in-progress, can make a renegotiation at the later stage,
as evidenced in increasing motorway tolls or energy prices. Consequently, that imposes more
financial pressure on final users or on social welfare as a whole.
In addition to the contrasting views on the effects of PPPs on the public sector, most of the
previous studies tend to compare PPPs with traditional public procurements and decide, ac-
cording to circumstance, which kinds of projects can maximize the social surplus. For example,
in the feasibility studies on PPP projects, the value-for-money criteria is chosen to analyze PPP
projects’ effectiveness and efficiency (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011; Tang et al., 2010). This
method is conducted by comparing a proposed PPP project with a public-sector comparator:
that is, a project implemented through a conventional public procurement. In this case, both
PPPs and conventional public projects use the same single prescribed rate as a discount rate:
that is, the government’s risk-adjusted indicator is used to measure the net present value of
the projects (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011). Consequently, the results are obtained from the
perspective of the government rather than that of the private sector, and these results attempt
to explain the government’s gains and losses from investing in PPPs.
2.6.2 Effects of Public–Private Partnerships on Partnering Private
Firms
Along with the dominance of previous literature on the public sector, there are a few studies
on how PPPs influence partnering private firms; however, these studies are still inconclusive
about the private sector’s advantages and disadvantages. In terms of financing, UNESCAP
(2011) states that PPPs, through the project finance mechanism, can help private sector firms
decrease financial risk, increase external financing and achieve more screening projects. This is
because the characteristics of project finance allow high leveraged projects with corresponding
high risk for lenders who may receive no guarantees beyond the cash flow generated from the
projects. Therefore, lenders have to assess private borrowers carefully based on the borrowers’
previous industry experience, their credit ratings and the viability of their projects. After the
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financing agreements have been signed, lenders also need to apply strict controls in terms of
a disbursement process as well as monitoring private borrowers’ operation to ensure that the
lenders’ projects generate sufficient cash flow. Consequently, the private borrowers, in turn,
can improve their financial performance in order to align with their lenders’ requirements. By
contrast, Engel et al. (2010) claim that the private sector has to keep a high proportion of
equity until the end of its PPP projects. This triggers a high cost of capital and triggers the
private sector’s failure to catch up with new investment opportunities.
Regarding contract design and ownership, Besley and Ghatak (2001) develop a model to
justify the actions of the private sector, the more caring party, granting an ownership in a PPP
project increase both participating parties’ investment incentives and their joint surplus. This is
because the private sector, which owns human capital, can internalize cost through the bundle of
construction and operation. This means that the prior investment in the building stage, together
with the private sector’s specialized management skills, can help lower its operation cost at the
operation stage later (Engel et al., 2010; Maskin and Tirole, 2008). On the contrary, based on
the theory of incomplete contracts, opponents of PPPs claim that bundling cannot develop its
potential advantages in the context of high risk, information asymmetries or innovation. This
is because in these cases, the incentives at the design and construction stage, which incorporate
the life-cycle cost, cannot ensure that firms will be totally protected from productivity shock
(Iossa and Martimort, 2012). As a result of an innovation in the design stage, these incentives
of cutting the life-cycle costs occur at the operation stage. However, these incentives are further
reduced through consequent renegotiations between the public and the private sector. This is
due to the fact that the public sector, after uncovering information asymmetries, may realize
that the high investment in the innovation in the design stage cannot be covered by revenue
generated from projects in the operation stage. This is because an increase in demand risk
leads to unexpected or fluctuated revenue. Or in other cases, the public sector may believe
that by pursuing its incentives in the innovative design, the private sector may fulfil only its
own aim of cost cutting. This differs from the public sector’s desire, which is to fulfil quality
improvement. Overall, the influence of PPPs on the private sector has been highly debatable,
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and this debate is mainly explained by the theory of incomplete contracts, which questions how
other traditional theories on firms can contribute and clarify this extant debate.
2.7 Effects of Government Reliance and Institutional Qual-
ity on Partnering Private Firms
The previous studies have been inconclusive on the influence of government involvement in
PPP-partnering private firms. Advocates of PPP models claim that the private sector achieves
numerous benefits when securing government support. The private sector can achieve the finan-
cial viability of its projects through some kinds of public investment, costless pledgeable gov-
ernment assets, government-guaranteed loans and government-subordinated loans (UNESCAP,
2011; Engel et al., 2010). Consequently, the private sector can eliminate financial risk, reduce
default risk and debt burden and increase its credit ratings to attract more debt and equity
capital. Moreover, regarding risk-sharing and risk-guarantee mechanisms, through government
subsidies in the low-demand state or through governments’ availability-based payment for a
concessionaire in the high-demand state (Engel et al., 2010), the private sector can transfer
partially or totally demand risk to the government. This enhances the commercial viability
of PPP projects. Additionally, there are further benefits worth mentioning, like government
support for land acquisition, tax exemption and exchange rate risk-sharing (UNESCAP, 2011).
In contrast, opponents criticize it due to unexpected changes in policy frameworks, corruption,
governments’ intervention, complex approval systems and, especially, risk misallocation (Ke
et al., 2013). This prevents the private sector from willingly investing in PPP projects because
it knows it will have to face considerable delays and high transaction costs.
In addition to the government intervening in a direct manner, as noted above, the gov-
ernment can also indirectly influence partnering private sector firms through various types of
contract mechanisms. For instance, the government can choose whether private sector firms
award PPP projects according to one of the following bidding processes. One process is where
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the firm is given more freedom to compete among private bidders; another process is where
the government is given more freedom to interfere in PPP projects because the firm negotiates
directly with the government. Yet another process is where the government can choose for a
PPP infrastructure project to be run under a greenfield project (in which the private sector
can build, operate and transfer a new infrastructure) or under a concession project (in which
the private sector rehabilitate governments’ assets). The concession project is assumed to be
more highly reliant on the government than the greenfield project.
The literature on PPP-contract mechanisms focuses on four main components: (i) the types
of contract in relation to ownership and bundling; (ii) contract payments and risk allocation;
(iii) contract awarding methods; and (iv) the level of political connection.
Regarding the types of contract, from an incomplete contract perspective, theoretical stud-
ies indicate that a choice of contracts depends on the trade-off between efficiency enhancing
(improving quality) and cost-cutting efforts (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005; Bennett and Iossa,
2004; Hart, 2003; Grossman and Hart, 1986). As these authors illustrate, if the quality of
services is specified, PPPs dominate the conventional procurement in terms of maximizing the
social surplus and vice versa. This accounts for the fact that the private sector is motivated
by cost cutting, but this strategy can be used at the expense of service quality. When it comes
to contract payments and risk allocation, previous studies focus on how an optimal contract
design can be created to maximize social welfare (Engel et al., 2013; Athias and Soubeyran,
2012, e.g.). Athias and Soubeyran (2012) believe that the allocation of demand risk relies on
choosing between the importance of public adaptation or the benefits of cost-reducing efforts.
They indicate that if public adaptation is a crucial consideration, demand risk should be borne
by the private sector and vice versa. The rationale for this finding is that when the private
sector bears demand risk, the public authority can afford to uphold it and there is an incentive
to invest in adaption (Athias and Soubeyran, 2012). Engel et al. (2013) continue the idea of
risk allocation and project payment by designing the optimal contract in high, medium and
low demand states. While in the high demand state, the private sector bears demand risk
and collects user fees, the low demand state allows demand risk-sharing through government
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subsidies. Concerning contract awarding methods, previous studies focus on exploring deter-
minants that drive a choice between negotiations and competitive bidding. These factors are
political scrutiny, levels of competitiveness and contractual characteristics such as the type,
size and level of complexity (Chong et al., 2012; Bajari et al., 2008). Regarding the level of
political connection, the previous literature supports the political corruption view that the se-
curing of political ties can lead to social loss. For example, numerous previous studies show
that corruption, which emerges through the mechanism of relationships or political ties, neg-
atively influences infrastructure projects. This can be seen in terms of the increasing cost of
infrastructure projects that reduces quality and economic returns. (Yehoue et al., 2006; Ke
et al., 2013; Kenny, 2007).1
As indicated by many existing studies, an optimal contract design is chosen to maximize
social welfare (Engel et al., 2013; Athias and Soubeyran, 2012; Dewatripont and Legros, 2005;
Bennett and Iossa, 2004; Hart, 2003; Grossman and Hart, 1986). However, the highest total
surplus does not mean the highest private benefits. For example, according to Athias and
Soubeyran (2012), when the government wants to adapt or change the quality of services to
satisfy a rising demand, demand risk should be borne by the private sector. If this situation
happens, in spite of an increase in the social surplus, benefits of partnering private firms can
be reduced significantly because they have to bear more demand risk as well as face more
difficulties in cost-cutting. Therefore, from the perspective of the private sector, further studies
on the contract design need to take the private sector’s benefits into consideration - as an
independent component. Previous studies pay attention to factors driving the choice of contract
mechanisms (Bajari et al., 2008). A few studies, as in Lalive and Schmutzler (2011), test the
effects of contract mechanisms on firm performance. For example, the study of Lalive and
Schmutzler (2011) focuses only on the output of projects in terms of service price and quality.
These studies have not yet provided a systematic evaluation of partnering firms’ performance.
Also, empirical studies on PPPs usually focus on evaluating the effect of one given type of PPP,
in which a Build–Operate–Transfer (BOT) project is the most popular research objective (Ke
1It is estimated that about seven percent of project value in construction firms is used for bribing for winning
bids and changing contractual terms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Kenny, 2007).
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et al., 2009; Thomas et al., 2003; Zhang and Kumaraswamy, 2001; Tam, 1999).
Moreover, there have been some empirical articles to study the relationship between insti-
tutional quality and PPPs. The majority of these articles makes the best effort to identify
the critical success factors (CSFs) and risk allocation for PPPs (Bing et al., 2005; Chan et al.,
2010; Hwang et al., 2013; Zhang, 2005). Zhang (2005) conducts interviews with worldwide
PPP academics and practitioners to rank the CSFs. The result shows that under the CSFs,
a “favorable investment environment”, political stability, government support and a reason-
able framework achieve the three highest rankings. Meanwhile, Hwang et al. (2013) conduct a
questionnaire survey in Singapore that reveals “well-organized public agency” to be recognized
by practitioners as the most crucial CSF. In quantitative research, Hovakimian (2009) studies
the determinants of PPPs in developing countries between 1990 and 2003 based on the World
Bank’ Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database. Hovakimian (2009) finds that
high institutional quality, such as a stable macroeconomy that shows little sign of corruption
and an effective rule of laws, results in more PPP projects. Overall, the above literature fo-
cuses on discovering what kinds of institutional quality can help to attract more PPP projects
and ensure their success rate on the macro level. However, less attention is drawn to how
institutional quality can influence the benefits of partnering private sector firms on the micro
level.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter provides a basic knowledge of PPPs and their economic features including contract
design, ownership, risk transfer and financing. Moreover, this chapter review previous literature
on how PPPs influence two partnering parties, the public and the private sector, as well as
their associated-determinants related to governments and institutions. This literature review
documents some research gaps that exist in the previous studies:
Research gap 1. The dominance of previous research from a government perspective aims
to evaluate the effects of PPPs on the public sector, and there is inconclusive evidence on the
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advantages and disadvantages of partnering firms via PPPs. In particular, there is virtually
no research on how PPPs influence partnering private sector firms in the corporate finance
dimension.
Research gap 2. There is inconclusive evidence the opportunities offered to, and challenges
faced by, partnering private firms when they are directly or indirectly influenced by government
support. In this debate, the contract mechanism serves as an indicator of the varying degrees of
government support for the private sector. The literature on this mechanism focuses on factors
driving the choice of contract mechanisms; however, the impacts of these contract mechanisms
on firm value have received less exploration.
Research gap 3: The literature on the relationship between institutional quality and PPPs
focuses on exploring the kinds of institutional quality that helps attract more PPP investments
for an economy as a whole; however, there is a shortage of research on how institutional quality
has real impacts on partnering private sector firms on the micro level.
In order to fil these research gaps, I spends the following three crucial empirical chapters to
uncover the influence of PPPs on partnering private sector firms. I do this in relation to the costs
and benefits of private sector firms when engaging in PPPs and in relation to how the variation
in the reliance on governments and institutions enhances/hinders the benefits of PPPs. More
importantly, since the previous studies mainly use contract theory to argue for the impacts of
PPPs, my thesis focuses on a less explored perspective on PPPs by using corporate finance
theory to construct my hypotheses. Engaging in PPPs is one of the important investment
decisions in addition to other joint ventures, diversification, and research and development
(R&D). Accordingly, my thesis relies on the theory of investment efficiency and market valuation
in the corporate finance literature to argue for the benefits of PPPs for partnering private sector
firms. More importantly, since PPPs provide a unique setting with a clear social alignment
to encourage the mutual benefits between the private sector and social welfare, my thesis
contributes to the debate of government involvement and the theory of public choice by arguing
that high reliance on governments can benefits both the private sector and the public sector.
Furthermore, as PPPs establish a context in which political connections can be more active,
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my thesis contributes to the theory of “law–finance–growth” in explaining financing capacity
and financial benefits. The literature related to these theories is also reviewed in the following
three chapters.
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Chapter 3
Public–Private Partnerships, Investment
Efficiency and Firm Market Valuation
3.1 Introduction
In the last two decades, emerging economies have experienced tremendous growth due to their
growing populations, rapidly progressing urbanization, industrialization, and increasing inte-
gration into global supply chains. However, high growth has led to visible infrastructure gaps
that hinder this tremendous growth trajectory. Projections from China and India’s 12th Five-
Year Plan indicate that US$1.03 trillion and US$1.025 trillion, respectively, should be invested
to bridge the infrastructure gaps in these countries (Hongyan, 2010; India’s Planning Commis-
sion, 2012). Given the failure of privatization programs and the limited capacity of both the
private and the public sectors, Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) are gaining popularity in
these markets (Engel et al., 2008).
According to Wilkins et al. (2014), only about 15% of the funding for infrastructure in China
came from private investors in 2012. Likewise, in India, under the 11th Five-Year Plan (2007-
2011), private financing accounted for about 40% of total investment (High Level Committee
on Financing Infrastructure, 2012). Such low interest by private sector firms motivates us
to understand a less-explored rationale for private sector participation in PPP investments.
Moreover, the existing literature mainly focuses on the efficacy of PPPs from a government or
public welfare perspective (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011; Engel et al., 2010; Hart, 2003).
The question I seek to answer in this study is whether PPPs, which have seen a nine-fold
increase in emerging markets in the last decade, assist in reducing the capital constraints faced
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by private sector firms. Government involvement provides costless pledgeable assets1 for the
partnering private firm, hence enhancing its borrowing capacity and also reducing its cost of
raising capital. This benefits cash-starved private sector firms suffering from underinvestment
and helps reduce the persistent investment–cash flow sensitivity problem in emerging markets.
Hence, I hypothesized that PPPs benefit the private sector by reducing its underinvestment
problem.
It is important to note that high investment–cash flow sensitivity can also imply another
problem: overinvestment. Firms that aggressively invest can experience higher investment–cash
flow sensitivity. In emerging markets, it is quite probable that cash-rich private sector firms
with political connections can influence and secure PPP contracts (Khwaja and Mian, 2005).
However, PPPs might also be hypothesized to reduce the private sector’s overinvestment since
the PPP contract mechanism prohibits resource transfer during its operation phase. Therefore,
the PPP mechanism prevents the free cash flow generated from its projects from being diverted
to fulfil managers’ own ambitions, and thus it reduces agency problems (Engel et al., 2010).
From these alternative perspectives, whether the private sector benefits from PPPs, through
reduction in underinvestment or overinvestment, is an empirical question. By digging into
how private sector firms with different investment opportunities (as indicators of under or
overinvestment) react to PPP benefits, my study disentangles the attribution associated with
investment–cash flow sensitivity.
I used the sample of PPP contracts in two of the world’s largest emerging markets, namely
China and India, to address this issue. India, for instance, has made approximately US 400
billion dollars’ worth of PPP investments, almost half the market capitalization of the Indian
capital market. However, there is virtually no research on the aspect of corporate finance in
relation to these financial contracts. Understanding this aspect of PPP contracts allows me to
shed light on whether these unique contractual agreements can reduce the unmet demand for
capital in emerging markets.
1Costless pledgeable assets can be government assets that are taken over by partnering private sector firms to
manage, build, rehabilitate and operate, and these work as collateral for bank loans (World Bank Group, 2012b).
Costless pledgeable assets can be sourced from government equity participation, direct government support that
covers projects costs, and government loan guarantee to secure the borrowings of partnering private sector firms.
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PPP contracts are considered to be hybrid contracts as they share several features of both
public and privatized public sector firms. Similar to public sector firms, PPPs have government
backing in terms of legal and political risk, as the assets are owned by the government. Likewise,
similar to privatized public sector firms, they are managed by the private sector with virtually no
government intervention. Compared to traditional government contracting, where construction
and operation are executed as separate contracts, PPPs allow bundling of contracts. In terms of
risk sharing, PPPs can be considered as the middle path between conventional project finance
and privatization programs. Different from conventional project financing arrangements and
privatization programs, in the case of PPPs, the risk is shared between the public and private
sectors rather than one party bearing the entire risk.
To my knowledge, this study is one of the first comprehensive studies on PPPs as it uses
data from the two largest emerging markets in the world. My study contributes towards a
better understanding of one of the major and one of the fastest growing infrastructure financing
contracts in the world. My evidence provides insights into the possible benefits of these unique
contractual agreements. It also attempts to examine whether the intended purpose of reducing
underinvestment in the private sector can really be fulfilled through PPP contracts.
Using the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Project Database of the World Bank
and the corporate announcements section of the stock exchanges’ websites, I identified 138 and
124 PPP project announcements, spanning 25 years (1988-2013), belonging to firms listed in
China and India, respectively. Then, I matched control group firms with PPP firms in terms of
firm size, industry, and other firm-level variables from the DataStream database. This helped
me isolate relative value addition through PPP contracts compared to those of competing non-
PPP projects undertaken by other firms in the same product market. Using these details, I
sought answers to the following main questions.
1. Do PPPs benefits partnering private sector firms?
1a. Do PPP announcements add value to participating private sector firms?
1b. Do PPP investments reduce the investment–cash flow sensitivity of partnering private
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sector firms in the post-PPP investment period?
2. Does higher reliance on the government benefit partnering private sector
firms?
2a. Does higher government equity participation reduce capital constraints for partnering
private sector firms?
2b. Do political connections reduce capital constraints for partnering private sector firms?
2c. Do the variations in the contract mechanism explain the cross-sectional variation related
to the benefits of PPP contracts?
I report the following main findings:
1. Investors consider PPP announcements by partnering private firms as good news, leading
to increased firm value, with positive cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of 1.87% and 2.11%
in China and India, respectively.
2. The type of firm that opts for PPPs varies between China and India. In the case
of China, firms with lower investment–cash flow sensitivity than their matched firms pursue
PPPs, whereas in India, firms with higher investment–cash flow sensitivity or cash-constrained
firms pursue PPPs. I also find that capital-constrained firms in India opting for PPPs have
relatively higher growth opportunities than competing private sector firms not participating in
PPPs (hereafter, referred to as non-PPP private sector firms or non-PPP counterparts). This
implies that underinvestment is considered as a major factor for PPP investments by the private
sector in India. In the post-PPP investment period, PPP investment reduces investment–cash
flow sensitivity in both the Chinese and the Indian firms.
3. High government equity and political connections are beneficial for partnering private
sector firms in China. On the contrary, the Indian private sector firms benefit more from low
reliance on the government.
4. Political uncertainty, measured by whether the year is an election year and corresponding
changes in the government, increase investment–cash flow sensitivity risk for PPP projects
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awarded during such years in both China and India.
5. Contract mechanisms that require more government reliance benefit mainly the Chinese
PPP private sector firms.
Overall, my results highlight the fact that PPP investments benefit the private sector;
however, the nature of the firm and the institutional environment play a significant role in
explaining these benefits. My results provide important guidance on the direction and viability
of PPPs in China and India. My evidence can help initiate a policy debate on the infrastructure
gap in these emerging markets.
The rest of this chapter is organized into four sections. I develop my hypotheses in Section
3.2. Section 3.3 provides the descriptions of the data and my empirical methodology. The
empirical results are presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
I investigate whether PPPs and their mediating factors add value to partnering private firms.
From the corporate finance perspective, firm value is affected by its performance and its val-
uation by investors (Kleinschmidt, 2007). In my research, firm value is evaluated by invest-
ment efficiency and market valuation. The choice of investment efficiency is based on the idea
that PPPs are considered as important strategic investment decisions alongside joint ventures,
mergers and acquisitions, research and development projects, and diversification. Therefore,
examining investment efficiency through investment–cash flow sensitivity indicates how effec-
tively this strategic investment works in private sector firms when the firms have a range of
available investment choices but only have limited resources. The study also considers the
firms’ abnormal returns when they announce PPP projects in order to analyse how the stock
market responds on PPP investments.
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3.2.1 Investment Decisions and Market Valuation
Three established hypotheses can explain change in firm valuation due to new investment
decisions. The Shareholder Value Maximization Hypothesis (SVMH), which is based on the
traditional valuation theory, supports firms’ positive returns after announcements of strategic
decisions, attributing the same to a possible increase in raising future cash flow (Woolridge and
Snow, 1990). On the contrary, the Institutional Investors Hypothesis supports possible negative
returns on long-term investment announcements, attributing the same to the short-term focus
of institutional investors who mainly prioritize quarterly earnings (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985).
Meanwhile, the Rational Expectations Hypothesis predicts an insignificant stock return after
an announcement of a strategic investment. This is attributed to the temporary and unsta-
ble competitive advantages of corporate expenditure coupled with initial positive unexpected
cash flow (Woolridge and Snow, 1990). In summary, the predicted relationship between an
investment decision and investors’ reaction is inconclusive.
Participating in PPPs is considered as a strategic investment decision for firms; thus, it
may influence stock market returns and the market value of partnering private sector firms.
Compared to other investment projects, PPPs come with the benefits of government support
and associated risk-sharing mechanisms, the operational freedom of partnering private firms
through the bundling of contracts, and transparency during the duration of project finance
(Besley and Ghatak, 2001; Engel et al., 2010; Hart, 2003). Besley and Ghatak (2001) develop
a theoretical model to assert that investment incentives will be better if ownership is granted
to the private sector (which cares more about investments) rather than the government (which
cares more about investment technology). Accordingly, through PPPs, the private sector,
with human capital and temporary ownership, can internalize cost through bundling, so prior
investments in the design stage and private management skills can help lower operation cost
(Engel et al., 2010; Maskin and Tirole, 2008). Therefore, PPP announcements are considered
as good news and are expected to add value to partnering private firms. This is consistent with
the SVMH. Moreover, the infrastructure sector sometimes provides firms with long-running
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competitive advantages due to barriers against entering the market, namely, natural monopoly
or government restrictions (Gomez, 2003). This discussion leads me to frame my hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 Stock markets will react positively to partnering private firms’ announcements
of PPP projects.
3.2.2 Investment Decisions and Investment Efficiency
The literature on corporate investment and investment efficiency is based on the idea of im-
perfect capital markets. Accordingly, firm investments are determined not only by investment
opportunities but also by the firms’ ability to finance these possibilities (Pindado et al., 2011).
Fazzari et al. (1988) indicate that when firms suffer from financial constraints, which are mea-
sured by low dividend payouts, the firms’ investment relies on internal cash flow due to lack of
external financing. This idea is supported by Myers and Majluf (1984), who claim that firms
with high information asymmetries cannot be financed by external sources since they are not
only too expensive but also unavailable. As a result, managers may forgo projects with positive
net present value (NPV) and suffer from underinvestment. Investment–cash flow sensitivity is
also explained by Jensen (1986) in terms of agency problems. Accordingly, owing to the conflict
between managers and shareholders, managers use the free cash flow to pursuit projects with
negative NPV (overinvestment) to serve their own best interests at their shareholders’ expense.
The over-reliance on internal funds leads to an increase in investment–cash flow sensitivity
(Fazzari et al., 1988; Jensen, 1986; Myers and Majluf, 1984).
When it comes to PPPs, the investment–cash flow sensitivity of partnering firms is hypoth-
esized to decrease by lowering more underinvestment or overinvestment problems than those
of competing non-PPP counterparts. In terms of underinvestment problems, the government
provides private sector firms with pledgeable assets to decrease their investment asymmetries,
enhance borrowing capacity, and reduce financing cost. The private sector can also decrease
demand risk and uncertainty of future cash flow through risk-sharing mechanisms, such as
revenue guarantee and fixed payment from the government, in which the government bears a
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portion of demand risk (Engel et al., 2010). PPPs also provide more unique investment op-
portunities than conventional investments through the reduction of regulatory hurdles, such
as land acquisition for building roads or tax exemptions for private partners’ income and fee
(UNESCAP, 2011). This is even more significant in the infrastructure sector where the mar-
ket’s incompleteness and inefficiencies can intensify underinvestment problems and deter the
private sector’s ability to access external financing due to high life-cycle costs and regulatory
hurdles. Otherwise, regarding overinvestment problems, the SPV allows PPP investments to
be independent of private firms’ internal cash flow. According to Engel et al. (2010), PPPs
do not have excess cash flow, so there are fewer opportunities for PPP projects’ cash flow to
be diverted from repaying creditors and to be directed towards managers who can then fund
for their own potential projects. This lack of excess cash flow helps to reduce overinvestment
problems in PPP partnering private sector firms. This is in contrast to the case of their compet-
ing private firms when their projects may be operated in such a way that the divisions within
their large corporation, which allows resources to be expropriated for the managers’ own use.
Therefore, it is argued that investing in PPPs will reduce the investment–cash flow sensitivity
of participating private sector firms compared to competing non-PPP private sector firms in
the same product market. This rationale leads to the hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 In the post-PPP investment period, the investment–cash flow sensitivity of PPP
private sector firms will reduce compared to competing non-PPP private sector firms in the same
product market.
3.2.3 Role of Reliance on the Government
The literature on government involvement in firm value shows the extent of debate on this
topic. Advocates for government involvement argue that governments have a positive impact
on firm value. Firms gain government support for accessing external financing, especially
debt financing. Borisova and Megginson (2011) indicate that governments, because of their
ownership, can guarantee firms’ debt repayment for creditors, which increases debt financing
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and reduces capital cost correspondingly. This argument is even more realizable in a country
with a weak institutional environment, where these kinds of firms can obtain access to domestic
bank debt at a low cost (Fan et al., 2008; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). Governments also
mitigate firms’ information asymmetries when acting as the firms’ venture capitalist, evaluating
and monitoring firms before and after financing by the state becomes a reality (Lerner, 2000).
On the contrary, opponents of government involvement claim that government intervention
can lower firm value because it usually pursues the government’s social/political aims rather
than firm value maximization (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Governments’ power and subsidies
to persuade firms to implement political goals, especially in countries with high corruption,
distorts firms’ investment behavior and decreases their investment efficiency (Chen et al., 2011).
Government support also raises agency problems owing to an increase in managers’ moral
hazard when firms obtain government debt warranties (Chen et al., 2011; Qingquan et al.,
2007).
One of the most important reasons for private sector firms to engage in PPPs is that they
can secure government support for undertaking risky and large infrastructure projects. Firms
secure their reliance on the government in several ways. The direct method involves negotiating
government equity in the PPP project. However, there are several indirect methods for securing
high reliance on the government. Negotiating favorable contract mechanisms and establishing
strong political connections are the major indirect methods of securing government reliance. I
explore three important mediating factors to gain more insights into the significance of private
sector firms relying on the government for the success or failure of PPP projects.
First, the government can directly participate in PPPs through equity participation. It
assures government support for the implementation and operation of the PPP. Equity partici-
pation helps in many ways. It may be an important source to supplement equity provided by
the private sector firm, particularly when equity capital from other sources is not available. It
helps to achieve a more favourable debt–equity ratio, which is necessary to keep the debt service
obligations manageable in the initial years of project operation (Engel et al., 2010). It may
give comfort to debt financiers and consequently reduce the cost of capital, thereby lessening
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reliance on internal cash flow. Moreover, it acts as a good signaling device in securing public
support for projects that are politically sensitive and strategically important. Hence, I hypoth-
esize that higher equity participation by the government reduces the long-term investment–cash
flow sensitivity of the partnering private sector firm.
Second, political connections play an important role in emerging markets. Politically con-
nected firms have a higher likelihood than non-politically connected firms of not only getting a
loan (Khwaja and Mian, 2005) but also receiving a bailout for loan defaults (Faccio et al., 2006).
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) state that a strong political connection is an alternative means
to create firm value. Hence, there are incentives for firms to connect to powerful politicians.
Such relationships are important in government-related contracts like PPPs. Similar to the
government’s equity participation initiative, political connections give comfort to lenders and
also increase the chances of obtaining cheaper loans, consequently reducing the cost of capital
and lessening reliance on internal cash flow. Hence, I hypothesized that political connections
can lead to the reduction in investment–cash flow sensitivity during the post-PPP investment
period.
Third, the contract mechanism plays a significant role in the success of PPP ventures.
According to World Bank Group (2012b), PPP contracts can be mainly classified based on
the awarding method, the nature of the project and the method of sharing revenue. PPPs
can be awarded either through a competitive bidding process or through direct negotiations
with the government. Based on the nature of the project, PPPs can be broadly classified as
greenfield or concession projects. Based on the revenue sharing agreement, future revenues
from PPP projects can be shared either through fixed payments from the government or from
revenue sharing by imposing a user fee on the customers. Projects that are awarded through
competitive bidding, greenfield projects, or projects that generate revenue through user fees
are more independent as they rely less on the government. On the other hand, if the projects
are awarded through direct negotiations and receive government concessions, they are more
dependent on or tend to have a higher reliance on the government. Having a higher reliance on
the government reduces the risk of future cash flow as firms can have more reliable estimates
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on their future cash flow. The above rationale leads to my third hypothesis and corresponding
sub-hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3 Higher reliance on the government reduces the long-term investment–cash flow
sensitivity of PPP-partnering private sector firms.
Hypothesis 3a Higher equity participation by the government reduces the long-term investment–
cash flow sensitivity of PPP-partnering private sector firms.
Hypothesis 3b Having political connection reduces the long-term investment–cash flow sensi-
tivity of PPP-partnering private sector firms.
Hypothesis 3c PPP-partnering private firms with a contract mechanism that allows closer
association with the government will experience lower long-term investment–cash flow sensitiv-
ity.
3.3 Data and Methodology
3.3.1 Data Sources
I created a comprehensive database by integrating several data sources. Information on PPP
projects, government equity participation in PPP projects, and contract mechanisms were
sourced from the World Bank’s PPI Project Database. Information related to financial and
stock prices data of partnering private firms was obtained from Datastream. To measure po-
litical connections, I obtained historical information relating to the firms’ board of directors
from annual reports of partnering private sector firms in China and India. For the Indian
firms, in addition to annual reports, I used the list of members in India’s bicameral Parlia-
ment: that is, members both from the Upper House (Rajya Sabha) and from the Lower House
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(Lok Sabha). Indicators of institution quality were sourced from the Worldwide Governance
Indicators created by Kaufmann et al. (2011).2
Regarding the event study analysis undertaken in this study, the announcement dates of
the PPPs were sourced from the corporate announcements section of stock exchange websites.
For the years between 1988 and 2013, I obtained 138 announcements for China and 124 an-
nouncements for India. The daily stock prices of the selected firms and market indexes for the
selected stock markets were collected from Datastream.
For the investment–cash flow sensitivity analysis, I focused on both the year of the PPP
announcement and the five-year post-PPP investment period. These short- and long-term
analyses helped me understand the nature of firms that engage in PPPs and the consequent
effects of PPP investment on their future investment–cash flow sensitivity relationship. For the
years between 1988 and 2013, I obtained 169 firm–year observations for China and 215 firm–
year observations for India. However, owing to the exclusion of overlapping PPP investments
during the five-year periods, for the long-term post-PPP analysis, I was left with 50 firm–year
observations for China and 55 firm–year observations for India.
In order to reduce the potential identification problem, I created a control group of compet-
ing non-PPP firms. Applying the propensity score matching, I obtained one-to-one matched
firms (for the firms investing in PPPs), matched by firm size and industry (based on the sector
level of the FTSE/Dow Jones Industrial Classification Benchmark [ICB] in Datastream). I
applied the nearest-neighbour matching method to capture the bias in the estimated treatment
effects when matching PPP firms and non-PPP firms. See Figure 3.1 for a summary of the
data collection process mentioned earlier.
3.3.2 Descriptive Analysis
Table 3.1 reports on whether PPP firms are significantly different in terms of firm characteristics
compared to their competing non-PPP private firms. The main objective of this mean difference
2See the Appendices A for more details.
53
Partnering 
Private Firms
Unlisted Firms Listed Firms
China
54 listed firms
India
76 listed firms
Financial firms Non-Financial firms
Firms NOT have 
enough panel 
data
TREATMENT 
GROUP
Firms have 
enough panel data 
& exclude full 
divestiture
China
PPP year: 169 obs
5Y Pre&Post: 100 obs
India
PPP year: 215 obs
5Y Pre&Post: 110 obs
CONTROL 
GROUP
India
74 listed firms
124 announcements
China
44 listed firms
138 announcements
China
272 private firms
India
248 private firms
PPI World Bank
Datastream
Stock exchange
Datastream
PPI World Bank
Figure 3.1: Data Collection Process for the Analysis of Investment Efficiency
analysis is to understand how the treatment and control group firms vary at the time of PPP
investments and in the post-PPP investment period (five years).
As shown in the table, PPP firms in both China and India are slightly larger than their
competing non-PPP firms. The Chinese PPP firms are valued better than their counterparts
who do not invest in PPPs. Such a difference does not exist in India. Also, the Chinese PPP
firms are older than non-PPP firms. On the contrary, the Indian PPP firms are younger. It is
important to note that owing to a lower leverage ratio, the Chinese PPP firms are less debt-
burdened compared to non-PPP counterparts. However, the trend is exactly the opposite in
India where the Indian PPP firms are more debt burdened.
These results highlight the nature of firms that engage in PPPs in both economies. In
China, older, more mature, better valued, and high cash flow firms, relative to their matched
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firms, engage in PPPs. On the other hand, in India, firms that are younger and have a relatively
higher debt burden than their matched counterparts engage in PPPs. This indicates that on
a relative basis, the Indian firms that invest in PPPs might consider PPPs as a method of
reducing their underinvestment problem.
Table 3.2 reports the descriptive analysis based on PPP firm–year observations. The results
are arranged in three groups. Panel A reports the distribution of PPP observations based on
the contract mechanism. Panel B reports reliance on government-based measures, and Panel
C reports the various mean values of institutional quality measures during the sample period.
Panel A’s statistics indicate that the majority of PPP contracts in both China and India are
greenfield contracts. However, based on the awarding method, most of the Chinese firms prefer
direct negotiations with the government. The Indian firms prefer the competitive bidding pro-
cess. This indicates that the Chinese firms are more comfortable dealing with the government
directly than those in India.
Panel B reports reliance on the government through two variables: namely, political con-
nections and government equity participation. The mean value of political connections for
the Chinese firms is 0.88 (88% of the sample firms have a political connection, past or cur-
rent, through a board member), whereas for India, the corresponding value is 0.22 (or 22%).
This indicates that the Chinese private sector firms participating in PPPs are more politically
connected than their Indian counterparts. This could be one reason for the Chinese firms’
higher preference for direct negotiations with the government. Also, the Chinese government,
by providing a mean public equity of around 27%, provides higher support than the Indian
government whose average public equity is only 4%.
Panel C reports the mean institutional quality values through several measures. All the val-
ues are scaled and fall between -2.5 and +2.5. The higher the value, the higher the institutional
quality during the PPP years. The values reported indicate that China has lower institutional
quality compared to India in terms of accountability and the rule of law. India has a lower
rating in terms of political stability and government effectiveness.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Analysis – PPP and Non-PPP Firms in the PPP Years and the Five-Year Post-PPP Investments
This table provides the mean of firm-level variables and the difference of means between PPP firms and non-PPP firms along with t-tests. Panels
A and B report the results of descriptive analysis on the Chinese and Indian firms, respectively, in the PPP years. Panels C and D report the
results of descriptive analysis on the Chinese and Indian firms, respectively, in the five-year post-PPP period. Investment was measured by the
changes in gross fixed assets, divided by the previous years’ fixed assets. Cash flow denoted income before extraordinary items, depreciation and
amortization, divided by the previous years’ fixed assets. Size was measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage was calculated
by total debt divided by total assets. Age was measured from the year of a firm’s incorporation. Tobin′s q (with one year lag) was measured by
the market to book value of total assets in order to capture investment opportunities. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
Variable PPP Non-PPP Difference t-test N
Panel A: Chinese firms in the PPP years PPP Non-PPP
Investment 0.544 1.810 -1.266 -1.105 159 140
Cash flow 0.659 5.677 -5.018 -0.998 159 140
Size 7.062 6.867 0.195 1.970** 168 148
Leverage 0.265 0.302 -0.037 -1.657* 168 148
Age 12.485 8.689 3.796 4.594*** 169 148
Tobin’s q 2.212 1.580 0.632 2.410** 147 122
Panel B: Indian firms in the PPP years
Investment 1.422 0.291 1.131 1.584 194 145
Cash flow 0.881 0.996 -0.115 -0.292 192 144
Size 7.665 7.538 0.127 1.763* 213 149
Leverage 0.400 0.311 0.089 4.626*** 213 149
Age 7.772 9.383 -1.611 -2.975*** 215 149
Tobin’s q 2.511 2.063 0.448 0.772 175 133
Panel C: Chinese firms in the five-year post-PPP period
Investment 0.246 0.222 0.024 0.256 50 45
Cash flow 0.359 0.192 0.167 1.280 50 45
Size 7.385 7.044 0.341 1.955* 50 45
Leverage 0.219 0.294 -0.075 -2.350** 50 45
Age 15.400 10.333 5.067 4.256*** 50 45
Tobin’s q 2.210 1.944 0.266 0.423 50 45
Panel D: Indian firms in the five-year post-PPP period
Investment 0.198 0.218 -0.020 -0.413 52 45
Cash flow 0.251 0.378 -0.127 -3.016*** 52 45
Size 7.939 7.887 0.051 0.360 52 46
Leverage 0.422 0.280 0.142 4.315*** 52 46
Age 11.273 11.182 0.091 0.101 55 55
Tobin’s q 1.288 1.971 -0.683 -1.564 52 52
56
Table 3.2: Descriptive Analysis of Contract Mechanism, Government Involvement and Institutional Quality for PPP Firms in the PPP Years
This table reports the descriptive analysis of the mediating factors for government reliance in PPP firms in China and India. Panel A reports the
distribution of PPP observations based on the contract mechanism. Panel B reports reliance on government-based measures. Panel C reports
the various mean values of institutional quality measures during the sample period.
Panel A: Contract mechanisms China India
N 169 215
Types of PPPs
1. Concessions 15.43 37.38
2. Greenfield projects 57.41 51.40
3. Management and lease contracts 0.62 0.47
4. Partial divestiture 4.32 1.40
5. Multiple types in an observation year 22.22 9.35
Awarding methods
1. Competitive bidding 19.66 64.22
2. Direct negotiation 60.68 29.41
3. Multiple methods in an observation year 19.66 6.37
Revenue sources
1. Fixed payments from government 47.44 43.11
2. User fees 47.44 34.13
3. Multiple sources in an observation year 5.13 22.75
Panel B: Government reliance China: Mean China: Std.Dev India: Mean India: Std.Dev
Public equity 0.273 0.236 0.041 0.122
Political connection 0.881 0.325 0.223 0.417
Panel C: Institutional quality China: Mean China: Std.Dev India: Mean India: Std.Dev
Accountability -1.535 0.121 0.410 0.036
Political stability -0.458 0.111 -1.201 0.110
Government effectiveness 0.012 0.112 -0.044 0.085
Regulatory quality -0.243 0.109 -0.344 0.083
Rule of law -0.435 0.064 0.022 0.121
Control of corruption -0.495 0.127 -0.467 0.096
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3.3.3 Methodology
Event Study
My study used the event study to evaluate the effects of PPP announcements on firm market
returns. In my event study, daily returns were adjusted by expected returns to obtain abnormal
returns in which adjustments were estimated by the market model (Brown and Warner, 1985).
Cumulative abnormal returns were also calculated over different windows, including (-10,+10),(-
1,+1),(0,+5), and (0,+1). This was to capture early or delayed market response. According to
Ramiah et al. (2013), non-believers in the efficient market hypothesis think market participants
may not react immediately on the first day of the announcement, or they may subsequently
adjust their over or under-reaction. My study next used t-tests to test whether the abnormal
returns were significant different from zero or not.
ARi = Ri − E(Ri) (3.1)
CARi =
∑
ARi (3.2)
tcritical = AAR/SE (3.3)
AAR =
∑
ARi/n (3.4)
SE =
√
(
∑
SE2i )/n
2 (3.5)
Where ARi were abnormal returns, Ri were daily returns calculated by the first natural log-
arithmic difference of given stock prices. E(Ri) were expected returns estimated by the market
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model with a 250-day estimation window, CARi were cumulative abnormal returns. AAR were
average abnormal returns and equal to
∑
ARi/n with n which was the number of announcement
dates. SE were unadjusted cross-sectional errors, which were equal to
√
(
∑
SE2i )/n
2.
For the robustness tests, I followed Barber and Lyon (1997) to calculate abnormal returns
by applying the matched firm approach. Accordingly, abnormal returns were calculated as
the difference between Holding Period Returns (or Buy-and-Hold Returns) on PPP firms and
those of the non-PPP matched firms. I applied the propensity score matching to match the
treatment and the control group. Accordingly, the competing non-PPP firms were one-to-one
nearest matched with each partnering private firms by size, price-to-book value and industry.
Accordingly, Barber and Lyon’s abnormal returns (BLAR) were calculated by adjusting the
daily returns of the PPP private sector firms by daily returns of the non-PPP matched firms .
The Barber and Lyon cumulative abnormal returns (BLCAR) and the Buy-and-Hold abnormal
returns (BAH) were then calculated across different windows, including -10 to +10,0 to +1,
-1 to +1, -5 to +5. The t-test was conducted to test whether these abnormal returns were
significantly different from zero or not.
Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity Analysis
Following Fazzari et al. (1988) and Hovakimian (2009), I ran the following regression to estimate
the differences in investment–cash flow sensitivity between the PPP and non-PPP firms.
(
I
K
)it = α + β1(
CF
K
)it + β2PPP + β3(
CF
K
)it × PPP
+ f(Control variables) + δi + δt + it
(3.6)
In Equation (3.6), I denoted investment measured by the changes in gross fixed assets, while CF
was cash flow measured by income before extraordinary items, depreciation, and amortization.
Both were standardized by being divided by the previous year’ fixed assets (K).
The PPP dummy took value 1 for private sector firms investing in PPP (a treatment
group) and zero for competing non-PPP private sector firms (a control group). An interaction
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between Cash flow and the PPP dummy was to capture the differences in investment–cash
flow sensitivity between the two groups.
PPP =
 1 if firms participate in PPPs (the treatment group)0 if firms do NOT participate in PPPs (the control group) (3.7)
I used a list of Control variables that were expected to affect investment–cash flow sensitiv-
ity. They were Size, Leverage, Age, and Tobin′s qt−1 (Hovakimian, 2009)3. Firmsize and Age
were used as proxies to capture the ability to raise funds. Smaller and younger firms usually
face more difficulties in raising external funds because of higher borrowing costs (Hovakimian,
2009) and adverse selection problems (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Therefore, smaller and younger
firms are expected to have higher investment–cash flow sensitivity. According to the corporate
life-cycle hypothesis (Hovakimian, 2009), firms have more investment opportunities but less
cash flow when they are young and vice versa. Hence, a negative relationship between cash
flow and investment is expected when firms become more mature. The variable Leverage can
influence investment–cash flow sensitivity in two contrasting ways. High leverage can limit
potential possibilities to raise external funds (Myers and Majluf, 1984) because of high risk,
but it also considered to lower financial constraints and lessen cash flow issues, thus reducing
agency problems (Hovakimian, 2009). Tobin′s qt−1 (with a one-year lag) (hereafter referred to
as Tobin′s q) was used to capture investment opportunities. To deal with unobservable fixed
effects, δi, δt were used to capture firm fixed-effects and time effects. The standard errors were
clustered by industry to address the within-industry correlation.
3.3.4 Disentangling the Cause for Investment–Cash Flow Sensitiv-
ity: Underinvestment or Overinvestment
One potential interpretation problem associated with investment–cash flow sensitivity is that
it can be attributed to both underinvestment and overinvestment. The idea of investment–
3See the Appendix for the definitions of these variables
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cash flow sensitivity is supported by Myers and Majluf (1984), who claim that firms with high
information asymmetries cannot be financed by external sources since they are too expensive
and unavailable. As a result, managers may forgo projects with positive NPV and suffer from
underinvestment. Investment–cash flow sensitivity is also explained by Jensen (1986) in terms
of agency problems. Accordingly, owing to the conflict between managers and shareholders,
managers use the free cash flow to pursue projects with negative NPVs (or they overinvest) for
their own interest, which results in higher dependence of investment on internal cash flow.
I addressed this potential interpretation problem by exploring whether investment–cash
flow sensitivity is caused by underinvestment or overinvestment. Firms with high investment
opportunities (high Tobin’s q) may suffer more information asymmetries and have less pledged
assets, resulting in high dependence on internal cash flow (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Pawlina
and Renneboog, 2005). Meanwhile, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), managers tend to
overinvest free cash flow to pursue their pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits of larger firm size.
Firms with low growth opportunities (low Tobin’s q) have more overinvestment problems due
to the shortage of projects with positive NPV, leading to high investment–cash flow sensitivity.
I used Tobin’s q with a one-year lag to capture investment opportunities and then followed
Dawson and Richter (2006) to interpret the three-way interaction PPP*Tobin’s q*Cash flow. I
first ran the regression seen below regarding the three-way interaction.
(
I
K
)it = α + β1(
CF
K
)it + β2PPP + β3Tobin
′s q + β4(
CF
K
)it × PPP + β5(CF
K
)it × Tobin′s q
+ β6PPP × Tobin′s q + β7PPP × Tobin′s q × (CF
K
)it + f(Control variables) + δi + δt + it
(3.8)
Subsequently, to distinguish the overinvestment and underinvestment problem, I computed
simple slopes of the variable Investment on the variable Cash flow, where the moderator vari-
ables PPP and Tobin’s q were held constant at different combinations of high and low values.
I then compared these simple slopes and tested whether their differences were significant from
zero in predicting the Investment variable. I conducted the Bonferroni correction to reduce
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the probability of type I errors by calculating the adjusted-p value. The adjusted-p value was
measured by dividing the critical p-value by the number of simultaneous tests (Dawson and
Richter, 2006; Miller, 1966).
This procedure generated a total of six pairs of slopes:
(1) (PPP and high Tobin’s q) - (PPP and low Tobin’s q)
(2) (PPP and high Tobin’s q) - (Non-PPP and high Tobin’s q)
(3) (PPP and low Tobin’s q) - (Non-PPP and low Tobin’s q)
(4) (Non-PPP and high Tobin’s q) - (Non-PPP and low Tobin’s q)
(5) (PPP and high Tobin’s q) - (Non-PPP and low Tobin’s q)
(6) (PPP and low Tobin’s q) - (Non-PPP and high Tobin’s q)
In order to correctly interpret the results on whether the differences in investment–cash flow
sensitivity in PPP firms were caused by underinvestment or overinvestment, I focused on the
first three pairs (i.e.Pair 1 to 3). These pairs allowed me to assess differences in investment–cash
flow sensitivity of PPP firms with varying degree of investment opportunities (as in Pair 1),
or to compare PPP firms with their non-PPP counterparts in the same degree of investment
opportunities (as in Pairs 2 and 3). A visual interpretation is illustrated in Figures 3.2 and 3.3.
Figure 3.2: Hypothesis Development Matrix on Causes of Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity
This figure presents the 3 x 2 matrix for distinguishing whether investment–cash flow sensitivity is
caused by underinvestment or overinvestment. Each cell (or entry) shows the value of changes in
simple slopes when combining the moderators PPP and Tobin’s q. I consider two different values,
comprising of positively and negatively statistically significant ones, to interpret the value in each cell.
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Figure 3.3: Graph of Slopes Indicating the Causes of Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity
This figure visualizes the simple slopes of the variable Investment on the variable Cash flow, where
the moderator variables PPP and Tobin’s q were held constant at different combinations of the high
and low levels.
In Figure 3.2, the entry for (3,1) (the entry in Row 3 and Column 1), which refers to Pair 1,
captures the differences of simple slopes when I kept the moderator PPP constant and let the
moderator Tobin’s q changed from a high value to a low one (one standard deviation above and
below the mean, respectively) (Dawson and Richter, 2006). The entry for (3,1) is visualized in
Figure 3.3 by the slope differences between the blue regression line (PPP and high Tobin’s q) and
the red regression line (PPP and low Tobin’s q). A positive and statistically significant value
for (3,1) indicate that PPP firms experience higher investment–cash flow sensitivity when the
investment opportunities (Tobin’s q) are higher. In other words, such firms may face a higher
underinvestment problem as they are constrained by capital (for investments) even with high
growth investment opportunities. Conversely, if the entry for (3,1) is negative and significant,
this could mean that firms with low investment opportunities are more reliant on their internal
cash flow compared to those with high investment opportunities. According to Vogt (1997),
these kinds of firms may face overinvestment problems since they may overuse their abundant
internal cash flow for an ineffective (or even negative NPV) projects.
Likewise, the entry for (1,3), regarding Pair 2, illustrates the difference of simple slopes
when the moderator PPP dummy variable changed from the high value of 1 (i.e. PPP firms)
to the low value of zero (i.e. non-PPP firms), while keeping the moderator Tobin’s q constant
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at the high level (one standard deviation above the mean) (Dawson and Richter, 2006) in both
cases. This is captured in Figure 3.3 by the slope differences between the blue regression line
(PPP and high Tobin’s q) and the green regression line (Non-PPP and high Tobin’s q). The
positive difference indicates that PPP firms with high q have higher sensitivity of cash flow to
investments than non-PPP firms. This supports the underinvestment hypothesis (Pawlina and
Renneboog, 2005; Vogt, 1994).
In cell (2,3) for Pair 3, the moderator PPP dummy changed from the high value of 1 to
the low value of zero, and the moderator Tobin’s q was low (one standard deviation below the
mean) (Dawson and Richter, 2006) in both cases. This is captured in Figure 3.3 by the slope
differences between the red regression line (PPP and low Tobin’s q) and the orange regression
line (Non-PPP and low Tobin’s q). In this case, a higher sensitivity implies overinvestment, as
PPP firms with low q show higher demand for investment.
3.3.5 Does More Reliance on the Government Benefit Private Sec-
tor Firms?
I investigated the impacts of three important mediating factors indicating reliance on the gov-
ernment, including government equity participation, political connections, and the contract
mechanism.
Role of Government Equity Participation on Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity of
Private Sector Firms
To indicate the effects of government equity participation on firms investing in PPPs, I ran the
following regression.
(
I
K
)it = α + β1(
CF
K
)it + β2Public equity + β3(
CF
K
)it × Public equity + f(Control variables)
+ δi + δt + it
(3.9)
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In Equation 3.9, data on PublicEquity were sourced from the World Banks’ PPI Project
database by subtracting the proportion of private investment from the value of 1. This variable
was measured by government equity participation in PPP projects of each partnering private
sector firm. I also used State ownership to measure annual government equity participation in
partnering private firms in the five-year post-PPP period. By using this variable, I was able to
compare the government influence on PPP partnering private sectors firms with those on their
non-PPP counterparts.
Role of Political Connections on Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity of Private Sec-
tor Firms
To indicate the effects of political connections on PPP firms, I ran the following regression:
(
I
K
)it = α + β1(
CF
K
)it + β2Political connection+ β3(
CF
K
)it × Political connection+
f(Control variables) + δi + δt + it
(3.10)
In Equation 3.10, Political Connection (Pol) is a dummy variable that took 1 for firms
whose chair and executive directors were formerly or are currently officers in the government,
parliament, or military (Chen et al., 2011). With the Indian firms, I only accepted one firm
to be politically connected if its chair or executive directors in the partnering private firms
were currently members of the Indian Parliament (the Upper and Lower Houses). This is
because there are differences in the political system of the two countries. While the Chinese
firms operate under a stable, centrally run state and a unitary party, India has more political
parties as it was influenced by the Western rational system (Desai, 2005; Almond, 1956). In
India, the party that obtains the majority in the Parliament after a general election forms the
government. Therefore, firms have actual political connections only if they have a connection
with the current parliament.
I also tested the effects of institution quality, including Public uncertainty, Accountability,
Political stability, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, and
65
Control of corruption4 using the same method.
To clarify the actual effects of the public sector on PPP firms, I again followed Dawson and
Richter (2006) to interpret a three-way interaction Public variable*Tobin’s q*Cash flow(CF).
First, I ran the regression seen below for the three-way interaction.
(
I
K
)it = α + β1(
CF
K
)it + β2Tobin
′s q + β3Public variable+ β4(
CF
K
)it × Tobin′s q
+ β5(
CF
K
)it × Public variable+ β6Tobin′s q × Public variable
+ β7Tobin
′s q × Public variable× (CF
K
)it + f(Control variables) + δi + δt + it
(3.11)
In Equation (3.11), Public variables can be PublicEquity or Political Connection.
Subsequently, I computed simple slopes of the variable Investment on the variable Cash
flow when the moderator variables Public variable and Tobin’s q were held constant at different
combinations of high and low values. I then compared these simple slopes and tested whether
their differences were significant from zero in predicting the Investment variable. Following
this, I then interpreted these results and linked them with underinvestment and overinvestment
problems.
Role of Contract Mechanism on Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity of Private Sector
Firms
To indicate the effects of the contract mechanism on firms investing in PPPs, I ran the following
regression:
(
I
K
)it = α + β1(
CF
K
)it + β2Project dummy + β3(
CF
K
)it × Project dummy + f(Control variables)
+ δi + δt + it
(3.12)
In Equation (3.12) , the Project dummy can be categorized by types of PPPs, awarding
4See the Appendix A for the definitions of these variables
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methods, or sources of revenue:
Regarding the types of PPPs,
Project dummy =
 O if Concession1 if Greenfields (3.13)
Regarding the awarding methods,
Project dummy =
 O if Competitive bidding1 if Direct negotiation (3.14)
Regarding the sources of revenue,
Project dummy =
 O if Fixed payments1 if User fees (3.15)
A major obstacle to using the fixed-effects model is that it can sweep out the effects of time-
invariant variables such as project dummy variables. In these cases, according to Chatelain
and Ralf (2010), the pre-test estimator should be applied to choose a suitable estimation from
among the Mundlak–Krishnakumar, Hausman Taylor, and restricted generalized least squares
(GLS) estimators. The pre-test, which is based on the Mundlak–Krishnakumar estimator, was
conducted as seen below:
yit = β1(X1it) + β2(X2it) + β3(X3it) + pi1X¯1i + pi2X¯2i + pi3X¯3i + γZi + αi + it (3.16)
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3.4 Empirical Results and Discussion
3.4.1 Public–Private Partnerships and Market Valuation
Event Study
Table 3.3 presents the results of the event study that aims to evaluate market responses to
PPP investment announcements that are made by listed private sector firms in China and
India. The results confirm that, on average, announcements of PPP investment decisions have a
significant positive impact on firm value. Both the Chinese and the Indian PPP-invested private
sector firms experience statistically significant positive average abnormal returns (AAR) on the
PPP announcement day (Day 0). The Chinese (Indian) private sector firms experience 0.43%
(0.94%) abnormal returns on the announcement date. For a ten-day cumulative abnormal
return (CAR) window, the cumulative abnormal returns are 1.87% and 2.11% for the Chinese
and Indian firms, respectively. This indicates that PPP investment decisions are economically
significant in both countries. Also, these results are generally consistent with the SVMH and
the traditional valuation theory, which associate strategic investment decisions with a possible
increase in future cash flows (Woolridge and Snow, 1990). Therefore, these results lend support
to the hypothesis that stock markets react positively to the announcements partnering private
firms make about PPP projects.
Figure 3.4 depicts the trend of CAR over the event window from t = -10 to t = 10. Overall,
the Chinese and Indian firms witness the significant increase in their wealth. However, there
appears to be a leakage of information in China as the Chinese firms react much earlier to news
of the investment: that is, before the public announcement date. As can be seen in Figure
3.4, the Chinese firms’ CAR experiences a significant increase from Day -10 to Day 10, apart
from some slight decreases on Day -1, Day 4 and Day 9. Meanwhile, in India, the PPP firms
experience a dip in CAR from Day -10 to Day -4 before experiencing a dramatic surge to reach
a peak at roughly 2.6 on Day 6. Therefore, compared with the Chinese CAR, the Indian CAR
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Table 3.3: Chinese and Indian Firms - Event Study
The table presents the results of the event study to evaluate the effects of 138 PPP announcements
of Chinese firms and 124 PPP announcements of Indian firms on firm market value. The event
window was ten days before and after the PPP announcements. An abnormal return was calculated
by adjusting daily return by expected return, which is approximated by the market model with the
250-day estimate window. In Panel A, an average abnormal return (AAR) was measured by averaging
the abnormal returns over PPP announcements on the same day in the event window. A cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) was calculated over 20 days from t = -10 to t = 10. In Panel B, CARs were
calculated over different windows, including -10 to +10, -1 to +1, 0 to +5, 0 to +1. The t-test was
used to test whether average abnormal returns are significant different from zero or not. ***,**,*
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A China India
Day relative to the event AAR t-test CAR AAR t-test CAR
-10 -0.05% -0.245 -0.05% 0.32% 1.322 0.32%
-9 0.24% 1.145 0.19% -0.08% -0.350 0.23%
-8 0.27% 1.258 0.46% -0.08% -0.316 0.16%
-7 0.23% 1.076 0.69% 0.04% 0.180 0.20%
-6 0.11% 0.506 0.80% -0.11% -0.445 0.09%
-5 0.26% 1.210 1.05% -0.11% -0.449 -0.01%
-4 0.06% 0.274 1.11% -0.08% -0.328 -0.09%
-3 0.01% 0.040 1.12% 0.47% 1.958* 0.37%
-2 0.22% 1.018 1.34% 0.22% 0.917 0.59%
-1 -0.24% -1.137 1.10% 0.32% 1.322 0.91%
0 0.43% 2.023** 1.53% 0.94% 3.939*** 1.85%
1 0.04% 0.186 1.57% 0.18% 0.735 2.02%
2 0.25% 1.162 1.82% 0.27% 1.121 2.29%
3 0.06% 0.262 1.87% 0.03% 0.105 2.31%
4 -0.13% -0.598 1.74% -0.10% -0.429 2.21%
5 0.03% 0.132 1.77% 0.15% 0.611 2.36%
6 0.03% 0.142 1.80% 0.25% 1.030 2.60%
7 0.40% 1.853 2.20% -0.31% -1.307 2.29%
8 0.21% 1.004 2.41% 0.07% 0.301 2.36%
9 -0.32% -1.488 2.09% -0.02% -0.082 2.34%
10 -0.22% -1.047 1.87% -0.24% -0.990 2.11%
Panel B China India No of announcements
Windows CAR T-stat CAR T-stat China India
(-10,+10) 1.87% 8.7373*** 2.11% 8.846*** 138 124
(0,+5) 0.68% 3.167*** 1.45% 6.082***
(0,+1) 0.47% 2.210** 1.11% 4.673***
(-1,+1) 0.23% 1.081 1.43% 5.996***
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Figure 3.4: Chinese and Indian Firms - Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) Graph
This figure presents graphs of Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) with the event window from t =
-10 to t = 10 of 138 PPP announcements in China and 124 announcements in India. The figure for
CAR is based on Table 3.3
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seems to be lower on the pre-PPP announcement dates but outnumbers the Chinese CAR on
the days after the PPP announcements.
Barber and Lyon Matched-Firm Approach
For the robustness tests, I followed Barber and Lyon (1997) to calculate abnormal returns by
the matched firm approach. The results are presented in Table 3.4. Most of the abnormal
returns indicate positive and significant means over different windows, apart from those in
the (-10,+10) windows The results further confirm that announcements of PPPs add value to
private sector firms in the partnership compared with non-PPP competing firms in the same
industry.
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Table 3.4: Chinese and Indian Firms: Barber and Lyon Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Buy-
and-Hold Abnormal Returns
The table evaluates the effects of 138 PPP announcements of the Chinese firms and 124 PPP an-
nouncements of the Indian firms on firm market value as the robustness test in addition to the event
study. Following Barber and Lyon (1997), a Barber and Lyon abnormal return (BLAR) was calcu-
lated by adjusting the daily Holding Period Return of the sample firm by those of the control firm,
with the latter matched by Size, Price-to-book value and Industry. Barber and Lyon cumulative
abnormal returns (BLCARs) were then calculated over different windows, including -10 to +10, 0 to
+1, -1 to +1, -5 to +5. I also calculated the Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns (BAH) over different
windows. The t-test was used to test whether the average abnormal returns were significantly different
from zero or not. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: China Mean t-test N Panel B: India Mean t-test N
BLAR0 0.68% 2.617*** 138 BLAR0 0.89% 2.531** 124
BLCAR(-10,+10) 1.59% 0.877 138 BLCAR(-10,+10) 1.37% 1.121 124
BLCAR(0,+1) 1.03% 1.894* 138 BLCAR(0,+1) 1.07% 2.601** 124
BLCAR(-1,+1) 1.02% 1.696* 138 BLCAR(-1,+1) 1.69% 3.721*** 124
BLCAR(-5,+5) 1.62% 1.481 138 BLCAR(-5,+5) 1.96% 2.16** 124
BAH(-10,+10) 2.48% 1.039 138 BAH(-10,+10) 1.61% 1.263 124
BAH(0,+1) 1.05% 1.909* 138 BAH(0,+1) 1.06% 2.595** 124
BAH(-1,+1) 1.06% 1.721* 138 BAH(-1,+1) 1.66% 3.640*** 124
BAH(-5,+5) 1.96% 1.699* 138 BAH(-5,+5) 2.04% 2.163** 124
Determinants of Wealth Effects Arising from PPP Announcements
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 report the regression results, which guides me in understanding the determi-
nants of wealth effects associated with the decision to invest in PPPs. This was done by regress-
ing the dependent variable, the two-day (0,+1) cumulative abnormal return (CAR01) on the
groups of variables, including firm characteristics, government reliance and institutional quality.
The firm-level variables, similar to investment–cash flow analysis, include Tobin′s qt−1, Size,
Leverage and Age. Tobin′s qt−1 was used to capture investment opportunities. Cash flow,
Size, and Age reflect the effects of overinvestment and underinvestment problems, which can
influence the market valuation of investment (Hovakimian, 2009; Jensen, 1986; Vogt, 1997).
Leverage was considered to be an index of credible pre-commitment, which reduces the ex-
pected cost of free cash flow. It was expected to have a positive relation with market responses
(Jensen, 1986). The standard errors were clustered by industry to control for within-industry
correlation.
71
For the Chinese firms, as indicated in Panel B of Table 3.5, after controlling for firm charac-
teristics, I find that firms that are politically connected experience significantly higher positive
announcement effects than nonpolitically connected firms. Regarding institutional quality, as
indicated in Panel C of Table 3.5, political uncertainty, measured as the year of change in
government or government officers, has adverse effects on firms investing in PPPs during those
years in China. However, in the context of higher regulatory quality and higher corruption
control, the Chinese PPP firms benefit more from their announcements.
In the case of the Indian firms, as indicated in Panel B of Table 3.6, unlike China, political
connections do not have significant effects, while higher regulatory quality has adverse effects.
As indicated in Panel C of Table 3.6, these Indian firms are similar to the Chinese firms in
that, for both countries, political uncertainty has adverse impacts on firm value. Additionally,
accountability matters in India, as higher accountability is correlated with higher wealth effects
being associated with PPP announcements. Overall, these results highlight the varying effect
of political connections on PPP investments.5
3.4.2 Public–Private Partnerships and Investment–Cash Flow Sen-
sitivity
Table 3.7 compares investment–cash flow sensitivity between PPP and non-PPP firms in the
PPP investment year and the five-year post-PPP investment. The objective of this analysis is
to explain the influence on firm characteristics and, in particular, their internal cash flow, on
firm investments. I find that at the time of engaging in PPP contracts, as seen in Column 1, the
Chinese firms suffer from the investment–cash flow sensitivity problem. This is evident from the
positive and significant coefficient for the variable Cash flow. The coefficient equals 0.215, which
indicates that, on average, investments are dependent by 21%, for every one unit increase in
5For the sensitivity test, I used the two-day Barber and Lyon cumulative abnormal returns (BLCAR01) and
the two-day Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns (BAH01) as the dependent variables to replace the cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR01). The results are shown in Appendix B. The Chinese firms still experience the
positive and significant effects of political connections and high regulatory quality on abnormal returns, whereas,
in the Indian firms, political connections have adverse effects.
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Table 3.5: Chinese Firms: Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Reliance on the Government and Institution Quality
This table presents the effect of government reliance and institution quality on the cumulative abnormal return of PPP firms. CAR01, the
dependent variable, was the cumulative abnormal return of day 0 and day +1. Cash flow denoted income before extraordinary items, depreciation
and amortization, divided by the previous year’s fixed assets. Size was measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage was calculated
by the total debt divided by the total assets. Age was measured from the year of a firm’s incorporation. Tobin′s q (with one year lag) was
measured by the market to book value of total assets in order to capture investment opportunities. Public uncertainty (PU) was a dummy
variable, which took value 1 for PPP firms in general election years, or else zero for PPP firms in non-election years. Public equity (PE), which was
measured by the proportion of total PPP investment that belongs to the government, captured government equity participation in PPP projects.
Political connection (Pol) was a dummy variable, which took value 1 for firms that had a chair and executive directors who were formerly
or are currently officers in the government, the parliament or the military. Accountability, Political stability, Government effectiveness,
Regulatory quality, Rule of law and Control of corruption capture institution quality. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
CAR01 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Firm-characteristic variables
Cash flow -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0001 -0.001
(-1.00) (-1.32) (-1.09) (-1.05) (-0.91) (-0.77) (-1.00) (-0.82) (-0.12) (-0.79)
Leverage 0.009 0.019 0.002 0.009 0.006 0.014 0.002 -0.008 -0.002 0.025
(0.75) (1.67) (0.24) (0.72) (0.34) (0.99) (0.09) (-0.32) (-0.15) (1.61)
Size -0.022* -0.022* -0.022* -0.022* -0.022* -0.025* -0.021* -0.024* -0.019 -0.030**
(-1.87) (-1.95) (-1.96) (-1.96) (-1.80) (-2.15) (-1.89) (-2.02) (-1.62) (-2.46)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002*
(1.29) (1.42) (1.31) (1.35) (1.13) (1.52) (1.12) (1.51) (1.09) (1.92)
Tobin’s q -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.0003 -0.002
(-0.67) (-0.44) (-0.99) (-0.27) (-0.62) (-0.71) (-0.60) (-0.35) (0.18) (-0.98)
Panel B: Government involvement variables
Public equity 0.023
(0.78)
Political connection 0.022***
(4.67)
Panel C: Institution quality variables
Public uncertainty -0.012**
(-2.65)
Accountability -0.012
(-0.43)
Political stability 0.014
(1.14)
Government effectiveness 0.024
(0.60)
Regulatory quality 0.053*
(1.82)
Rule of law -0.134**
(-2.61)
Control of corruption 0.047**
(2.31)
Constant 0.150* 0.152** 0.135* 0.153* 0.133 0.176** 0.149* 0.182* 0.072 0.219**
(2.07) (2.28) (1.97) (2.15) (1.63) (2.52) (2.17) (2.10) (0.90) (2.89)
R-squared 4.74 5.68 5.04 5.45 5.09 5.1 5.23 6.17 6.62 5.73
N 124 124 121 124 117 117 117 117 117 117
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Table 3.6: Indian Firms: Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Reliance on the Government and Institution Quality
This table presents the effect of government reliance and institution quality on the cumulative abnormal return of PPP firms. CAR01, the
dependent variable, was the cumulative abnormal return of day 0 and day +1. Cash flow denoted income before extraordinary items, depreciation
and amortization, divided by the previous year’s fixed assets. Size was measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage was calculated
by the total debt divided by the total assets. Age was measured from the year of a firm’s incorporation. Tobin′s q (with one year lag) was
measured by the market to book value of total assets in order to capture investment opportunities. Public uncertainty (PU) was a dummy
variable, which took value 1 for PPP firms in general election years, or else zero for PPP firms in non-election years. Public equity (PE), which was
measured by the proportion of total PPP investment that belongs to the government, captured government equity participation in PPP projects.
Political connection (Pol) was a dummy variable, which took value 1 for firms that had a chair and executive directors who were formerly
or are currently officers in the government, the parliament or the military. Accountability, Political stability, Government effectiveness,
Regulatory quality, Rule of law and Control of corruption captured institution quality. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
CAR01 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Firm-characteristic variables
Cash flow 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.57) (0.53) (0.47) (0.50) (0.62) (0.59) (0.57) (0.56) (0.48) (0.47)
Leverage -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.009 -0.008
(-0.16) (-0.24) (-0.17) (-0.23) (-0.28) (-0.19) (-0.16) (-0.25) (-0.41) (-0.38)
Size -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008
(-1.17) (-1.07) (-1.16) (-1.12) (-1.15) (-1.18) (-1.14) (-1.18) (-1.08) (-1.10)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.35) (1.30) (1.35) (1.30) (1.31) (1.33) (1.27) (1.25) (1.20) (1.27)
Tobin’s q -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(-1.11) (-1.08) (-1.13) (-1.17) (-1.20) (-1.10) (-1.12) (-1.03) (-1.05) (-1.04)
Panel B: Government involvement variables
Public equity -0.013
(-1.29)
Political connection -0.004
(-0.30)
Panel C: Institution quality variables
Public uncertainty -0.007**
(-2.59)
Accountability 0.052*
(1.96)
Political stability -0.007
(-0.31)
Government effectiveness -0.002
(-0.11)
Regulatory quality -0.050***
(-7.26)
Rule of law -0.016
(-1.82)
Control of corruption -0.022
(-1.25)
Constant 0.069 0.064 0.068 0.067 0.047 0.061 0.069 0.053 0.068 0.057
(1.40) (1.30) (1.40) (1.36) (0.93) (0.97) (1.36) (1.12) (1.36) (1.12)
R-squared 3.28 3.7 3.8 3.44 3.51 3.34 3.28 4.37 3.55 3.57
N 98 96 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98
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the firms’ internal cash flow. Further, the sensitivity increases to 88% (coefficient of 0.886), five
years after the PPP investment period. However, for firms investing in PPPs, the interaction
variable between the PPP dummy and internal cash flow shows that there is significantly lower
sensitivity, evident from the negative and significant coefficient for the interaction variable.
This indicates that the PPP firms in China, on average, exhibit lower investment–cash flow
sensitivity than their competing non-PPP firms. The post-PPP investment sensitivity changes
from 22% to 75%, relative to the non-PPP firms. This indicates that PPP investment by
private sector firms has significant economic benefit. Their reliance on internal cash flow reduces
substantially compared to their competing non-PPP firms. To give some perspective, if a firm
has to make an investment of $100 million, on average, the firm in China use $21 million from
their internal cash flow. However, a firm investing in PPPs needs 22% less internal cash flow
in the investment year (compared to a non-PPP firm). Later, the reliance reduces further by
75% in the post-PPP period, supporting Hypothesis 2.
The results for the Indian market contrast with those for the Chinese firms. The Indian
firms investing in PPPs suffer from higher investment–cash flow sensitivity. On average, the
Indian firms investing in PPPs need 227% higher internal cash flow (the interaction coefficient
2.27) than their non-PPP firms. This clearly indicates that cash-constrained firms opt for PPP
in India, possibly owing to the underinvestment problem. The post-PPP investment period
results indicate no significant difference in investment–cash flow sensitivity between the PPP
and the non-PPP firms. However, the overall sensitivity is quite high for both types of firms.
This suggests that the Indian firms, on average, suffer from underinvestment problems. This
result corroborates with those in Table 3.1, indicating that the Indian PPP firms are relatively
more cash burdened when they opt for PPP investment.6
Now, I turn my analysis to whether overinvestment or underinvestment drives high cash
flow sensitivity in China and India.
6I also used sales growth, measured by the changes in net sales divided by previous net sales, as the alternative
measure of investment opportunities instead of Tobin’s q. I arrive at the same results. See Table C6 in the
Appendix C for more details.
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Table 3.7: Chinese and Indian Firms: Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity: PPP and Non-PPP Firms
in the PPP Investment Years and the Five-Year Post-PPP Investment Period
This table compares investment–cash flow sensitivity between PPP firms and non-PPP firms. Columns
(1) and (2) indicate the Chinese firms. Columns (3) and (4) indicate the Indian firms. Investment was
measured by the changes in gross fixed assets, divided by the previous year’s fixed assets. Cash flow
denoted income before extraordinary items, depreciation and amortization, divided by the previous
year’s fixed assets. Size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage was calculated
by the total debt divided by the total assets. Age was measured from the year of firm’s incorporation.
PPP was a dummy variable, which took value 1 for firms invested in PPP projects, else zero for firms
which were matched by industry and firm size. Tobin′s q (with one year lag) was measured by the
market to book value of total assets in order to capture investment opportunities. The t-statistics are
in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
China China India India
PPP year five-year post-PPP PPP year five-year post-PPP
Investment (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash flow 0.216*** 0.886*** 0.006 0.989***
(169.38) (3.25) (0.44) (5.13)
Leverage 2.076 0.100 1.944*** 0.266
(0.90) (0.26) (3.03) (1.41)
Size -1.360 -0.029 0.063 0.119**
(-1.43) (-0.38) (0.22) (2.6)
Age 0.081 -0.100*** 0.045 -0.012*
(1.07) (-3.3) (0.95) (-1.94)
Tobin’s q -0.444 0.004** -0.040*** -0.060***
(-1.26) (0.38) (-2.06) (-3.74)
PPP 0.440** 0.212 -1.269** 0.155
(2.08) (1.36) (-2.65) (1.46)
PPP*Cash flow -0.222*** -0.751*** 2.271*** -0.503
(-13.87) (-3.28) (3.39) (-1.36)
Constant 9.196 0.324 -1.177 -0.921***
1.55 0.86 -0.77 -3.45
R-squared 88.97 9.56 77.72 19.26
N 267 95 303 97
3.4.3 Underinvestment vs Overinvestment
In order to explore the reasons for the differences in investment–cash flow sensitivity for China
and India, as discussed in Section 3.3.4, I used the three-way interaction PPP*Tobin’s q*Cash
flow method and drew inferences by comparing simple slopes. I then applied the slope difference
method in Tables 3.8.
During the year of the PPP investment (PPP year), as shown in Panel A of Table 3.8, the
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Table 3.8: Chinese and Indian Firms: Reason for the Differences in Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity
- PPP and Non-PPP Firms
This table uses the Slope Difference Test to show whether the differences between PPP and non-PPP
firms in investment-cash flow sensitivity are caused by underinvestment or overinvestment. Panels A
and B reports the results of the Chinese firms in the PPP investment year and the 5-year post-PPP
period, respectively. Panels C and D reports the results of the Indian firms in the PPP investment
year and the 5-year post-PPP period, respectively. PPP was a dummy variable which took value 1 for
firms invested in PPP projects, or else zero for firms which were matched by industry and firm size.
Tobin′s q was measured by the market to book value of total assets in order to capture investment
opportunities. The adjusted-p was a Bonferroni adjusted p-value which accounted for the fact that
there are six post-hoc tests. This was a conservative adjustment by multiplying each p-value by the
number of tests. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Chinese firms in the PPP year Coef. Std. Err. t-test p-value Adjusted-p
(PPP & high q)-(PPP & low q) -0.091 0.028 -3.25 0.006 0.036**
(PPP & high q)-(Non-PPP & high q) -0.298 0.351 -0.85 0.411 2.466
(PPP & low q)-(Non-PPP & low q) -0.137 0.024 -5.73 0.000 0.000***
(Non-PPP & high q)-(Non-PPP & low q) 0.070 0.363 0.19 0.850 5.100
(PPP & high q)-(Non-PPP & low q) -0.228 0.013 -17.77 0.000 0.000***
(PPP & low q)-(Non-PPP & high q) -0.207 0.370 -0.56 0.585 3.510
Panel B: Chinese firms in the post-PPP Coef. Std. Err. t-test p-value Adjusted-p
(PPP & high q)-(PPP & low q) -3.763 1.333 -2.82 0.005 0.030**
(PPP & high q)-(Non-PPP & high q) -0.504 0.259 -1.94 0.052 0.312
(PPP & low q)-(Non-PPP & low q) 3.401 2.031 1.67 0.094 0.564
(Non-PPP & high q)-(Non-PPP & low q) 0.142 0.719 0.2 0.844 5.064
(PPP & high q)-(Non-PPP & low q) -0.362 0.866 -0.42 0.676 4.056
(PPP & low q)-(Non-PPP & high q) 3.259 1.578 2.07 0.039 0.234
Panel C: Indian firms in the PPP year Coef. Std. Err. t-test p-value Adjusted-p
(PPP & high q)-(PPP & low q) 2.653 0.063 42.09 0.000 0.000***
(PPP & high q)-(Non-PPP & high q) 2.739 0.079 34.54 0.000 0.000***
(PPP & low q)-(Non-PPP & low q) 0.260 0.018 14.59 0.000 0.000***
(Non-PPP & high q)-(Non-PPP & low q) 0.175 0.115 1.51 0.150 0.900
(PPP & high q)-(Non-PPP & low q) 2.913 0.0470 62.03 0.000 0.000***
(PPP & low q)-(Non-PPP & high q) 0.085 0.127 0.67 0.512 3.072
Panel D: Indian firms in the post-PPP Coef. Std. Err. t-test p-value Adjusted-p
(PPP & high q)-(PPP & low q) -1.195 0.522 -2.29 0.022 0.132
(PPP & high q)-(Non-PPP & high q) -0.476 0.132 -3.59 0.000 0.000***
(PPP & low q)-(Non-PPP & low q) 0.346 0.757 0.46 0.648 3.888
(Non-PPP & high q)-(Non-PPP & low q) -0.372 0.304 -1.22 0.221 1.326
(PPP & high q)-(Non-PPP & low q) -0.848 0.322 -2.64 0.008 0.048**
(PPP & low q)-(Non-PPP & high q) 0.718 0.634 1.13 0.257 1.542
77
Chinese firms experience a negative and significant slope difference between PPP firms with
high Tobin’s q and PPP firms with low Tobin’s q. This suggests that the Chinese PPP firms with
low investment opportunities may have a higher cash burden than those with high investment
opportunities. This result supports the overinvestment hypothesis of Jensen (1986), indicating
that the Chinese PPP firms may overinvest. However, Panel A of Table 3.8 show that Chinese
firms witness significant negative slope differences between PPP and non-PPP firms with low
Tobin’s q. This indicates that PPP firms with low Tobin’s q experience lower investment–cash
flow sensitivity than non-PPP firms with low Tobin’s q. This indicates that Chinese firms with
lower overinvestment problems opt for PPP projects. Now, I turn to the post-PPP period. As
shown in Panel B of Table 3.8, the statistical significant slope difference only holds between PPP
firms with high Tobin’s q and PPP firms with low Tobin’s q, suggesting that the overinvestment
problem for PPP firms in China persists even after five years of participation in PPP projects.
Overall, the results suggest that Chinese firms investing in PPPs exhibit high investment–cash
flow sensitivity due to the overinvestment problem.
During the PPP years, there is evidence of both underinvestment and overinvestment for
Indian firms investing in PPPs, as indicated in Panel C of Table 3.8. This is evident from the
positive and significant slope differences between PPP firms and non-PPP firms when I kept the
moderator variable Tobin’s q constant (at both the high and the low levels), as shown in Pairs
2 and 3 in Panel C of Table 3.8. Within the PPP firms, the slope difference between PPP firms
with high Tobin’s q and PPP firms with low Tobin’s q is also positive and significant, as shown
in Pair 1 of Panel C. This indicates that PPP firms with high Tobin’s q experience higher
investment–cash flow sensitivity than PPP firms with low Tobin’s q. This result supports
the underinvestment hypothesis (Vogt, 1994). The results of the PPP sensitivity analysis
for India are in line with those in Tables 3.1 and 3.7, suggesting that the Indian PPP firms
depend considerably on internal cash flow to circumvent the adverse selection problem (Vogt,
1994; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).The post-PPP sensitivity analysis, as
reported in Panel D of Table 3.8, shows a significant negative slope difference between PPP firms
with high Tobin’s q and non-PPP firms with high Tobin’s q. The slope difference between PPP
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firms with low Tobin’s q and non-PPP firms with low Tobin’s q is not significant. Therefore,
in India, the lower investment–cash flow sensitivity of PPP firms compared to non-PPP firms
only occurs in the sub-group of firms with high Tobin’s q or high growth opportunities. This
result supports the underinvestment hypothesis. Thus, private sector firms appear to benefit
through lower underinvestment constraints compared to non-PPP firms in the post-PPP period,
supporting Hypothesis 2.
3.4.4 Which Firms Prefer Political Connections?
My second moderating variable, as discussed in Section 3.3.5, indicates the extent of political
connections of the participating firms investing in PPPs. Before I gained an understanding of
the role of political connections, I needed to appreciate which firms investing in PPPs were more
likely to have political connections. Table 3.9 reports the results based on a logit regression,
which uses the firms’ political connections as the binary dependent variable. Columns 1 and 3
report the results for the Chinese and the Indian PPP firms, respectively. In China, PPP firms
with high leverage and large investments in PPPs are more likely to have political connections.
This is evident from the positive and significant coefficients for Leverage and Total investment.
In India, PPP firms with low internal Cash flow and high Size seem to be more likely to seek
political connections. These findings are in line with the idea above that the Indian PPP firms
facing capital constraints and making political connections may be considered as a mechanism
to alleviate liquidity problems faced in PPP projects. The Indian PPP firms with higher
government equity participation in PPPs and multiple PPP projects are also more likely be
politically connected. This is evident from the positive and significant coefficients for Multiple
projects and Public equity.
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Table 3.9: Chinese and Indian Firms: Firm-Level Characteristics and Project-Level Characteristics for Politically Connected Firms in the PPP
Years
This table presents the results of logit regression to illustrate what certain kind of firms and PPP projects are more likely to have political
connections. Political connection (Pol) was a dummy variable that took value 1 for firms that had a chair and executive directors who were
formerly or are currently officers in the government, the parliament or the military. Cash flow denoted income before extraordinary items,
depreciation and amortization, divided by the previous year’s fixed assets. Size was measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage
was calculated by total debt divided by total assets. Age was measured from the year of firms’ incorporation. Tobin′s q (with one year lag)
was measured by the market to book value of total assets in order to capture investment opportunities. Total investment was measured by the
logarithm of the sum of investment in physical assets and payments to the government of a given PPP firm in a given year. Public equity (PE)
was measured by the proportion of total PPP investment that belongs to the government. Multiple project was a dummy variable that took
value 1 if PPP firms had more than one PPP projects or zero else. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Political connection China India
(1) (2)
Cash flow -0.014 -1.035**
(-0.69) (-2.21)
Leverage 7.054*** 0.561
(2.76) (0.18)
Size 0.452 1.444**
(0.73) (2.24)
Age -0.014 -0.033
(-0.25) (-0.61)
Tobin’s q 0.077 -0.053
(0.52) (-0.80)
Total investment 0.006*** -0.0003
(6.75) (-1.66)
Multiple project -0.222 1.708**
(-0.26) (2.53)
Public equity -1.131 5.855
(-0.80) (2.51**)
Constant -2.766 -13.684***
(-0.75) (-3.40)
N 127 163
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3.4.5 Role of Reliance on the Government on Investment–Cash Flow
Sensitivity
As PPP projects involve the public sector, government commitment and political uncertainty
can have a significant impact on the cash flow position of the participating private firms. I
tested this conjecture using equity participation by the government as a measure of govern-
ment commitment or involvement in a given PPP venture. I also tested whether political
connections and changes in institutional quality through governance indicators influence PPP
firms’ investment efficiency in the post-PPP period.
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 report the results of the regression on Equation 3.9 for the five-year
post-PPP contract period. I used the duration of the five-year period in order to keep the
election cycle in perspective.
In terms of public equity, I find that, as indicated in Column 1 of Tables 3.10 and 3.11, for
the Chinese firms investing in PPPs, higher equity contribution from the government reduces
their investment–cash flow sensitivity in the post-PPP period, which supports Hypothesis 3.
However, in the case of the Indian firms, it is exactly the opposite: higher equity contribution
from the government increases the participating private sector firms’ investment–cash flow
sensitivity. This indicates that higher commitment from the government can have mixed results.
Table 3.12 clarifies the reasons for the influence of public equity on the firms’ investment–
cash flow sensitivity. As can be seen from Panel A and the hypothesis matrix in Table 3.12, for
the Chinese firms, there is a significant negative slope difference between firms with high Public
equity and low Tobin’s q, and firms with low Public equity and low Tobin’s q. This indicates
that firms with higher government investment have less overinvestment or that government
involvement helps Chinese firms reduce overinvestment. The results for the Indian firms, as
indicated in Panel B, are insignificant.
I also use State ownership to reconfirm the influence of goverment equity participation in
private sector firms, and the results are reported in Tables 3.13. Panel A of these tables uses
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Table 3.10: Chinese Firms: Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity, Government Reliance and Institution Quality in the Five-Year Post-PPP Period
This table presents the effect of government reliance and institution quality on the investment–cash flow sensitivity of PPP firms in the five-
year post-PPP period. Investment was measured by the changes in gross fixed assets, divided by the previous year’s fixed assets. Cash flow
denoted income before extraordinary items, depreciation and amortization, divided by the previous years’ fixed assets. Size was measured
by the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage was calculated by total debt divided by total assets. Age was measured from the year of
firms’ incorporation. Tobin′sq (with one year lag) was measured by the market to book value of total assets in order to capture investment
opportunities. Public uncertainty (PU) was a dummy variable which took value 1 for PPP firms in general election years, or else zero for
PPP firms in non-election years. Public equity (PE), which was measured by the proportion of the total PPP investment that belonged to
the government, captured government involvement in PPP projects. Political connection (Pol) was a dummy variable which took value 1 for
firms that had a chair and executive directors who were formerly or are currently officers in the government, the parliament or the military.
Accountability, Political stability, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law and Control of corruption captured institution
quality. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Investment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Firm-characteristic variables
Cash flow 5.156*** 3.129** 0.129*** 4.432 -4.824 0.368 -4.626*** -4.434 -0.535
(9.36) (2.29) (4.03) (0.93) (-1.54) (0.99) (-5.22) (-0.94) (-0.19)
Leverage 0.688 1.399 0.796 4.390 4.733** 4.770* 4.290** 5.265* 5.013*
(0.76) (1.54) (1.32) (1.5) (2.3) (1.67) (2.19) (1.84) (1.76)
Size 0.035 -0.083 0.322*** 1.107** 2.810*** 1.113** 0.096 0.641 -0.122
(0.3) (-0.7) (4.11) (2.26) (3.52) (2.25) (0.2) (0.95) (-1.42)
Age -0.016 0.020 -0.033*** -0.062 -0.234*** -0.068 -0.047 -0.051 1.687
(-1.21) (1.3) (-6.49) (-1.14) (-2.79) (-1.37) (-1.38) (-0.55) (1.60)
Tobin’s q 0.003 -0.014 0.006** 0.015*** -0.018 0.015*** -0.012** 0.018*** 0.007
(0.42) (-0.64) (2.68) (4.24) (-0.92) (3.08) (-2.34) (2.67) (1.1)
Panel B: Government involvement variables
Public equity 3.414***
(9.53)
Public equity*Cash flow -12.644***
(-8.93)
Political connection 0.354
(1.2)
Political connection*Cash flow -3.045**
(-2.22)
Panel C: Insititution quality variables
Public uncertainty -0.560*
(-1.89)
Public uncertainty*Cash flow 4.911***
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(4.68)
Accountability 0.529
(0.46)
Accountability*Cash flow 2.648
(0.91)
Political stability 1.636
(1.28)
Political stability*Cash flow -10.243
(-1.57)
Government effectiveness -0.299
(-0.14)
Government effectiveness*Cash flow -1.846
(-0.74)
Regulatory quality 6.366***
(3.21)
Regulatory quality*Cash flow -36.494***
(-5.42)
Rule of law 3.289
(0.62)
Rule of law*Cash flow -13.320
(-0.97)
Control of corruption -1.192**
(-2.02)
Control of corruption*Cash flow -1.150
(-0.22)
Constant -1.356 -2.087*** -0.399 -7.353* -17.147*** -8.187** 0.001 -3.863 -12.040*
(-1.51) (-2.91) (-0.42) (-1.91) (-3.61) (-2.35) (0.00) (-0.76) (-1.76)
R-squared 62.11 69.05 57.31 47.79 59.13 47.48 70.53 51.06 48.15
N 50 50 50 45 45 45 45 45 45
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Table 3.11: Indian Firms: Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity, Government Reliance and Institution Quality in the Five-Year Post-PPP Period
This table presents the effect of government reliance and institution quality on the investment–cash flow sensitivity of PPP firms in the five-
year post-PPP period. Investment was measured by the changes in gross fixed assets, divided by the previous year’s fixed assets. Cash flow
denoted income before extraordinary items, depreciation and amortization, divided by the previous years’ fixed assets. Size was measured
by the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage was calculated by total debt divided by total assets. Age was measured from the year of
firms’ incorporation. Tobin′sq (with one year lag) was measured by the market to book value of total assets in order to capture investment
opportunities. Public uncertainty (PU) was a dummy variable which took value 1 for PPP firms in general election years, or else zero for
PPP firms in non-election years. Public equity (PE), which was measured by the proportion of the total PPP investment that belonged to
the government, captured government involvement in PPP projects. Political connection (Pol) was a dummy variable which took value 1 for
firms that had a chair and executive directors who were formerly or are currently officers in the government, the parliament or the military.
Accountability, Political stability, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law and Control of corruption captured institution
quality. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Investment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Firm-characteristic variables
Cash flow 0.341 -0.107 0.075 6.439*** 1.385 0.616 -0.621 0.642 -0.558
(0.74) (-0.60) (0.35) (3.15) (0.74) (1.20) (-0.48) (0.97) (-0.40)
Leverage 0.124 -0.213 0.013 0.891 0.281 0.449 0.218 0.286 0.328
(0.44) (-1.64) (0.05) (0.77) (0.24) (0.38) (0.19) (0.24) (0.29)
Size 0.1361*** 0.042 0.146*** 0.599 0.890 0.688 1.007 1.045 -0.065
(7.27) (0.67) (3.62) (0.91) (1.15) (1.23) (1.74) (1.41) (-1.03)
Age -0.021*** -0.013 -0.031** -0.072 -0.063 -0.084* -0.074 -0.085 0.998
(-3.05) (-1.47) (-2.46) (-1.22) (1.00) (-1.77) (-1.56) (-1.11) (1.49)
Tobin’s q -0.130** -0.135*** -0.100** -0.115** -0.082 -0.080* -0.028 -0.068 -0.065
(-2.83) (-3.89) (-2.28) (-1.66) (-1.38) (-1.74) (-0.44) (-1.06) (-0.96)
Panel B: Government involvement variables
Public equity -0.523***
(-3.64)
Public equity*Cash flow 3.016***
(8.81)
Political connection -0.404***
(-2.73)
Political connection*Cash flow 1.663***
(3.21)
Panel C: Insititution quality variables
Public uncertainty -0.927***
(-3.3)
Public uncertainty*Cash flow 2.668***
84
(4.64)
Accountability 5.923***
(2.69)
Accountability*Cash flow -14.524***
(-2.85)
Political stability -0.326
(-0.44)
Political stability*Cash flow 0.592
(0.3)
Government effectiveness 0.9778192
(0.86)
Government effectiveness*Cash flow -8.681***
(-2.98)
Regulatory quality -0.006
(-0.01)
Regulatory quality*Cash flow -3.575
(-1.01)
Rule of law -0.515
(-0.47)
Rule of law*Cash flow -0.629
(-0.25)
Control of corruption 0.333
(0.25)
Control of corruption*Cash flow -2.554
(-0.83)
Constant -0.596* -0.490 0.335 -6.452 -6.812 -4.673 -7.192* -7.321 -7.056
(-1.8) (-1.4) (0.78) (-1.23) (-1.07) (-1.06) (-1.76) (-1.36) (-1.42)
R-squared 26.53 42.72 32.92 32.66 21.2 35.09 35.92 23.93 21.66
N 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
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Table 3.12: Chinese and Indian Firms: Reasons for the Effects of Public Equity on Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity in the Five-Year Post-PPP
Period
This table uses a Slope Difference Test to show whether high government involvement in PPP projects lead firms to suffer overinvestment
or underinvestment problems. Public equity (PE), which was measured by the proportion of the total PPP investment that belonged to the
government, captured government involvement in PPP projects. Tobin′s q (with one year lag) was measured by the market to book value of
total assets in order to capture investment opportunities. The adjusted-p was the Bonferroni adjusted p-value which accounted for the fact that
there were six post-hoc tests. This was a conservative adjustment made by multiplying each p-value by the number of tests. ***,**,* indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: China - Slopes Coef. Std. Err. t-test p-value Adjusted-p
(high q & high PE)-(high q & low PE) 1.404 1.240 1.13 0.257 1.542
(high q & high PE)-(low q & high PE) 0.916 1.383 0.66 0.508 3.048
(high q & low PE)-(low q & low PE) -4.637 1.453 -3.19 0.001 0.006***
(low q & high PE)-(low q & low PE) -4.148 1.523 -2.72 0.006 0.036**
(high q & high PE)-(low q & low PE) -3.232 1.179 -2.74 0.006 0.036**
(high q & low PE)-(low q & high PE) -0.489 0.155 -3.16 0.002 0.012**
Panel B: India - Slopes Coef. Std. Err. t-test p-value Adjusted-p
(high q & high PE)-(high q & low PE) 0.811 0.393 2.06 0.039 0.234
(high q & high PE)-(low q & high PE) -1.127 0.605 -1.86 0.062 0.372
(high q & low PE)-(low q & low PE) -1.127 0.605 -1.86 0.062 0.372
(low q & high PE)-(low q & low PE) 0.811 0.393 2.06 0.039 0.234
(high q & high PE)-(low q & low PE) -0.316 0.993 -0.32 0.750 4.500
(high q & low PE)-(low q & high PE) -1.937 0.235 -8.25 0.000 0.000***
Hypotheses Development Matrix
Panel C: China - Tobin’s q High PE - High PE High PE - Low PE Low PE - Low PE
High q - Low q Not significant No prediction (-): Low PE has overinvestment
High q - High q No prediction Not significant No prediction
Low q - Low q No prediction (-): High PE has less overinvestment No prediction
Panel D: India - Tobin’s q High PE - High PE High PE - Low PE Low PE - Low PE
High q - Low q Not significant No prediction Not significant
High q - High q No prediction Not significant No prediction
Low q - Low q No prediction Not significant No prediction
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Table 3.13: Chinese and Indian Firms: The Effects of State Ownership on Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity in the Five-Year Post-PPP Period
– A Comparison of PPP and Non-PPP Firms
This table reports the comparison of PPP and non-PPP firms under the effects of state ownerships in firms. Panel A reports the regression results
of the investment–cash flow sensitivity analysis with the influence of state ownership. Panels B and C report the results of a Slope Difference
Test to show whether high state ownership leads firms to suffer overinvestment or underinvestment problems for PPP firms and non-PPP firms,
respectively. Investment was measured by the changes in gross fixed assets, divided by the previous years’ fixed assets. Cash flow denoted
income before extraordinary items, depreciation and amortization, divided by the previous years’ fixed assets. Size was measured by the natural
logarithm of total assets. Leverage was calculated by the total debt divided by the total assets. Age was measured from the year of the firms’
incorporation. Tobin′sq (with one year lag) was measured by the market to book value of total assets in order to capture investment opportunities.
State ownership (SO) was measured by the proportion of partnering private sector firms that belongs to the government. The adjusted-p was
the Bonferroni adjusted p-value which accounted for the fact that there were six post-hoc tests. This was a conservative adjustment made by
multiplying each p-value by the number of tests. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Regression results China India
PPP Non-PPP PPP Non-PPP
Investment (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash flow 2.871** 0.235 0.356 1.085**
(2.149) (0.141) (0.762) (2.531)
Leverage 3.169** 0.404 0.112 0.550***
(2.352) (0.826) (0.381) (2.902)
Age 0.054 -0.091 0.142*** 0.075
(1.124) (-1.477) (7.157) (0.644)
Size 0.197 0.602 -0.021*** 0.001
(0.354) (1.846) (-3.037) (0.006)
Tobin’s q 0.017*** 0.039 -0.127*** -0.058*
(3.205) (0.737) (-2.717) (-1.753)
State ownership 7.426* 0.575 -0.696*** 0.125
(1.886) (0.572) (-3.151) (0.581)
State ownership * Cash flow -4.804* 3.134 4.382*** -0.041
(-1.968) (0.917) (9.352) (-0.080)
Constant -4.537 -3.651** -0.649** -0.846
(-1.190) (-2.638) (-2.065) (-1.102)
R-squared 68.77 27.4 26.03 31.45
N 50 45 52 45
Panel B: Slope Differences for PPP Firms China India
Coef. Std. Err. t-test p-value Adjusted-p Coef. Std. Err. t-test p-value Adjusted-p
(high q & high SO) - (high q & low SO) -1.257 0.321 -3.92 0 0*** 2.503 1.664 1.5 0.132 0.792
(high q & high SO) - (low q & high SO) -1.371 0.660 -2.08 0.038 0.228 1.308 0.935 1.4 0.162 0.972
(high q & low SO) - (low q & low SO) -4.210 1.282 -3.28 0.001 0.006* -1.316 1.421 -0.93 0.354 2.124
(low q & high SO) - (low q & low SO) -4.096 0.654 -6.27 0 0*** -0.121 0.597 -0.2 0.84 5.04
(high q & high SO) - (low q & low SO) -5.467 1.185 -4.61 0 0*** 1.187 0.487 2.44 0.015 0.09*
(high q & low SO) - (low q & high SO) -0.114 0.775 -0.15 0.883 5.298 -1.195 0.850 -1.41 0.16 0.96
Panel C: Slope Differences for Non-PPP Firms Coef. Std. Err. t-test p-value Adjusted-p Coef. Std. Err. t-test p-value Adjusted-p
(high q & high SO) - (high q & low SO) 2.031 0.440 4.62 0 0*** -0.542 0.643 -0.84 0.399 2.394
(high q & high SO) - (low q & high SO) 0.979 0.133 7.37 0 0*** -0.600 0.441 -1.36 0.174 1.044
(high q & low SO) - (low q & low SO) -2.067 1.577 -1.31 0.19 1.14 0.173 0.428 0.4 0.687 4.122
(low q & high SO) - (low q & low SO) -1.014 1.270 -0.8 0.425 2.55 0.230 0.614 0.38 0.707 4.242
(high q & high SO) - (low q & low SO) -0.036 1.236 -0.03 0.977 5.862 -0.370 0.589 -0.63 0.53 3.18
(high q & low SO) - (low q & high SO) -1.053 0.351 -3 0.003 0.018** -0.058 0.765 -0.08 0.94 5.64
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the investment–cash flow sensitivity analysis in the 5-year post-PPP period to compare the
effects of state ownerships on PPP firms with those on non-PPP firms.
Regarding the Chinese firms, for PPP firms, those with higher state ownership have lower
investment–cash flow sensitivity as justified by the negative coefficient in the interaction term
between State ownership and Cash flow in Column 1. However, for non-PPP counterparts,
as indicated in Column 2, there is an insignificant result. I further explain this difference in
Panels B and C by investigating whether state ownership helps firm reduce underinvestment
or overinvestment. Panel B indicates results for PPP firms while Panel C indicates results for
non-PPP firms. I focus more on the pair of slopes in which State ownership (SO) changes from
high to low level while Tobin′s q is kept constant to see how changes in state ownership benefit
firms. As can be seen in Panel B of Table 3.13, for PPP firms, there are negative and significant
slope differences between high State ownership (high SO) and low State ownership (low SO)
when the moderator Tobin′s q is held constant at a high or a low level. This indicates that high
state ownership may help PPP-invested firms reduce both overinvestment and underinvestment.
Whereas, in the case of non-PPP counterparts, as seen in Panel C of Table 3.13, positive and
significant slope differences between high State ownership (high SO) and low State ownership
(low SO) became evident when the moderator Tobin′s q is held constant at a high level. This
result shows that non-PPP firms with high state ownership may still underinvest. Overall, as
stated by these results above, for the Chinese firms, participating in PPPs enhances the benefits
of higher government equity participation for partnering private sectors firms.
By contrast, for the Indian firms, as indicated in Panel A of Table 3.13, PPP-partnering
private sector firms experience a higher investment–cash flow sensitivity when involving in
higher state ownership. This is evident by the positive and significance of the interaction term
between State ownership and Cash flow as seen in Column 3. There is no such significant
result for non-PPP counterparts as seen in Column 4. When I decompose further into the
underinvestment and overinvestment problems, as seen in Panels B and C of Table 3.13, there
is almost no significance for both PPP and non-PPP firms. These results in the Indian firms
again confirming the overall results in India that PPPs are even detrimental to partnering
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private sector firms when receiving higher government equity participation.
The effects of political connections are indicated in Panel A of Table 3.14. Columns 1 and
2 is for PPP and non-PPP firms in China, Columns 3 and 4 is for PPP and non-PPP in India,
respectively. The Chinese PPP firms with political connections have less investment sensitivity
than those without such connections. This is evident from the negative and significant coeffi-
cient of the interaction variable between Political connection and Cash flow in Column 1. This
result strongly supports Hypothesis 3. On the contrary, in India, politically connected PPP
firms have more investment–cash flow sensitivity as indicated in Column 3; or in other words,
political connections may be risky for private sector firms in PPPs. I conducted the same
analysis on the influence of political connection on non-PPP private sector firms, as also seen
in Columns 2 and 4 in Panel A of Table 3.14 for the Chinese and the Indian non-PPP firms,
respectively. I found no evidence of the significant influence of political connection on the non-
PPP competitors’ investment–cash flow sensitivity, as evident by the insignificance results of
the interaction term between Political connection and Cash flow in the non-PPP counterparts.
I delve into the reasons for these differences. Tables 3.14 explore whether political connec-
tions affect the investment–cash flow sensitivity of PPP firms and their non-PPP counterparts
(as seen in Panels B and C respectively) by dealing with underinvestment or overinvestment.
For PPP firms, the results of the slope differences in the Chinese PPP firms, as indicated
in Panel B of Table 3.14, suggesting that politically connected firms have less underinvestment
and overinvestment than their nonpolitically connected counterparts. This is evident from
the negative and significant slope differences between Political connection and Nonpolitical
connection when the moderator Tobin’s q is held constant at a high or a low level. By contrast,
in the Indian firms investing in PPPs, as also indicated in Panel B of Table 3.14, politically
connected firms have more overinvestment than their nonpolitical counterparts.
Regarding non-PPP counterparts, the same analysis on the influence of political connection
was conducted. For the Chinese firms, as reported in Panel C of Table 3.14, no positive effects
are evident on the effects of political connections on investment efficiency of non-PPP firms,
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Table 3.14: Chinese and Indian Firms: The Effects of Political Connection on Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity in the Five-Year Post-PPP
Period - A Comparison of PPP and Non-PPP Firms
This table reports the comparison of PPP and non-PPP firms under the effects of Political connection. Panel A reports the regression results
of investment–cash flow sensitivity analysis with the influence of Political connection. Panels B and C report the results of a Slope Difference
Test to show whether political connections lead firms to suffer overinvestment or underinvestment problems for PPP firms and non-PPP firms,
respectively. Investment was measured by the changes in gross fixed assets, divided by the previous years’ fixed assets. Cash flow denoted
income before extraordinary items, depreciation and amortization, divided by the previous years’ fixed assets. Size was measured by the
natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage was calculated by total debt divided by total assets. Age was measured from the year of firms’
incorporation. Tobin′sq (with one year lag) was measured by the market to book value of total assets in order to capture investment opportunities.
Political connection (Pol) was a dummy variable which took value 1 for firms that had a chair and executive directors who were formerly or are
currently officers in the government, the parliament or the military. The adjusted-p was the Bonferroni adjusted p-value which accounted for the
fact that there were six post-hoc tests. This was a conservative adjustment made by multiplying each p-value by the number of tests. ***,**,*
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Regression results China India
PPP Non-PPP PPP Non-PPP
Investment (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash flow 3.129** 0.532 -0.107 1.037**
(2.286) (0.918) (-0.601) (2.557)
Leverage 1.399 -0.218 -0.213 0.217
(1.535) (-0.860) (-1.641) (0.532)
Age 0.020 -0.043*** -0.013 -0.012
(1.296) (-6.992) (-1.471) (-0.517)
Size -0.083 0.136*** 0.042 0.223
(-0.699) (7.143) (0.674) (0.898)
Tobin’s q -0.014 0.005 -0.135*** -0.059*
(-0.644) (0.164) (-3.893) (-1.896)
Political connection 0.354 -0.246* -0.404*** 0.003
(1.202) (-1.953) (-2.739) 0.010
Political connection * Cash flow -3.045** 0.759 1.663*** -0.475
(-2.215) (1.419) (3.206) (-0.928)
Constant -0.399 -0.317*** 0.335 -1.681
(-0.422) (-5.026) (0.782) (-1.126)
R-squared 57.31 32.34 32.92 31.07
N 50 45 52 45
Panel B: Slope differences for PPP firms China India
Coef. Std. Err. t-test p-value Adjusted-p Coef. Std. Err. t-test p-value Adjusted-p
(high q & high Pol) - (high q & low Pol) -1.735 0.160 -10.85 0 0*** -0.652 0.333 -1.960 0.051 0.306
(high q & high Pol) - (low q & high Pol) 0.066 0.340 0.19 0.847 5.082 -2.699 0.554 -4.870 0.000 0.000***
(high q & low Pol) - (low q & low Pol) -2.983 0.863 -3.46 0.001 0.006* -0.192 0.424 -0.450 0.651 3.906
(low q & high Pol) - (low q & low Pol) -4.784 0.867 -5.52 0 0*** 1.855 0.571 3.250 0.001 0.006*
(high q & high Pol) - (low q & low Pol) -4.718 0.952 -4.96 0 0*** -0.844 0.544 -1.550 0.121 0.726
(high q & low Pol) - (low q & high Pol) 1.801 0.398 4.53 0 0*** -2.047 0.293 -6.990 0.000 0.000***
Panel C: Slope Differences for non-PPP firms Coef. Std. Err. t-test p-value Adjusted-p Coef. Std. Err. t-test p-value Adjusted-p
(high q & high Pol) - (high q & low Pol) 1.964 0.391 5.02 0 0*** -1.372 0.653 -2.1 0.036 0.216
(high q & high Pol) - (low q & high Pol) 1.046 0.111 9.38 0 0*** -1.546 0.584 -2.64 0.008 0.048**
(high q & low Pol) - (low q & low Pol) -1.856 1.500 -1.24 0.216 1.296 0.057 0.472 0.12 0.904 5.424
(low q & high Pol) - (low q & low Pol) -0.936 1.219 -0.77 0.442 2.652 0.230 0.631 0.36 0.715 4.29
(high q & high Pol) - (low q & low Pol) 0.108 1.201 0.09 0.928 5.568 -1.316 0.802 -1.64 0.101 0.606
(high q & low Pol) - (low q & high Pol) -0.918 0.325 -2.82 0.005 0.03** -0.173 0.610 -0.28 0.777 4.662
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both in terms of reducing underinvestment and overinvestment problems. Therefore, in China,
PPPs help partnering private sector firms improve their government-backed benefits compared
with those of their non-PPP counterparts. For the Indian non-PPP firms, as also shown in
Panel C of Table 3.14, the results do not witness any benefits of political connections. Hence,
for the Indian PPP firms, participating in PPPs may even hinder their investment efficiency
whereas in case of their non-PPP counterparts, I cannot see the evidence of such obstacles.
Overall, reliance on the government and on political connections benefit the Chinese firms
by lowering their overinvestment problem; however, these kinds of connections are risky for the
Indian firms since political connections exacerbate the overinvestment problem. These results,
which highlight the opposing effects of political connections on the Chinese and Indian firms,
are consistent with the above results on the determinants of wealth effects arising from PPP
announcements.
The possible rationale for the contrasting results of the influence of government support
on PPPs in China and India is each country’s distinct political setup. In China, my results
are consistent with the findings of Bai et al. (2005); Chen et al. (2011) and Li et al. (2008)
who claim that the Chinese economy and banking system are controlled and regulated by the
Chinese government; therefore, private sector firms seek political ties to ensure better growth
opportunities, succeed in the approval process and gain easier access to bank lending. Hence,
the more government support, the higher bank loans that private sector firms can access to
fulfil their investment demand, which in turn reduces the possibility of over-reliance on internal
cash flow. According to Jiang and Zeng (2014), Chinese state-owned banks have a disciplining
role for private sector firms with low growth opportunities, so that their monitoring role will
alleviate the overinvestment problems of private firms with high debt financing. Moreover, my
findings about the Chinese firms are aligned with Bai et al. (2006) and Cull and Xu (2005)
who argue that China’s extensive regulation of interest rates in some cases prevents the price
of external financing from being exceeded by that of internal financing. For example, in the
case of PPPs, the government can provide subsidized loans for partnering private sector firms
at a lower cost than normal. Therefore, the Pecking Order Hypothesis, which indicates that
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owners prefer internal cash flow to external financing, may not operate in China. As a result,
higher and preferred bank lending in firms with more government support may reduce more the
overuse of internal cash flow compared to firms who do not experience government interference.
My results for the Indian firms suggest that, unlike in China, political connections are
detrimental to PPP-partnering private sector firms in that they impose more overinvestment
than they do with the nonpolitical counterparts. This difference of these two countries may
be attributed to the differences in their political systems. While China pursues a unitary
polity, India belongs to a federal system. Desai (2005) emphasizes that which China has a
stable centrally run state that ensures the success of government pursuing a single goal with
full commitment. Meanwhile, India’s federalism along with alternative changes of the party in
power makes it difficult for the country to deliver a strong focused government. As a result,
in the case of social projects like PPPs in China, the mutual benefits between governments
(social welfare) and private sector firms may be easy to achieve through political ties, since the
government can provide another discipline role for ensuring the smoothness of a project without
any disturbance from cash flow assigned to the managers’ private purposes. By contrast, the
two-level government structure of Indian federalism means that politically connected firms are
not fully favored or manipulated by both ruling political parties, neither at the center nor
at the state level (Datta and K. Ganguli, 2014). Consequently, politicians are more likely to
pursue their own interests to extract advantages as much as possible even though this can harm
the social welfare as a whole. This argument is aligned with Gerring et al. (2006) who state
that the absence of unity in the early federal system may encourage individualistic behavior
towards personal short-term goals rather than general long-term political goals. Overall, the
contrasting results of government involvement in the Chinese and Indian firms suggest that the
institutional environment is working as a crucial mediator for the success of PPP partnering
private sector firms.
Therefore, my study now turns to an exploration of the institutional effects as measured
by the indicators of Public uncertainty and Governance in Columns 3 to 9 of Tables 3.10
and 3.11. I used the election year dummy as my public uncertainty indicator. I conjectured
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that PPPs that entered into contracts in the election year would face higher uncertainty as
possible policy changes of the new government can impact the cash flow associated with the
PPP investments. In the case of political uncertainty, the results are similar for both China
and India: PPP projects awarded during the election year face higher investment–cash flow
sensitivity. Regarding the governance indicators, as indicated in Column 7 of Table 3.10, the
Chinese PPP firms are seen to have lower investment–cash flow sensitivity when regulatory
quality improves. As indicated in Columns 4 and 6 of Table 3.11, the Indian PPP firms can
have lower investment–cash flow sensitivity when Accountability and Government effectiveness
is high. It is interesting to find that accountability matters more in India than China. Given
that accountability is measured by the ability to practise citizens’ freedom of expression and to
select their preferred government (Kaufmann et al., 2011), the results are consistent with the
idea that the political set-up in India—democracy—is mirrored in the Indian firms as well. In
China, however, regulatory quality, measured as the ability of the government to promote the
private sector (Kaufmann et al., 2011), matters more. This is consistent with the benefits of
high reliance on the government in China.
In summary, my results indicate that reliance on the government is beneficial in China,
whereas it can be detrimental in India. Better institution quality is favorable for both the
Chinese and the Indian firms. Both countries benefit from better institutional quality although
their favorable assessment criteria for institutional quality are not similar.
3.4.6 Role of Contractual Agreements on Investment–Cash-Flow
Sensitivity
My final analysis explores the role of contractual agreements on investment–cash flow sensitivity,
as shown in Table 3.15. The contractual methods are mainly classified into three groups. The
first classification is based on whether the project is a new or greenfield project with full
autonomy of the private partner or a concession project, where the private partner takes over
the management of the existing public sector firm. I find that greenfield projects experience
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higher investment–cash flow sensitivity in China, whereas the opposite prevails in India. This
is consistent with the result of the level of government participation in terms of equity in the
previous section. It suggests that the Chinese private sector firms benefit from higher reliance
on the government, whereas the Indian private sector firms benefit more from independent
projects with total autonomy. This finding also supports Hypothesis 3.
The second classification is based on the method of awarding the PPP contract. As discussed
earlier, PPPs can be awarded either through competitive bidding or through direct negotiations
with the government. The results indicate that the awarding method matters in China. The
Chinese private sector firms benefit from lower investment–cash flow sensitivity when PPP
contracts are awarded through direct negotiations, supporting Hypothesis 3. However, the
awarding method is not significant in India.
The final classification is based on the source of revenue for the private partner. The private
partner in a PPP project can collect revenue directly by charging a fee from the customers, or it
can receive a fixed payment from the government. In both China and India, higher uncertainty
exists for partnering private firms that collect directly from future users of the project; contracts
that collect future revenue through user fee experience higher investment–cash flow sensitivity
during the post-PPP investment period. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3.
In summary, one interesting finding from the contracting method analysis is that the Chinese
firms benefit more from relying on the government.
3.4.7 Robustness Tests
Heckman Two-Stage Analysis to Control for Selection Bias Arising from the Choice
of Awarding Methods
One major issue with my analysis has been a potential endogeneity problem that may have
arisen due to unobservable firm-level productivity and its corresponding success in securing
PPP contracts. For instance, there is every chance that only those firms that are top perform-
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Table 3.15: Chinese and Indian Firms: the Effects of Contract Mechanism on Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity in PPP Firms in the Five-Year
Post-PPP Period
This table presents the effects of PPP contract mechanisms on the investment–cash flow sensitivity. Investment was measured by the changes
in gross fixed assets, divided by the previous years’ fixed assets. Cash flow (CF) denoted income before extraordinary items, depreciation and
amortization, divided by the previous years’ fixed assets. Size was measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Tobin′s q (with one year
lag) was measured by the market to book value of total assets in order to capture investment opportunities. Leverage was calculated by the total
debt divided by the total assets. TypePPP was a dummy variable which took value 1 for PPP firms with greenfield projects and took value
zero for those with concession projects. Awardingmethod was a dummy variable which takes value 1 for PPP firms whose projects awarded
by direct negotiations, and took value zero for those whose projects awarded by competitive biddings. Revenue sources was a dummy variable
which took value 1 for PPP firms receiving a fixed payment from the government, and took value zero for those having revenue from user fees.
The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Investment China China China India India India
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash flow (CF) 0.106 4.968*** 0.113 1.397 -0.245 -0.370
(1.58) (7.86) (1.67) (0.72) (-0.26) (-0.67)
Leverage 3.250*** 2.745*** 2.490*** 0.154 -0.136 -0.038
(3.04) (3.22) (2.78) (0.24) (-0.11) (-0.07)
Size -0.342* -0.001 -0.280 0.533 1.735* -0.033
(-1.74) (0.00) (-1.32) (1.52) (1.75) (-0.09)
Age 0.008 -0.022 0.002 -0.033 -0.118 -0.058**
(0.5) (-0.96) (0.11) (-1.36) (-1.51) (-2.36)
Tobin’s q 0.019 -0.213* 0.017 -0.104* -0.077 -0.104
(1.02) (-1.75) (0.95) (-1.72 (-0.82) (-1.64)
Type PPP=Greenfields -0.151 -0.053
(-0.340) (-0.060)
Greenfields*CF 3.012*** -0.497
(6.200) (-0.260)
Awarding method=Direct negotiations 0.687 1.508
(1.610) (1.300)
Direct negotiations*CF -4.749*** 1.176
(-7.6) (1.1)
Revenue sources==User fees -1.356*** -1.869*
(-3.19) (-2.00)
User fees*CF 3.0786*** 3.930***
(6.26) (3.45)
Constant 1.399 -0.056 1.826 -3.571 -15.394* 0.972
(1.02) (-0.03) (1.26) (-1.52) (-1.79) (0.35)
N 50 45 50 52 40 52
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ers may end up securing PPP contracts. In that case, the reduction in the investment–cash flow
sensitivity can be due to the firms’ inherent qualities rather than the PPP investment effect.
I attempted to understand this issue by exploiting the endogeneity in the contract awarding
methods. Fortunately, my data allowed me to observe whether the PPP contract was awarded
through the direct negotiation method or the competitive bidding method. My hypothesis in
this context is that personal negotiation-based awarding is less transparent and hence may not
follow the strict, objective, and transparent criteria of the competitive open bidding process of
awarding PPP contracts. In that case, I expect competitive bidding-based PPP contracts to ex-
perience higher reduction in investment–cash flow sensitivity to account for their productivity-
as well as PPP-related gains. On the other hand, if negotiation-based contracts experience
relatively higher reduction of investment–cash flow sensitivity due to PPP engagement, then it
can be argued that the PPP effect is over and above the productivity effect.
Following Heckman (1976), I conducted the two-stage model to circumvent the above ex-
plained endogeneity and self-selection concerns. In the first stage, I ran the probit model
to estimate the probability of PPP projects being awarded by competitive bidding or direct
negotiation.
(Awarding method)it = α + β1(Size)it + β2(Leverage)it+ β3(Tobin
′s q)it
+ β4(Control of corruption)it + δi + δt + it
(3.17)
In Equation 3.17, the awarding method is a dummy variable that takes 1 for partnering private
firms when PPP projects are awarded through direct negotiation, and zero for those through
competitive bidding. I assumed that the winning bidders may have higher productivity, inno-
vation, and dynamism (Construction Industry Council, 2000). Therefore, I included some firm-
level variables that may determine firm-level innovation, like Size, Leverage, and Tobin′s q, in
the first-stage model. This is because firms that are larger have high investment opportunities
and high external financing and tend to be more innovative and dynamic (Ayyagari et al., 2012).
Moreover, I followed Chong et al. (2012) and Spiller (2008, 2013) to argue that government
and third-party opportunism exert effects on public contracting, and the government prefers
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auctions to avoid corruption and favoritism. Hence, I controlled for the level of corruption, as
in Kaufmann et al. (2011), to control for the influence of third party opportunism on the choice
of PPP contract awarding methods.
I then obtained the inverse Mills’ ratio from Equation 3.17 and included it in the second-
stage model (based on Equation 3.12). The purpose of the second-stage model was to estimate
the effects of contract mechanisms on PPP firms’ investment–cash flow sensitivity after con-
trolling for the selection bias of the awarding methods.
The results for the two-stage model are presented in Table 3.16. Panel A of this table
illustrates the probit estimates of the awarding methods. I find that the larger private sector
firms in both China and India are more likely to opt for PPP through the competitive bidding
method. More importantly, only the Chinese firms who have higher debt burdens and who are
facing more stringent regulatory oversight during corruption crackdowns are more likely to be
awarded PPP projects through competitive bidding. This is consistent with the observations
presented in Ayyagari et al. (2012); Chong et al. (2012) and Spiller (2008, 2013). Panel B
presents the effects of the awarding methods on investment–cash flow sensitivity after Mills’
ratio was included in the regression to control for selection bias. The coefficient of Mills’
ratio is negative and significant in both the Chinese and the Indian firms. This indicates
that selection bias might exist in both samples. After controlling for this selection concern in
the Chinese firms, the effects of the awarding method on investment–cash flow sensitivity are
qualitatively similar to the results reported in Table 3.15. The Chinese private sector firms
with projects awarded through direct negotiation experience higher reduction in investment–
cash flow sensitivity than firms whose projects are awarded through competitive bidding. This
confirms that the PPP effect is greater than the productivity effect in the Chinese firms. In
contrast, after controlling for selection bias in the Indian PPP firms, I find that firms with
projects awarded by direct negotiation experience higher investment–cash flow sensitivity. This
indicates that negotiation-based contracting is more beneficial for the Chinese private sector
firms. This result is in line with the general evidence that compared to the Indian private sector
firms, Chinese private sector firms benefit to a greater degree from contract mechanisms that
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involve more reliance on the government.
Heckman Two-Stage Model to Capture Endogeneity Issue Arising from Political
Ties Associated with the Choice of PPP Private Partners
In addition to unobserved firm-level productivity, there is potential endogeneity concern asso-
ciated with the political ties of PPP partnering private firms. PPP projects in infrastructure
are implemented to fulfil not only the economic goals but also the social and political goals of
the government; hence, they may tend to choose the winners with political ties to ensure that
they can easily establish more control and intervention on projects. Political connections are
proved to bring preferential access to external financing (Claessens et al., 2008; Cull and Xu,
2005; Faccio et al., 2006; Faccio, 2010; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Li et al., 2008); therefore, in
that case, the reduction in the investment–cash flow sensitivity can be due to both political
connections and PPP investment effects. To deal with this endogeneity issue, I again conducted
the Heckman two-stage model to control the effects of political connections on the choice of
PPP private partners before testing the effects of PPPs on the firms’ investment efficiency. In
the first stage, a probit model was used to estimate the determinants of private sector firms’
participation in PPP projects.
PPP = α + β1Cash flow + β2Size+ β3Age+ β4Leverage+ β5Tobin
′s q
+ β6Political connection+ 
(3.18)
In addition to Political connection, I also included firm-level variables in the first stage model to
determine the nature of private sector firms that opt for PPPs, including Cash flow,Size,Age,
Leverage, and Tobin′s q. This was due to the above evidence that the nature of private sector
firms that go for PPPs is considerably different between the two economies. In China, older,
mature, and better-valued firms with lower debt burdens (than their matched firms) engage
in PPPs while in India, younger firms with higher debt burdens and lower cash flow engage
in PPPs. Later, Mills’ ratio from Equation 3.18 was obtained and included in the second-
stage model (Equation 3.6) to test the effects of PPPs on partnering private sector firms. The
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Table 3.16: Heckman Two-Stage Analysis to Control for Selection Bias Arising from the Choice of
Awarding Methods
This table presents the two-stage model to circumvent the self-selection concerns of project awarding
methods. Panel A indicates the first-stage model in which I ran the probit model to estimate the proba-
bility of PPP projects being awarded by competitive biddings or direct negotiations. Awardingmethod
was a dummy variable, which took value 1 for partnering private firms when PPP projects were
awarded through direct negotiation, or else zero for those through competitive bidding. I included
Size, Leverage, Tobin′s q, and Control of corruption as the factors driving the choice of awarding
methods. Panel B presents the investment–cash flow analysis where I included Mills’ ratio, estimated
by Panel A, to control for self-selection problems of awarding methods. The t-statistics are in paren-
theses. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: The probit estimate of awarding methods
Awarding method China India
(1) (2)
Size -3.084** -8.221*
(-2.00) (-1.70)
Leverage -23.230** 6.699
(-2.01) (0.79)
Tobin’s q -0.231 -0.682
(-0.18) (-0.44)
Control of corruption -12.299** 18.355
(-2.04) (1.26)
Constant 21.605* 69.889
(1.69) (1.68)
Likelihood ratio 16.00*** 22.55***
N 45 40
Panel B: The effects of awarding method on investment–cash
flow sensitivity after controlling for self-selection problem
Investment China India
(1) (2)
Cash flow 5.411*** -1.107***
(6.510) (-2.970)
Size 0.025 -0.056
(0.170) (-1.140)
Leverage 1.163** 0.779*
(2.410) (1.750)
Age 0.012** 0.003
(2.28) (0.22)
Tobin’s q -0.278*** -0.120***
(-3.44) (-3.19)
Awarding method = Direct negotiations 0.826*** -0.894**
(4.52) (-2.35)
Direct negotiations * Cash flow -5.203*** 2.393**
(-6.33) (2.68)
Mills’ ratio -0.056* -0.541***
(-1.68) (-3.19)
Constant -1.097 1.175***
(-0.96) (2.98)
R-squared 78.55 36.86
N 45 40
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Table 3.17: Robustness Tests to Deal with the Endogeneity of the Choice of PPPs
This table presents the results of the robustness tests to deal with the endogeneity of the choice of PPPs. Columns 1 and 2 report
the results of the Heckman two-stage model to circumvent the endogeneity issue associated with the political ties of PPP partnering
private firms in China and India, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the results of the instrument-variable model in China and
India, respectively. Panel A indicates the first-stage model in which I ran the probit model to predict the probability of private
partners award PPP projects. PPP was a dummy variable, which takes value 1 for firms invested in PPP projects, else zero for
firms which were matched by industry and firm size. For the Heckman two-stage model (as in Columns 1 and 2), I included Size,
Leverage, Age, Tobin′s q, and Political connection in the first-stage of as the factors driving the choice of PPP private partners.
Then panel B (as in Columns 1 and 2) presents the investment–cash flow analysis where I included the Mills’ ratio, estimated by
Panel A, to control for the endogeneity concern of PPP choice. For the instrument-variable model (as in Columns 3 and 4), I
included the instrument variable Privatization as being measured by the proportions of a privatization deal that is in the same
industry and year as the PPP projects. Panel B presents the investment–cash flow analysis when replacing the endogenous variable
PPP with its predicted value from the first stage. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Stage 1-The probit estimate of PPPs
Heckman two-stage model Instrument variables
PPP China India China India
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash flow 0.546 -0.170 2.339 0.312
(0.558) (-0.103) (0.523) (0.108)
Leverage -3.350** 7.247*** -1.678 9.033**
(-2.470) (4.025) (-0.350) (2.994)
Age 0.161*** 0.201** 0.323* 0.231*
(2.919) (2.859) (1.957) (1.877)
Size -0.082 -0.667 0.069 -0.936
(-0.312) (-1.004) (0.068) (-0.742)
Tobin’s q (-0.023) (-0.250) 0.012 -0.390
(-0.407) (-1.559) (0.061) (-1.409)
Political connection 0.396* 0.830
(1.904) (1.045)
Privatization -7.448* 0.748
(-1.687) (0.202)
Constant -0.281 -0.671 -2.555 0.597
-0.157 -0.155 (-0.346) (0.069)
N 95 97 95 97
Panel B: Stage 2-The effects of PPPs on
investment–cash flow sensitivity
Heckman two-stage model Instrument variables
Investment China India China India
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash flow 1.114*** 0.972*** 4.044** 0.769**
(4.343) (5.148) (3.126) (2.012)
Leverage -0.082 0.217 0.384 0.082
(-0.192) (1.096) (0.484) (0.332)
Size -0.023 0.118** 0.033 -0.014**
(-0.249) (2.480) (0.795) (-2.103)
Age 0.001 -0.013** -0.205 0.104**
(0.174) (-2.037) (-1.300) (2.689)
Tobin’s q 0.011 -0.058*** 0.047 -0.040
(0.884) (-3.458) (1.628) (-1.355)
Mills’ ratio 0.219* -0.020
(1.767) (-0.375)
PPP 0.291*** 0.143 -0.319 0.218
(2.913) (1.267) (-0.273) (1.230)
PPP*Cash flow -0.946*** -0.488 -3.929** -0.359
(-4.097) (-1.337) (-3.030) (-0.644)
Constant -0.076 -0.862** 0.868 -0.735**
(-0.118) (-2.568) (0.881) (-2.126)
R-squared 10.71 19.41 9.10 16.3
N 95 97 95 97
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results are presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.17 for the Chinese and Indian firms,
respectively. Overall, after controlling for endogeneity concerns of PPP private sector firms
arising from political ties, the results from comparing PPP firms and their competing non-
PPP firms are qualitatively the same as before: in the post-PPP analysis, both the Chinese
and Indian PPP firms experience lower investment–cash flow sensitivity compared with their
non-PPP counterparts; however, the statistical significance is witnessed in the Chinese firms
only.
Instrument Variables to Deal with the Endogeneity of the Choice of PPP Partner-
ing Private Firms
In addition to the endogenous political ties mentioned above, other unobserved firm-
characteristics that cause private sector firms to choose PPP projects may also influence the
firms’ investments. Therefore, the increase in the firms’ investments are attributed to both PPP
investment choices and other unobserved effects. To deal with this endogeneity issue, I used
the instrument-variable (IV) method to isolate the exogenous variation of PPP investments.
To do that, I considered privatization deals in the same industry and year with my sample
PPP projects, then the instrument variable Privatization I chose was the proportion of the
total privatization deals. I used the Privatization database of the World Bank to calculate this
variable. There is every chance that the government may alternate between PPPs and priva-
tization to conduct their infrastructure projects. Therefore, it is hypothesized that a decrease
in privatization deals will increase the choice of PPP investments. However, from an intuitive
view, other new privatized firms may be unlikely to affect PPP-partnering private firms’ in-
vestments in other ways. Hence, following Bennedsen et al. (2007), I used Privatization as
the instrument variable to estimate the probability of private firms opting for PPPs (the first
stage model) and included the predicted value of PPP choices to estimate the private firms’
investments (the second stage model). By doing that, I isolated the causal effects of PPPs on
firms’ investments.
Table 3.17 reports the results of the IV method in Columns 3 and 4 for the Chinese and
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the Indian firms, respectively. As indicated in Panel A of Table 3.17, private sector firms in
China are more likely to opt for PPPs when the privatization deals decrease. This is evident in
the negative and significant coefficient of the variable Privatization in the probit estimate of
PPP choices after controlling for other firm-level characteristics. Subsequently, after isolating
the exogenous variation of PPP choices, as indicated in Panel B of Table 3.17, for the Chinese
firms, the IV estimates a negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term between
PPP and Cash flow. This coefficient is insignificant for the Indian firms. These results are
qualitatively similar to those in the original results (Table 3.7). Moreover, the magnitude of the
negative coefficient of the IV estimates is higher than that in the original model. This suggests
that the reduction in the government’s focus on privatization may create more chances for
PPP-partnering private sector firms to be granted a preferential government guarantee, which
in turn reduces the firms’ capital constraints.
Probability of Default as an Alternative Measure of Investment Efficiency
I used an alternative measure to capture investment efficiency for the robustness purposes. I
expected that the default risk of PPP private sector firm would reduce during the government’s
involvement in providing guarantees and partial funding for the project. The lending banks
would foresee lower default risk due to the involvement of the Government. Hence, the overall
investment efficiency would improve to lower financing costs for the PPP private sector firms. I
tested this conjecture by using the Thomson Eikon database that provided default risk estimates
of private sector firms in China and India. I was able to obtain the default risk estimates for all
firms in the period between 2006 and 2013. Later, I devised a difference-in-difference regression
for analysing the effect of PPP contracts on the firm’s default risk.
The differences were calculated between PPP and matched non-PPP firms. The dependent
variable measured the difference in the default risk estimates between PPP and non-PPP firms
for all the seven years of the data period. I used a dummy variable to capture the effect of
PPP contract on the default risk probabilities. The dummy variable takes value 1 for the year
in which a firm received PPP contract; otherwise it takes zero.
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Table 3.18: Probability of Default as an Alternative Measure of Investment Efficiency
This table report the results on how PPPs influence the probability of default of the partnering private
sector firms. The dependent variable was the difference in the default probability in between PPP
partnering private sector firms and their non-PPP counterparts. The independent variables included
the PPP year dummy and the diferences in Size, Leverage, Age, Tobin′s q in between the PPP and
non-PPP firms. The PPP year dummy was the dummy variable which took value 1 at the year the
private sector engages in a PPP project, or else zero. The t-statistics are in parentheses.***,**,*
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Difference in Probabilities of Default China India
(1) (2)
Difference in Size 0.059 0.087
(0.905) (0.386)
Difference in Leverage -0.449 1.834***
(-1.519) (4.024)
Difference in Age 0.003 0.030**
(0.704) (3.274)
Difference in Tobin’s q 0.020*** 0.001
(3.113) (0.096)
PPP year dummy -0.041*** -0.164***
(-2.674) (-2.970)
Constant -0.011 -0.739***
(-0.552) (-10.996)
R-squared 14.366 1.673
N 240 536
The results are reported in the Table 3.18. As reported in the table, both Chinese and Indian
PPP firms exhibit the reduction in the probability of default risk, compared to non-PPP firms
in the year of entering into PPP contracts. This is evident from the negative and significant
coefficients of the PPP year dummy. This further supports my hypothesis that PPP contracts
benefit the private sector firms by improving their investment efficiency.
3.5 Conclusion
PPPs are gaining significance as a major investment partnership between the public and private
sectors. They are aimed at addressing the growing infrastructure gap in emerging markets.
PPPs come with the benefit of readily pledgeable government assets that can help the private
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sector invest in large infrastructure projects which would otherwise increase their investment–
cash flow sensitivity.
I test whether this inherent benefit really reduces the underinvestment problem, which is
evident from the reduction in the investment–cash flow sensitivity of private sector firms. I use
data from two of the world’s largest emerging markets, India and China, to test this conjecture.
I also try to understand whether changes in investment–cash flow sensitivity are driven by
underinvestment or overinvestment. This is important as any reduction in the investment–cash
flow sensitivity does not guarantee reduction in the underinvestment problem. If the reduction
is experienced mainly by a subgroup of firms with low growth opportunities, then it reflects a
potential overinvestment problem.
My results indicate that the Chinese private sector firms that invest in PPPs are those that
have less dependency on their cash flow for investment. The investment–cash flow sensitivity of
these firms further reduces in the post-PPP investment period. I find this economically signifi-
cant. I further support this argument in my exploration of the possibly dependent relationship
that the Chinese private firms have with the government. I find that higher dependency on
the government, in the form of government investment, contractual arrangements, and political
connections, benefits the Chinese private sector firms through a reduction in their investment–
cash flow sensitivity. However, such benefits are mainly exploited by private sector firms that
have lower growth opportunities.
In the case of India, private sector firms, with a high sensitivity of investment to their cash
flow, invest in PPPs. I find that, unlike the Chinese private sector firms, the Indian private
sector firms who invest in PPPs mainly suffer from underinvestment. The Indian private sector
firms may reduce their underinvestment problem in the post-PPP investment period. Contrary
to the experience of their Chinese counterparts, the Indian firms find that a high reliance on
the government is detrimental.
In summary, my research highlights that PPP investments made by private sector firms are
generally perceived as value-enhancing investments by investors. However, the real benefits
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associated with reduced reliance on internal cash flow, and consequently, the reduced under-
investment problem of private sector firms in emerging markets are not that straightforward.
Such benefits are affected by the extent of government equity participation, political connec-
tions of participating firms, contract mechanisms and the institutional quality of the country.
Therefore, the following two chapters will explore more clearly how the reliance on governments
and the institutional and political structures of economies may affect the sustainability of PPP
contracts.
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Chapter 4
Public–Private Partnerships, Political
Connections and Social Lending Objec-
tives
4.1 Introduction
Private sector firms have become increasingly crucial for accelerating economic growth in emerg-
ing markets. For instance, in the case of the Chinese economy, as a result of a gradual shift
from total dependence of state-owned enterprises to a mixed economy, private sector firms have
grown significantly from the starting point of nearly zero in the late 1970s to 50% of total
employment and 60 % of industrial output by 2004 (Li et al., 2008). In order to sustain a high
economic growth rate, the Chinese economy is encouraging private sector firms to undertake so-
cial infrastructure projects. However, the success of such high-risk, large infrastructure projects
depends on the conducive relationships between the private sector and the government. Such
synergistic relationships between the government and private sector firms are evident through
political connections, where politicians undertake senior roles in the corporate boards. Such
connections, especially in emerging markets, allows firms to have better access to external fi-
nances from banks and financial institutions (Cole, 2009; Dinc¸, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005;
Sapienza, 2004).
On the positive side, social lending in the form of preferential treatment to politically
connected firms can be considered as an efficient resource allocation exercise by the government.
However, empirical evidence does not justify such altruistic motives. Khwaja and Mian (2005)
present direct evidence against the social lending view in their findings that, in contrast to banks
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that have social motives, politically connected firms gain preferential access only to those banks
that have profit motives. The most supported view on the role of political connections in the
empirical literature is that such connections for private benefits of private sector firms are often
misused. Cole (2009); Dinc¸ (2005) and Sapienza (2004) illustrate some mechanisms, such as
the increase of lending in election years or lending at a lower cost in politically preferred areas,
to highlight the negative side of political connections.
However, one of the major issues while testing such a Social Lending Hypothesis (SLH)
is the problem associated with the identification of the nature of the project. There is every
chance that political connections might work if there is a clear alignment of the nature of the
project and economic objectives of the economy. Political connections might work better in
nation building projects than in private-owned projects. The general corporate lending by
banks, which is used for testing the SLH (Khwaja and Mian, 2005), is not directly aligned with
national building objectives. Hence, there is a higher likelihood of the SLH being rejected.
This implies that using a sample where the average corporate firm may not engage in nation
building project, is not a good sample for testing the SLH.
My study contributes to the literature by using a sample of Public–Private Partnerships
(PPPs) in the two largest emerging markets, China and India, respectively. Both the Chinese
and Indian governments are struggling to maintain their high economic growth rates. It is
estimated that infrastructure demand will rise to US$ 19.2 trillion by 2030, with Asia needing
the lion’s share of US$ 15.8 trillion. Such a huge requirement highlights the possible issues
related to unmet demand for capital in emerging economies. Projections from China and India’s
12th Five-Year Plan indicate that US$1.03 trillion and US$1.025 trillion should be invested to
bridge the infrastructure gaps in the respective countries (Hongyan, 2010; India’s Planning
Commission, 2012). Given the failure of privatization programs and the limited capacity of
both the private and the public sectors, PPPs are gaining popularity in these markets (Engel
et al., 2008).
PPPs have clear a social lending alignment. The private sector firm undertakes otherwise
inefficient government projects that are expected to result in higher overall social welfare. Given
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the complexity of managing such large and high-risk PPP projects, if the private sector was
to develop a closer connection with the government, such as having politicians on the firm’s
board, this would smooth out such project-related issues. Hence, I argue that PPPs, which
are undertaken by private sector firms rather than by their non-PPP counterparts, provide a
better sample for testing the SLH. As per the SLH, politically connected PPP private sector
firms tend to have better access to bank lending compared to their matched firms, who are
politically connected but who do not engage in PPP projects. In addition to that, such higher
bank lending access of the PPP partnering private sector firms with political connections help
to alleviate their underinvestment problem. On the contrary, if corruption dominates in the
bank lending market, bank loans are likely to favor politically connected PPP private firms
that overinvest and thus leads to social welfare loss.
China and India provide an ideal setting for testing the SLH. Both economies command
the lion’s share in social infrastructure projects with active private sector participation. PPP
investments in China and India account for about 30% of the total number of PPP projects and
21% of the total PPP investments in developing countries in 2012 (World Bank Group, 2016b).
In China, considerable development has occurred since 1988, when the market matured and
privatization expanded massively (Urio, 2010). Moreover, highlighted by the government-issued
guidelines on commercial banks’ due diligence performance in 2005, both state and commercial
banks significantly increased their commercial lending (Chen et al., 2013). The Indian economy
also witnessed significant investments in infrastructure projects after liberalization in the year
1991.
Using 169 and 215 PPP projects for China and India, respectively, for the years between
1988 and 2013, my study finds that politically connected PPP firms, on average, have higher
access to bank loans than their matched non-PPP firms. This indicates that the SLH holds
in both markets. However, when investigating whether such higher lending to PPP projects is
welfare maximizing, my study finds that the more productive Chinese PPP firms with political
connections receive higher bank loans than those in non-PPP politically connected firms. In
the case of the Indian market, my study does not find such a marked difference, based on
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firm level productivity. When I examined this more closely to investigate whether political
connections lead to a firm-level overinvestment problem, I found that PPP firms with political
connections overinvested in India and not in the Chinese market. I further tested my result for
robustness by running Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) around political election events.
I found that firms that are politically connected benefit more through higher bank loans when
the incumbent party or leaders regain their seats in the government. My results suggest that,
within the context of the SLH, political connections are beneficial for the Chinese Government
and, on the contrary, the same political connections are costly for the Indian government.
A key implication from my study is that political influence for easy bank loans access to
high-risk projects should be exercised with caution. Although such access enables an efficient
allocation of resources, it can also lead to overinvestment in some cases.
The rest of the chapter is organized into six sections. This section is followed by the literature
review and hypotheses development in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents my methodology. Data
and preliminary results are presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents my main empirical
results. Section 4.6 concludes this chapter.
4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
4.2.1 Access to Bank Loans in Emerging Markets
One commonly known reason for limited access to bank loans in emerging markets is that
there is a high level of information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. Pindado
et al. (2011) review three fundamental ideas of information asymmetries in the literature.
First, shareholders tend to invest in riskier projects than those indicated in loan conditions as
this enables them to obtain higher expected returns due to existing post-contract information
asymmetries (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Second, in the case of information asymmetries
arising from moral hazard (due to a firm making a payment to lenders prior to shareholders
while the firm is bankrupt), shareholders may even not invest in positive NPV projects if their
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NPV is lower than debt issued. However, this strategy is at the expense of lenders because they
have to bear unexpectedly large losses transferred from shareholders (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
Third, adverse selection occurs when lenders are without symmetric information and hence
find it difficult to distinguish between “good” or “bad” borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
In transition economies like China or India, the problems of these three types of information
asymmetries are more severe than those in developed economies due to the low informational
content of balance sheets, inexperienced bank staff or an insufficiently sophisticated banking
technology that fails to serve as a screening device (Hainz, 2003).
The second stream of literature shows that poor protection of private properties in emerg-
ing markets hinders the capacity and the willingness of the private sector to obtain external
financing. Lo´pez de Silanes et al. (1998) argue that firms with strong legal protection can
achieve both high value and broad markets for their external finance. Johnson et al. (2002)
explain the other side of property rights when indicating that the weak protection of properties
reduces firms’ incentives to invest, resulting in a limited demand for external financing. Cull
and Xu (2005) expand those previous ideas by listing two proxies for the protection of property
rights, consisting of the risk of expropriation by the government and the reliability of contract
enforcement. These two components influence firms’ reinvestment decisions, which in turn are
positively associated with access to bank loans.
The third strand of literature emphasizes that the private sector firms are discriminated
against while accessing external sources of financing in emerging markets. Brandt and Li (2003)
conducted a bank-firm survey in China between 1994 and 1997, and they report that private
sector firms are discriminated in the formal loan market when compared to state enterprises.
They also highlight that the main source of this discrimination is the bank managers’ incentives,
which are associated with maintaining a good relationship with the government. Similarly,
private sector firms find it difficult to secure bank loans, as many external sources are reserved
to state-owned enterprises or restricted by the government’s strict regulations (Johnson et al.,
2000; McMillan and Woodruff, 2003).
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4.2.2 Political Connections and Bank Lending
In the context of high information asymmetries, poor protection of private properties, expropri-
ation and discrimination, seeking for higher reliance on the government is considered as a last
resort for successfully achieving external financing (Bai et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008; Firth et al.,
2009). This is because the government can influence firms’ financing by various approaches.
They include making direct subsidies, regulating private banks so as to lend money to polit-
ically desirable projects or owning banks so as to allocate and control external financing to
private firms (La Porta et al., 2002).
In PPPs, these strategies have been fully or partially implemented, since the PPP and
project finance mechanisms allow private sector firms to cooperate directly with the govern-
ment and obtain their funds as well as their guarantee to get external financing (Engel et al.,
2010). Government involvement provides costless pledgeable assets for the partnering private
firm. Government concessions or revenue guarantees reduces demand risk and also the uncer-
tainty of future cash flows. These factors complement each other in reducing an information
asymmetry problem and hence enhancing borrowing capacity. They also reduce the cost of bor-
rowing compared to similar non-PPP projects of partnering private firms. Therefore, initially,
I hypothesized that PPP-partnering private sector firms may have higher access to bank loans
than their non-PPP counterparts.
Research question 1c. Do PPP investments increase partnering private firms’access to
bank loans?
Hypothesis 4 PPP-partnering private sector firms should have higher access to bank loans
than their non-PPP counterparts.
There is a body of literature that studies how political connections influence firms’ access to
financing (Claessens et al., 2008; Cull and Xu, 2005; Faccio et al., 2006; Faccio, 2010; Khwaja
and Mian, 2005; Li et al., 2008). Faccio et al. (2006) explain some fundamental reasons for
why preferential access to bank loans is given to firms with political connections. In addition
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to the implicit government guarantee mentioned above, lenders may receive direct economic
support from the government or even be forced to make loans to politically connected firms.
Faccio (2010) show empirical evidence that companies with political connections have higher
leverage than nonpolitically connected firms. Claessens et al. (2008) document that after the
elections in 1998 and 2002, Brazilian firms that contribute to federal deputies, in comparison
with their matched firms, were able to increase their bank leverage. Li et al. (2008) use data
from the nationwide survey of Chinese private firms in the year 2002 and report that private
sector firms with party memberships can increase their loan from banks. Johnson and Mitton
(2003) conduct research on Malaysian firms in the Asian financial crisis period and report that
imposing capital controls mainly benefit firms with close ties to their prime minister, in terms
of increased firm market value and higher debt-to-asset ratio.
The extant literature thus provides enough justification to suggest that private sector firms
can have preferential access to bank loans through higher reliance on the government. How-
ever, it is hard to tease out whether political connections alleviate external financing concerns,
thereby decreasing underinvestment problems in the economy (the SLH) or whether they col-
lude with firms by providing higher external financing to corrupt firms and thereby increase
overinvestment problems in the economy (the Political Corruption Hypothesis [PCH]). The lit-
erature mostly identifies the negative effects of political connections due to possible corruption
in the political circles. The dark side of social proximity in relation to the allocation of credit
dates back to Adam Smith who, in Wealth of Nations, warned about the adverse effects of
this due to potential collusion in social networks. Social connections may lead to rent-seeking
and favouritism, thus distorting the allocation of credit (Bandiera et al., 2009; Kramarz and
Thesmar, 2013). Existing empirical evidence about the preferential treatment of politically
connected firms does not support the altruistic SLH. Most of the evidence supports the PCH.
Khwaja and Mian (2005) use the example of corporate lending in Pakistan from 1996 to 2002
to present direct evidence against the social lending explanation. They find that government
banks that are financially profitability witness a large and significant political preference for
corporate lending, this does not appear to be the case within explicit social government banks.
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The most supported view on the PCH is the misuse of such connections for private benefits of
private sector firms (Cole, 2009; Dinc¸, 2005; Sapienza, 2004) through some mechanisms, such
as increasing lending in election years or lending at a lower cost in politically preferred areas.
From the social lending view, political connections tend to work better in nation-building
private sector projects like PPPs than those in private-owned projects: PPPs have a clear
social alignment whereas the private sector overtakes high-risk infrastructure projects to fulfil
the huge infrastructure gap and expected economic growth of governments. Existing research
tests the SLH by using a sample of general corporate lending by banks that are not directly
aligned with national building objectives (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Hence, there is a higher
likelihood of the SLH being rejected. Given the complexity of PPPs, in terms of managing such
large and high-risk projects, a closer connection with the government, in the form of having
politicians on the firms’ boards, would smooth out the issues related to project execution,
which in turn would bring mutual benefits to both partnering parties. Hence, I argue that
PPPs that are undertaken by private sector firms, relative to non-PPP matched private sector
firms, provide a better sample for testing the SLH. As per the SLH, politically connected PPP
private sector firms have better access to bank lending than those non-PPP firms that are
politically connected, but which do not engage in PPP projects. With the above discussion in
perspective I framed the following hypotheses:
Research question 2b. Do political connections reduce capital constraints for private
sector firms?
Hypothesis 5 Politically connected private sector firms, on average, should have higher access
to bank loans than nonpolitically connected private sector firms.
Hypothesis 6 Politically connected PPP private sector firms, on average, should have higher
access to bank loans than their competing politically connected non-PPP private sector firms.
Hypothesis 7 Politically connected PPP private sector firms, that receive higher bank loans,
on average would overinvest compared to their competing politically connected non-PPP private
113
sector firms.
My Hypothesis 7 is directional due to stronger evidence on the negative effects of political
connections in the literature.
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Methodology for Endogeneity Issues
Heckman Two-Stage Model
One issue while testing the relationship between political connections and firm characteristics
was that of the potential endogenous ties associated between successful firms and politicians.
There is every chance that successful firms that have political ties are in a good position to
successfully secure PPP projects. PPP projects in infrastructure are implemented to fulfil not
only the economic goals but also the social, political goals of governments; hence, governments
may choose the winners to ensure that they can easily establish more control and intervention
in their projects. Following Heckman (1976), the Heckman two-stage model enabled me to
circumvent the endogeneity problem arising from the relationship between unobservable firm-
level characteristics and the firms’ success to secure PPP projects. In the first stage, a probit
model was used to estimate the determinants of private sector firms’ participation in PPP
projects.
PPP = α + β1Size+ β2Age+ β3Leverage+ β4Tobin
′s q
+ β5Political connection+ 
(4.1)
In Equation 4.1, PPP was a dummy variable that took 1 for PPP investment firms, and zero for
non-PPP matched private sector firms. Political Connection (Pol) is a dummy variable that
takes 1 for firms whose chair and executive directors who were formerly or currently officers
in the government, parliament or military (Chen et al., 2011). Political Connection captured
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how political ties influence the chance of private sector firms award PPP projects. Firm-level
variables determined the nature of private sector firms that opted for PPPs, including Size,Age,
Leverage, and Tobin′s q1 were included in the first-stage model. This is because there is
evidence that the nature of private sector firms that go for PPPs is considerably different for
each of the two economies. In China, older, mature, and better-valued firms, relative to their
matched firms, engage in PPPs while in India, younger firms with higher debt burdens engage
in PPPs.
Later, Mills’ ratio from Equation 4.1 was obtained and included in the second-stage model
(Equation 4.2). The purpose of the second-stage model was to estimate the effects of PPP
investments on the capability of private sector firms to access bank loans after controlling for
the endogeneity and the selection bias of PPP firms. Following Chen et al. (2013) the following
regression model was run to obtained unbiased estimates:
Bank loans/sales = α + β1Size+ β2Age+ β3Tobin
′s q + β4Insider ownership+ β5PPP
+ β6Political connection+ β7PPP ∗ Political connection+ β8Mills′ ratio+ 
(4.2)
In Equation 4.2, Bankloans/sales was the dependent variable to indicate the ability to access
to bank loans. Following Chen et al. (2013), I included Size,Age, Insider ownership, and
Political connection as control variables that may influence bank financing. Chen et al. (2013)
use the lagged return on sales (ROS) to capture the endogeneity issue arising from the rela-
tionship between firm performance and bank financing. For my regression, I included Tobin′s q
(with one year lag) rather than the lagged ROS to capture the additional effects of investment
opportunities while still controlling the endogeneity between firm value and bank financing.
The interaction term between PPP and Political connection was included in the regression
to determine how easy PPP politically connected firms accessed bank loans. It should be
noted that in both models (Equations 4.1 and 4.2), I also controlled for the industry effects
by including industry dummy variables to account for the government’s preferential alloca-
1See Appendices A for the definition of these variables
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tion to strategic industries. For example, the 12th Five-Year Plan in China indicates strategic
emerging industries, with some of these covering new energy, new material, new generation
information technology (Ruibo, 2010). Likewise, in India, Ghosh (2013) indicate five emerg-
ing and enabling technologies as a wide-ranging application for economic growth, including
biotechnology, nanotechnology, micro and nanoelectronics, photonics, and advanced materials.
Slope Differences to Explore Overinvestment Problems
In order to test Hypothesis 7, I needed to investigate whether PPP investments can help
private sector firms to alleviate the difficulties associated with accessing bank financing. As
discussed earlier, higher access bank loans brings significant economic benefits to private sector
firms. Alternatively, because of their political support, these firms use these funds to pursue
some overinvestment strategies without the rational of investment opportunities and without
paying the banks back the entire amount that was borrowed. The literature confirms that the
same situation is happening with state-owned enterprises, especially in the context of weak
institutional economies. For instance, in China, Ying et al. (2013) argue that, compared with
private sector firms, state-owned enterprises can easily access bank loans; however sometimes
the purpose for these loans is controlled by the government and directed towards the pursuit
of its social or political goals. In many cases, even, the loans are utilized to undertake negative
NPV projects as long as these kinds of projects can bring more employment and economic
growth to the areas in which they are implemented (Ying et al., 2013); in other cases, these
kinds of projects are developed to attract more support from voters before the next election.
However, this strategy might be at the expense of state-owned enterprises if considered from
the perspective of the economic benefits gained by the firms.
The main side effect of political influence is the overinvestment problem that arises due to
easy access to capital. Jensen (1986) argues that managers can overuse their free cash flow
to pursue their pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits. Stulz (1990) argues that managerial
discretion enables managers to overinvest because of its perquisites with increased investment
and because firms lack control over the management team. Based on these articles, Ding et al.
116
(2016) find empirical evidence that state-owned enterprises overinvest due to poor monitoring
by banks. This is consistent with Stulz (1990) who points out that the overinvestment of private
firms is explained by the free cash flow hypothesis.
I developed a regression model to see whether private sector firms with political connections
overinvest. To do that, first, I divided my sample into two groups of firms, namely, firms with
high Tobin’s q (above the median) and firms with low Tobin’s q (below the median). I then
ran the main regression (Equation 4.2) separately on two groups. Second, I used a three-
way interaction PPP ∗ Political connection ∗ Tobin′s q term to understand the influence of
politically connected PPP firms (compared to politically connected non-PPP firms) on firm-
level productivity.
Bank loans/sales = α + β1Size+ β2Age+ β3Tobin
′s q + β4Insider ownership+ β5PPP
+ β6Political connection+ β7PPP ∗ Political connection+ β8Mills′ ratio+ β9PPP ∗ Tobin′s q
+ β10Tobin
′s q ∗ Political connection+ β11Tobin′s q ∗ Political connection ∗ PPP + 
(4.3)
Following Dawson and Richter (2006), I measured the slope differences to interpret the three-
way interaction term. I computed simple slopes of the variable Bank loans/sales on the variable
PPP when the moderator variable Political connection and Tobin′s q were held constant at
different combinations of high and low values. The simple slopes were computed and tested
to see whether their differences were significant from zero in predicting the Bank loans/sales
variable. Consequently, there were six pairs of slopes:
(1) (Political connections and high Tobin’s q) - (Political connections and low Tobin’s q)
(2) (Political connections and high Tobin’s q) - (Nonpolitical connections and high Tobin’s
q)
(3) (Political connections and low Tobin’s q) - (Nonpolitical connections and low Tobin’s q)
(4) (Nonpolitical connections and high Tobin’s q)-(Nonpolitical connections and low Tobin’s
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q)
(5) (Political connections and high Tobin’s q) - (Nonpolitical connections and low Tobin’s
q)
(6) (Political connections and low Tobin’s q) - (Nonpolitical connections and high Tobin’s
q)
According to Jensen (1986), firms with low growth opportunities (low Tobin’s q) are more
susceptible to overinvestment problem due to lack of positive NPV projects. Hence, such
firms overuse additional cash flow for excess investment spending, maybe on value-destroying
projects (Vogt, 1994; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005). Therefore, to examine the overinvestment
problem, I focused on the third pair (Political connections and low Tobin’s q) - (Nonpolitical
connections and low Tobin’s q) where the moderator variable, Tobin′sq was kept at low and
the moderator variable Political connections changed from the high level of 1 to the low level
of 0.
This is captured in Figure 4.1 by the slope differences between the red regression line (Politi-
cal connections and low Tobin’s q) and the orange regression line (Nonpolitical connections and
low Tobin’s q). In this case, if the significant and positive difference on the slope only occurs
in the sub-group of firms with low Tobin′s q or low growth opportunities, this implies that, in
politically connected firms, the difference in bank loans between PPP and non-PPP firms is
higher than those in nonpolitical counterparts. However, the higher bank financing of politi-
cally connected firms only happens in low-investment-opportunity group. Therefore, political
connections may exacerbate the overinvestment problem in PPP private sector firms. This
supports the negative view that political connections may lead to rent-seeking and favoritism,
thus distorting the allocation of credit.
Regression Discontinuity Design as an Identification Strategy
In order to draw casual inference on whether political connections cause the increase in bank
loans, I use the RDD. Given that election result is an exogenous shock, I examined whether bank
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Figure 4.1: The Graph of Slopes to Disentangle Overinvestment
This figure visualizes the simple slopes of the variable Bank loans/sales on the variable PPP, where the
moderator variables Political connection and Tobin’s q were held constant at different combinations
of the high and low levels.
loans significantly increase if the same government wins the elections and the same political can
extend their influence in securing bank loans. This analysis provided a more direct attribution
of political connections to excess bank loans. The RDD is a quasi-experimental design to
estimate treatment effects where the treatment is assigned by an observed variable (also called
a forcing or running variable) above a known cutoff point (Lee and Lemieux, 2009). The RDD
allows for the estimating of effects near the cutoff point in which the probability of obtaining
the treatment or not is quite the same. This is like a coin-flip experiment or, in other words,
the treatment variations are more likely to be randomized (Lee and Lemieux, 2009).
The RDD was conducted based on the hypothesis that private sector firms with political
connections can have higher access to bank loans if they have projects awarded during the
election year when the incumbent government continues to maintain their power. Govern-
ment allows preferential bank financing to pursue their current political, social purposes, to
attract voting or to award politically connected firms owing to their support for sustaining the
incumbent government power. Therefore, in my RDD, the benefits of the election event (the
treatment) were assigned if firms had projects in or after the election event when the incumbent
government continued to win. Lee and Lemieux (2009) indicate that the crucial assumption
for the validity of the RDD is that individuals cannot “precisely” manipulate the assignment
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variable. Because receiving the treatment may benefit them, individuals may make more ef-
forts to obtain the benefits. If this happened, I could not isolate the treatment effects from
other individual effects in the outcome. However, in my scenario, this assumption could be
supported because the election event and even the PPP project awarding time were scheduled
and determined ex-ante by the government; hence, there was little likelihood that private sector
firms could manipulate this fixed schedule. In the absolutely rare cases, when private sector
firms try to adjust the project awarding time to fit the election event, there is no guarantee
for their behaviors being beneficial if their supported party cannot win in the election. More-
over, even if this happened, the RDD allowed me to estimate the treatment effects near the
threshold; therefore, the variation of treatment was randomized even when few individuals still
manipulated the running variable in an imprecise way (Lee and Lemieux, 2009).
I chose the Indian election event in 2009 and the Chinese election event in 2008 for this study.
In case of India, the last two decades experienced the interchange of political power between
the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) (the coalition of the centre-left political party) and the
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (the coalition of the centre-right political party). The
general election in 1999 experienced the win of NDA, after that, the UPA won two consecutive
general elections, in 2004 and 2009, to form a new government. However, the 2014 general elec-
tion witnessed a substantial transfer of political power when the NDA again became the winner.
In China, although the political power is in hands of Communist Party, there was a transfer of
power from President Jiang Zemin to President Hu Jintao in 2003. Hu Jintao maintained his
position in the 2008 election before this was passed on to the new leader XiJinping in 2013.
The study only considers the five-year period leading up to and following the election event to
take into account the five-year election cycles in China and India, and to ensure the dominance
of the current government in two consecutive cycles. I also conducted RDD separately into
four groups: PPP politically connected firms, PPP nonpolitically connected firms, non-PPP
politically connected firms and non-PPP nonpolitically connected firms. This classification was
designed to explore whether the effects of the election event varied among different kinds of
private sector firms (PPP or not, and politically connected or not).
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The most basic model of the RDD is
Bank loans/sales = α + β1Election dummy + β2PPP investment year +  (4.4)
where the receipt of the election event effect is denoted by the dummy variable Election dummy.
Election dummy takes the value of 1 if the PPP investment year is equal to or more than
2008(or 2009) for Chinese (or Indian) private sector firms respectively.
I adapt the RDD graph of Lee and Lemieux (2009) in Figure 4.2 to explain the basic
RDD setting. Accordingly, B’ is the estimated value of Y (Bank loans/sales) for the firm
observation having PPP investment in the year c (c=2008 for the Chinese firms and c=2009
for the Indian firms); hence, this firm received the treatment (the election event effect). A”
is the estimated value of Y (Bank loans/sales) for the same firm in the opposing state of not
having the treatment. Therefore, B’-A” is the causal effects of the election event on private
sector firms’ access to bank loans.
Figure 4.2: Simple Linear Research Discontinuity Setup
This figure is adapted from Lee and Lemieux (2009) to explain the basic RDD setting
In my RDD, the treatment determining variable PPP investment year is discrete with the
PPP year being recorded only in years. According to Lee and Card (2008), if the treatment
determining covariate is continuous, no functional form is needed to estimate the effect of the
event. Hence, I simply compared the outcome “just above” and “just below” the cutoff point
121
with the assumption that the treatment and the control group are identical. However, with
the discrete assignment variable, I may not have computed the average within the “as small as
possible” neighborhoods of the threshold; hence, this may have over-estimated the treatment
effect at the discontinuity threshold. To solve this problem, Lee and Card (2008) propose an
inference procedure to conduct an RDD with a discrete running variable.
1. Lee and Card (2008) normalize he assignment variable X (which is PPP investment year
in my setting) is normalized to make sure that the cutoff point equals to zero; hence, the
intercept of the regression is the estimate of E(Y0|X = 0). Then they choose the parametric
functional form to estimate the treatment effects by using the goodness-of-fit statistic to decide
whether a polynomial form is appropriate.2
2. They compute both heteroskedasticity and cluster-consistent standard errors (clustering
on the different discrete value of X) and decide whether the counterfactual functional forms
can be specified. If yes, then they have two identical specification errors in E(Y1|X = xk) and
E(Y0|X = xk). As a result, the cluster-consistent standard error is used for inference. Lee and
Card (2008) explain this circumstance by approximating two counterfactual functions
E(Y1|X = xj) = α0 +Xjγ0 + β0 + a1j
E(Y0|X = xj) = α0 +Xjγ0 + a0j
where a1j, a0j are the random specification errors. Part A of Figure 4.3 indicates the case
when two errors are identical. Both the estimate of E(Y1|X = xk) and the extrapolation of
E(Y0|X = xk) underestimate the true effects, but the errors a1j, a0j in these two estimates
have the same sign and magnitude. Therefore, the treatment effect is at the discontinuity
E(Y1−Y0|X = xk) = β (Lee and Card, 2008). Part B of Figure 4.3 indicates the case when two
errors are independent. The estimate of E(Y1|X = xk) underestimates the true effects while the
extrapolation of E(Y0|X = xk) overestimates them. Therefore, the estimate of the treatment
2The goodness-of-fit statistic G = (ESSR−ESSUR)/(J−K)(ESSUR)/(N−J)
where ESSR is the restricted error sum of squares from estimating Model 4.4 with the polynomial form in
the assignment variable X, ESSUR is the unrestricted error sum of squares achieved by regressing the outcome
variable Y (Bank loans/sales in my setting) on a full set of J dummy variables systematically generated from
the variable PPP investment year to capture J different discrete value recorded by years. G follows F(J-K,N-J)
with K denotes the number of parameters in Model 4.4 and N measures total observations(Lee and Card, 2008).
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effect at the discontinuity may be biased and the standard error will need to be inflated (Lee
and Card, 2008).
Figure 4.3: Counterfactual Specification: Identical Errors and Independent Errors
This figure is adapted from Lee and Card (2008) to explain two cases: identical errors and independent
errors. Part A presents the identical errors when the random specification error, generated from the
estimate of E(Y1|X = xk) (by the data from the right of this threshold), equals the specification error
that is generated from the extrapolation of E(Y0|X = xk) (by data from the left). Part B indicates
the latter case where these two errors are independent and unequal.
3. The method to inflate the standard error is to collapse data into cells with each cell
corresponding to one PPP investment year. The cell size-weighted regression is then run, and
the mean square error from this regression and the cell variance are used to compute σ̂2 3 .
3The formula is σ̂2= 1N
J∑
j=1
nj(Yj − Wj θ̂)2 − 1
N
J∑
j=1
1
nj − 1
nj∑
i=1
(Yij − Yj)2, in which the first term is the
weighted variance of the mean residual from the cell size-weighted regression and the second term is the average
cell variance (Lee and Card, 2008)
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Add this value to the sampling variance to get the robustness results.4
4.4 Data
4.4.1 Data Sources
The data was sourced from several multiple sources. Information on PPP projects was sourced
from the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Database. Information
related to the financial data of partnering private firms was obtained from Datastream. For the
years between 1988 and 2013, the final sample included 169 and 215 firm-year observations for
China and India, respectively. Political connection data is obtained from the board of directors
information reported in the annual reports of partnering private sector firms. For the Indian
firms, in addition to annual reports, I used India’s bicameral parliament online public data
of both from the Upper House (Rajya Sabha) and from the Lower House (Lok Sabha). Data
on insider ownership and bank loans were mainly collected from private sector firms’ annual
reports. These annual reports were available on the firms’ official websites or on Morningstar
Database. Data on bank loans, including both short-term and long-term bank loans, were
obtained from the liabilities section on the balance sheets and notes to financial statements.
Insider ownership was the percentage of shares held by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO),
the chair, the executive directors, the non-executive directors and associated family members
(Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005). For the Chinese firms, I was able to obtain insider ownership
data in the Directors’ interest section of the annual reports. For the Indian firms, insider own-
ership data was obtained from the corporate governance reports and the shareholding patterns
sourced from the annual reports or the websites of the National Stock Exchange of India and
the Bombay Stock Exchange, the two largest stock exchanges in India. I also used Thomson
Reuters Eikon Database for cross-checking the accuracy of the insider ownership data. In or-
der to reduce the potential identification problem, I created a control group of the competing
4The new adjusted interval is (β̂−1.96
√ ̂
V (β̂) + 2σ̂2); β̂+1.96
√ ̂
V (β̂) + 2σ̂2)) which contains E(Y1−Y0|X =
xk) with α = 5% (Lee and Card, 2008)
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non-PPP firms. Applying the propensity-score matching, I obtained one-to-one matched firms
(for the firms investing in PPPs), matched by firm size and industry (based on the sector level
of the FTSE/Dow Jones Industrial Classification Benchmark [ICB] in Datastream). I used
the nearest-neighbour matching method to capture the bias in the estimated treatment effects
when matching PPP firms and non-PPP firms by size and industry.
4.4.2 Descriptive Analysis
Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics at firm-level data. I ran a mean difference test to
explore the varying characteristics between PPP private sector firms and their competing non-
PPP counterparts (the control group) in PPP investment years. The total PPP firms’ sample
included 169 and 215 firm-year observations of the Chinese and the Indian PPP private sector
firms, respectively. Due to the unavailability of bank loan data, the final sample dropped to
149 and 203 firm-year observations in China and India, respectively.
Panel A compares PPP private sector firms and their non-PPP counterparts. As can be
seen in Panel A of Tables 4.1, both the Chinese and the Indian PPP firms have higher bank
loans/sales than their matched non-PPP firms. The relative difference in bank loans is more
than twice the size of their corresponding sales. An average PPP firm’s access to bank loans,
which is higher than that of a similar firm in the same sector, supports the idea that PPP
firms, with government assets as collateral and government loan guarantees, have better access
to external finances. While the Chinese PPP firms have a greater ability to meet their interest
payments than their non-PPP firms, the result is the exact opposite in India. This indicates
that the nature of firm that engages in PPP ventures varies between the countries.
Panels B, C and D of Tables 4.1 classify private sector firms into politically connected and
nonpolitically connected firms. For the Chinese firms, on average, politically connected firms
have higher bank loans/sales in all three groups, which is consistent with Hypothesis 5 claiming
that political connections enhance access to external financing. This result holds even for the
Indian firms.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Analysis on Bank Loans
This table provides the mean of firm-level variables, the difference of means between PPP and non-PPP firms, and between politically connected
and nonpolitically connected firms, along with the t-test. The mean value is reported in the years during which firms have had PPP projects.
Bank loans/sales is measured by total long term and short term bank loans divided by sales. Interest coverage denotes earnings before interest
and taxes divided by interest expenses on debts. Size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage is calculated by the total
debt divided by the total assets. Age is measured from the year of a firm’s incorporation. Tobin′s q (with one year lag) is measured by the
market to book value of total assets in order to capture investment opportunities. Insider ownership is the percentage of shares held by the
CEO, the chair, the directors and associated family members. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: The total sample China India
PPP Non-PPP Difference t-test PPP Non-PPP Difference t-test
(n=149) (n=116) (n=203) (n=146)
Bank loans/sales 3.319 0.718 2.601*** 6.5 2.208 0.917 1.291** 1.97
Interest coverage 9.691 3.713 5.978 1.64 4.490 26.165 -21.675*** -3.35
Size 7.056 6.908 0.148 1.29 7.692 7.546 0.146** 1.99
Age 12.812 9.147 3.665*** 3.87 7.917 9.459 -1.542*** -2.78
Leverage 0.266 0.286 -0.020 -0.8 0.409 0.311 0.098*** 5.05
Tobin’s q 2.214 1.381 0.833*** 3.39 2.523 2.087 0.436 0.84
Insider ownership 32.241 19.635 12.606*** 4.04 12.988 7.068 5.921*** 3.19
Panel B: The total sample Politically connected Nonpolitically Difference t-test Politically connected Nonpolitically Difference t-test
firms (n=158) connected firms (n=107) firms (n=76) connected firms (n=273)
Bank loans/sales 3.135 0.771 2.364*** 5.76 3.857 1.048 2.809*** 3.64
Interest coverage 6.079 8.532 -2.453 -0.66 17.664 12.394 5.270 0.67
Size 7.103 6.825 0.278** 2.43 7.997 7.528 0.469*** 5.57
Age 11.513 10.757 0.756 0.76 8.299 8.631 -0.332 -0.5
Leverage 0.299 0.240 0.059** 2.39 0.315 0.383 -0.068*** -2.92
Tobin’s q 1.880 1.805 0.075 0.29 1.872 2.473 -0.601 -0.96
Insider ownership 24.889 30.014 -5.125 -1.58 6.563 11.575 -5.012** -2.29
Panel C: PPP Politically connected Nonpolitically Difference t-test Politically connected Nonpolitically Difference t-test
firms (n=94) connected firms (n=55) firms (n=45) connected firms (n=158)
Bank loans/sales 4.609 1.115 3.494*** 5.24 5.815 1.122 4.693*** 4.07
Interest coverage 7.668 13.213 -5.545 -1.29 3.565 4.769 -1.204 -0.85
Size 7.053 7.061 -0.008 -0.04 7.914 7.626 0.288** 2.53
Age 12.479 13.382 -0.903 -0.59 8.617 7.709 0.908 1.13
Leverage 0.294 0.219 0.075*** 2.73 0.389 0.415 -0.026 -0.86
Tobin’s q 2.236 2.177 0.059 0.15 2.054 2.663 -0.608 -0.61
Insider ownership 32.999 30.945 2.054 0.53 10.577 13.605 -3.028 -0.96
Panel D: Non-PPP Politically connected Nonpolitically Difference t-test Politically connected Nonpolitically Difference t-test
firms (n=64) connected firms (n=52) firms (n=31) connected firms (n=115)
Bank loans/sales 0.971 0.407 0.564*** 4.85 0.790 0.949 -0.159 -0.2
Interest coverage 3.746 3.672 0.074 0.01 39.753 22.650 17.103 0.91
Size 7.177 6.576 0.601*** 4.03 8.126 7.396 0.730*** 6.08
Age 10.094 7.981 2.113** 2.1 7.800 9.888 -2.088* -1.87
Leverage 0.305 0.262 0.043 0.99 0.197 0.341 -0.144*** -4.04
Tobin’s q 1.357 1.411 -0.054 -0.19 1.566 2.213 -0.647 -1.56
Insider ownership 12.593 28.925 -16.332*** -3.23 0.275 8.840 -8.565 -3.21***
Panel E: Politically connected Politically connected Politically connected Difference t-test Politically connected Politically connected Difference t-test
PPP & non-PPP firms PPP firms (n=94) non-PPP firms (n=64) PPP firms (n=45) non-PPP firms (n=31)
Bank loans/sales 4.609 0.971 3.638*** 6.02 5.815 0.790 5.025* 1.93
Interest coverage 7.668 3.746 3.922 0.92 3.565 39.753 -36.188* -1.81
Size 7.053 7.177 -0.124 -0.86 7.914 8.126 -0.212 -1.33
Age 12.479 10.094 2.385* 1.97 8.617 7.800 0.817 0.74
Leverage 0.294 0.305 -0.011 -0.41 0.389 0.197 0.192*** 4.44
Tobin’s q 2.236 1.357 0.879*** 3.16 2.054 1.566 0.488 1.5
Insider ownership 32.999 12.593 20.406*** 5.67 10.577 0.275 10.303*** 3.14
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Panel E of Tables 4.1 compare, within politically connected firms, the differences between
PPP and non-PPP firms. This allowed me to gain initial insights on my Hypothesis 6. In both
China and India, politically connected PPP firms have higher bank loans/sales than politically
connected non-PPP firms. This result lends initial support to my Hypothesis 6 that within
the politically connected firms, the social lending view associated with PPP firms enables these
firms to gain higher access to bank loans. However, in India, there is a lower interest coverage in
politically connected PPP firms than those in non-PPP firms, while the result for the Chinese
firms is not significant. This may signal the potential evidence of the political corruption view
in India as the ability of paying interest does not go along with the high access to bank loans
in the politically connected PPP firms.
4.5 Empirical Results and Discussion
4.5.1 Political Connections and Bank Loans
My first test aimed to understand the relationship between political connections and bank loans.
The cross-sectional regression results are reported in Table 4.2. After controlling for firm-level
productivity (proxied by Tobin’s q), firm size, firm age, ownership structure and industry fixed
effects, I find that political connections have a positive and significant effect on firm-level bank
loans, given the positive and significant coefficient of the variable Political connection (as in
Column 1 for Chinese firms and Column 5 for Indian firms). While politically connected Chinese
firms’ bank lending is 2.584 times higher than that of nonpolitically connected Chinese firms,
this figure for the Indian firms is lower at 0.429. This lends support to my Hypothesis 5. In
relation to this, I controlled for political connections to explore the effects of PPP investments.
The results, as indicated in Column 2 for the Chinese firms and Column 6 for Indian firms,
support my Hypothesis 4 suggesting that PPP investments increase partnering private firms’
access to bank loans. In China, the bank lending of PPP firms is 3.050 times higher than their
non-PPP counterparts, whereas in Indian, this figure is only about 0.543. When I separated
127
private sector firms into PPP and non-PPP groups (as in Columns 3 and 4 for the Chinese
firms, and Columns 7 and 8 for the Indian firms), the politically connected firms still exhibit
the feature of higher bank lending, though the effect is more pronounced for PPP firms. Thus,
it supports my Hypothesis 6 that PPPs enhance the positive effects of political connection on
private sector firms in these two economies. Interestingly, the higher bank loans for politically
connected PPP firms were more pronounced in the Chinese economy. This is evident by the
positive and significant coefficient of the variable Political connection belong to PPP groups.
Politically connected PPP firms’ bank lending is 2.674 (1.502) times higher than nonpolitically
connected PPP firms in China (India), respectively. This implies that political connections
matter more for PPP private sector firms in China.
4.5.2 Effects of PPPs and Political Connections on Private Sector
Firms’ Bank Financing: the Heckman Two-Stage Model
Table 4.3 reports the effects of PPPs and political connections on private sector firms’ bank
financing. Panel A presents the results of the first stage of the Heckman model when I conducted
the probit estimate of the variable PPP . For the Chinese firms, as indicated in Column 1 of
Panel A, private sector firms with lower Leverage, higher Age and higher Tobins′q prefer
PPP projects. This is consistent with the descriptive statistics and the investment–cash flow
sensitivity analysis documenting that, in China, older, better-valued firms with less debt burden,
relative to their matched firms in the same sector, prefer PPP projects. Especially, private sector
firms with political connections are more likely to opt for PPPs compared with nonpolitically
connected firms. This is evident from the positive and significant results of the coefficient of
the variable Political connection. This is consistent with the view proposed by Chen et al.
(2011) that politically connected firms may receive better investment opportunities from the
government which in turn enables the firms to enhance their value.
For the Indian firms, as indicated in Column 2 of Panel A, younger firms higher debt burden
with opt for PPPs. This is consistent with my findings in the investment–cash flow sensitivity
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Table 4.2: Role of Political Connections on Bank Lending
This table present the effects of political connections on access to bank loans. Political Connection (Pol) is a dummy variable that takes 1 for
firms whose chairperson and executive directors who were formerly or currently officers in the government, the parliament, or the military (Chen
et al., 2011). Bank loans/sales is measured by total long term and short term bank loans divided by sales. Size is measured by the natural
logarithm of total assets. Age is measured from the year of a firm’s incorporation. Tobin′s q (with one year lag) is measured by the market to
book value of total assets in order to capture investment opportunities. Insider ownership is the percentage of shares held by the CEO, the
chairperson, the directors and associated family members. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
China India
The total sample The total sample PPP firms Non-PPP firms The total sample The total sample PPP firms Non-PPP firms
Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tobin’s q -0.019 -0.147 -0.137 -0.056 -0.013 -0.020 0.032 -0.028
(-0.172) (-1.382) (-0.833) (-1.311) (-0.546) (-0.826) (0.373) (-0.711)
Size 0.095 -0.047 0.224 0.052 0.734*** 0.607*** 1.138*** 0.472***
(0.267) (-0.146) (0.352) (0.548) (4.109) (3.323) (3.967) (2.794)
Age 0.023 -0.022 -0.077 0.016 -0.111*** -0.1003*** -0.193*** -0.0644***
(0.634) (-0.675) (-1.271) (1.062) (-4.936) (-4.405) (-4.947) (-3.455)
Insider ownership 0.002 -0.016* -0.026 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.002 -0.004
(0.174) (-1.823) (-1.501) (0.223) (0.743) (0.120) (0.183) (-0.613)
Political connection 2.584*** 2.310*** 2.674*** 0.542*** 0.429* 0.460* 1.502*** -0.712***
(5.868) (5.785) (3.578) (3.407) (1.662) (1.802) (3.928) (-2.694)
PPP 3.050*** 0.534***
(7.418) (2.747)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.532 0.974 2.402 -0.317 -4.086** -3.616** -6.889** -2.611*
(0.447) (0.314) (0.462) (-0.369) (-2.665) (-2.367) (-2.975) (-1.770)
R-squared 20.153 35.148 32.720 42.777 18.648 20.522 26.624 26.855
N 258 258 149 109 343 343 201 142
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Table 4.3: Heckman Two-Stage Model and Slope Differences to Estimate the Effects of PPPs and Political Connections on Bank Financing
This table presents the effects of PPPs and political connections on firm’s capability to access bank loans. Panel A reports the first stage probit
model to estimate what determines private sector firms to participate in PPP projects. Panel B reports the second-stage model to estimate the
effects of PPP investments on private sector firms’ capability to access bank loans after controlling for the endogeneity and the selection bias
of PPP firms. Panel C reports the Slope Difference Test by computing simple slopes of Bank loans/sales on PPP when Political connection
and Tobin′s q were held constant at different combinations of high and low values. This was designed to explore whether changes in bank loans
relate to overinvestment problems. Bank loans/sales was measured by the total long term and short term bank loans divided by the sales. Size
was measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Age was measured from the year of a firm’s incorporation. Tobin′s q (with one year lag)
was measured by the market to book value of total assets in order to capture investment opportunities. Insider ownership is the percentage of
shares held by the CEO, the chair, the directors and associated family members. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Panel A. Heckman two-stage model: China India
Stage 1-The probit estimate of PPPs
PPPs Coef/t Coef/t
(1) (2)
Leverage -1.154** 1.924***
(-2.24) (4.15)
Size 0.025 0.346**
(0.19) (2.33)
Age 0.061*** -0.050***
(4.25) (-2.66)
Tobin’s q 0.079* 0.050
(1.93) (1.37)
Political connections 0.304* 0.086
(1.77) (0.40)
Industry effects Yes Yes
Constant -1.732 -2.814**
(-1.66) (-2.47)
N 288 348
Pseudo R-squared 9.51 9.76
Panel B. Heckman two-stage model:
Stage 2-The effects of PPPs on Bank loans
Total bank loans/sales Total sample High q Low q Total sample High q Low q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tobin’s q -0.062 -0.040 0.913 -0.040 -0.020 -3.138**
(-0.616) (-0.480) (0.981) (-0.265) (-0.075) (-2.244)
Size -0.046 -0.036 0.730 2.087** 3.048** 1.729
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(-0.150) (-0.111) (1.387) (2.221) (2.159) (1.265)
Age 0.071 0.081 0.045 -0.385*** -0.399** -0.470**
(1.334) (1.373) (0.484) (-3.166) (-2.261) (-2.557)
Insider ownership -0.020** -0.024** -0.001 -0.020 -0.016 -0.018
(-2.302) (-2.215) (-0.101) (-0.890) (-0.490) (-0.523)
Mills’ ratio 2.596** 3.775** 3.609** 2.752 4.332 3.173
(2.160) (2.429) (2.105) (1.344) (1.440) (1.004)
PPP=1 1.999*** 0.902 3.745*** -0.813 -0.771 -1.599
(2.983) (1.098) (3.427) (-0.986) (-0.648) (-1.283)
Political connection=1 1.637** 0.250 2.915*** -3.191** -1.966 -4.774**
(2.417) (0.298) (2.744) (-2.139) (-0.822) (-2.293)
PPP* Political connection 1.807** 2.643** 0.949 7.911*** 8.646*** 8.228***
(2.051) (2.398) (0.670) (4.530) (3.143) (3.283)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -4.792 -2.855 -14.633** -14.679* -21.149* -9.026
(-1.248) (-1.014) (-2.507) (-1.819) (-1.671) (-0.799)
R-squared 37.50 52.90 45.17 0.151 0.203 0.173
N 258 124 134 333 167 166
Panel C: Slope Difference to
explore overinvestment problems
Y=Total loan/sales (X=PPP) Coef Std.Err t-test p-value Adjusted-p Coef Std.Err t-test p-value Adjusted-p
(pol & high q) - (pol & low q) -1.004 2.031 -0.49 0.622 3.732 -5.118 7.314 -0.7 0.485 2.91
(pol & high q) - (non-pol & high q) 1.799 0.642 2.8 0.005 0.03** 4.946 4.724 1.05 0.296 1.776
(pol & low q) - (non-pol & low q) 1.669 1.403 1.19 0.236 1.416 9.978 3.581 2.79 0.006 0.036**
(non-pol & high q) - (non-pol & low q) -1.134 1.414 -0.8 0.423 2.538 -0.086 1.825 -0.05 0.962 5.772
(pol & high q) - (non-pol & low q) 0.665 1.680 0.4 0.693 4.158 4.860 4.769 1.02 0.309 1.854
(pol & low q) - (non-pol & high q) 2.803 1.343 2.09 0.038 0.228 10.064 3.621 2.78 0.006 0.036**
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analysis that show private sector firms opting for PPPs to circumvent underinvestment prob-
lems. However, unlike the case of the Chinese firms, there is no significance in the effects of
Political connection on the probit estimate of PPP .
Panel B of Table 4.3 indicates the second stage of the Heckman two-stage model, which was
to test the effects of PPPs and political connection on private sector firms’ access to bank loans.
Columns 1,2 and 3 are for the Chinese firms. Columns 4,5 and 6 are for the Indian firms. For
the Chinese firms, as indicated in Column 1 of Panel B, PPP firms have better access to bank
financing compared with their non-PPP counterparts. This is evident from the positive and
significant result of the coefficient of the variable PPP . PPP and politically connected firms,
especially, have higher bank loans. This is evident from the positive and significant coefficient
of the interaction term between PPP and Political connection. For the Indian firms, the same
results are documented when there is a positive and significant coefficient of the interaction
term between PPP and Political connection, as indicated in Column 4 of Panel B. This is
consistent with my Hypothesis 5, which claims that political connections provide better access
to bank financing of PPP-partnering private sector firms than that of nonpolitically connected
firms.
4.5.3 Testing for Potential Overinvestment Problems: Slope Differ-
ence Test
Firstly, to disentangle overinvestment problems, the main regression was conducted for two
subsamples: the high-q group of firms and the low-q group of firms, as indicated in Panel B of
Table 4.3. Columns 2 and 3 are for the Chinese firms with high Tobin’s q and low Tobin’s q,
respectively. Columns 5 and 6 are for the Chinese firms with high Tobin’s q and low Tobin’s
q, respectively. For the robustness tests, as indicated in Panel C of Table 4.3, I computed
the slope difference to test the effects of PPP on firms’ bank financing when the moderator,
Political connection and Tobin′s q were held constant at different combinations of high and
low values. The aim of firm classification into the high-q group and the low-q group was to
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link firms’ financing with overinvestment problems. Accordingly, firms with low investment
opportunities (low q) may suffer more from overinvestment problems (Jensen, 1986; Pawlina
and Renneboog, 2005; Vogt, 1994).
In relation to the Chinese firms, as indicated in Columns 2 and 3 of Panel B of Table
4.3, when private sector firms were classified into the high-q group and the low-q group, the
coefficient of the interaction term between PPP and Political connection is only significant at
the high-q group. More importantly, for the slope difference test, as indicated in Panel C of
Table 4.3, only the second pairs, (Political connection and high q) -(Nonpolitical connection
and high q), experience the positive and significant results. This means that the better access of
PPP politically connected firms to bank financing only happens in firms with high investment
opportunities in China. This implies that in China, political ties may bring better access bank
financing to PPP-partnering private sector firms, helping them fulfil their plentiful investment
opportunities.
For the Indian firms, as indicated in Columns 5 and 6 of Panel B of Table 4.3, PPP po-
litically connected firms have higher bank financing for both the high-q and low-q groups of
firms. However, for robustness tests indicated in Panel C of Table 4.3, only the third pair,
(Political connection and low q) -(nonpolitical connection and low q), experiences the positive
and significant results. This implies that the PPP Indian private sector firms with political ties
may have better access to bank financing despite the fact that they have few investment oppor-
tunities. Therefore, owing to their political connections, these kinds of firms have more chances
to overuse their abundant bank financing. This supports the overinvestment hypothesis. This
result is consistent with the descriptive analysis of when the PPP Indian firms have higher bank
loans but document lower interest coverage compared with their non-PPP counterparts. As
also indicated in the descriptive analysis, these PPP firms also have higher insider ownership,
which allows managers to have more power to manipulate the firms’ financing.
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4.5.4 Effects of Election Events – Regression Discontinuity Design
Table 4.4, following Lee and Card (2008), reports the result of the goodness-of-fit statistic on
whether the polynomial form was appropriate for my RDD. Lee and Card (2008) conclude that
the polynomial function is too restrictive if the statistic exceeds the critical value. However, all
of my results for different groups of firms witness that the G-value is less than the critical F-
value; hence the polynomial form was appropriate for my analysis. Gelman and Imbens (2014)
study the effects of a high-order of polynomials in the RDD. Following these authors, I used a
local linear or quadratic polynomials in the RDD rather than the higher order of polynomials,
since the higher order can lead the causal effects to become misleading. My study used the
discrete assignment treatment (PPP investment years as recorded by years), so local linear
regression, as a non-parametric estimation was not to be used. Therefore, my study used the
quadratic polynomials to estimate the treatment effects of the election event on the firms’ bank
financing.
Tables 4.5 reports the main regression results that estimated the effects of the election
events on the Chinese and Indian firms by implementing the RDD.5. Panels A and C report the
results, for the Chinese and Indian firms respectively, in which standard errors were estimated
by Huber-White sandwich estimators to capture heteroscedasticity. Panels B and C reports the
estimators, for the Chinese and Indian firms respectively, with the cluster-consistent standard
errors. The observations were clustered into years to capture the correlation of private sector
firms’ bank financing within years.
For the Chinese firms, as indicated in Panels A and B of Table 4.5, there are no significant
results in the coefficient of the variable Election dummy on the variable Bank loans/sales
after controlling for the PPP investment years and their quadratic polynomial. Therefore,
there is no statistical evidence of differences in firms’ bank loan access before and after the
election events in China. By contrast, in India, as indicated in Panels C and D of Table 4.5,
for the data in the total sample (Column 1), the coefficient of the variable Election dummy is
5The results of these tables are visualized in Figures 4.4 and 4.5
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Table 4.4: The Goodness-of-Fit Statistics to Choose the Parametric Functional Form for Regression
Discontinuity Design
This table presents the results of the goodness-of-fit statistic, proposed by Lee and Card (2008),
to decide whether a polynomial form was appropriate for the research design discontinuity or not
in the Chinese and Indian firms. Panel A indicates the goodness-of-fit test for the 2nd degree of
polynomials. Panel B indicates the 3rd degree of polynomials. The goodness-of-fit statistic G =
(ESSR−ESSUR)/(J−K)
(ESSUR)/(N−J) where ESSR is the restricted error sum of squares from estimating Model 4.4
with the polynomial form in the assignment variable X, and ESSUR is the unrestricted error sum of
squares attained from regressing the outcome variable Y (Bank loans/sales in my setting) on a full
set of the J dummy variables systematically generated from the variable PPP investment year. This
is designed to capture the J different discrete values recorded by years. G follows F(J-K,N-J) with
K denoting the number of parameters in Model 4.4, and N measures the total observations (Lee and
Card, 2008).
China The total sample PPP & politically PPP & nonpolitically non-PPP & politically non-PPP & nonpolitically
connected firms connected firms connected firms connected firms
Panel A: Degree of
polynomial==2
ESSr 2074.607 1399.674 79.107 21.146 3.398
ESSur 2007.98 1289.828 58.709 20.018 2.980
J 10 10 10 10 10
K 3 3 3 3 3
N 187 70 32 45 40
(J-K,N-J) (7,177) (7,60) (7,22) (7,35) (7,30)
G 0.839 0.730 1.092 0.282 0.600
Critical F-value 2.062 2.167 2.464 2.285 2.334
Panel B: Degree of
polynomial==3
ESSr 2070.143 1389.868 76.617 20.995 3.397
ESSur 2007.98 1289.828 58.709 20.018 2.980
J 10 10 10 10 10
K 4 4 4 4 4
N 187 70 32 45 40
(J-K,N-J) (6,177) (6,60) (6,22) (6,35) (6,30)
G 0.913 0.776 1.118 0.285 0.699
Critical F-value 2.150 2.254 2.549 2.372 2.421
India The total sample PPP & politically PPP & nonpolitically non-PPP & politically non-PPP & nonpolitically
connected firms connected firms connected firms connected firms
Panel A: Degree of
polynomial==2
ESSr 1012.114 274.112 433.381 16.653 103.715
ESSur 1006.335 251.969 422.535 11.018 100.363
J 10 10 10 10 10
K 3 3 3 3 3
N 322 41 147 28 106
(J-K,N-J) (7,312) (7,31) (7,137) (7,18) (7,96)
G 0.256 0.389 0.502 1.315 0.458
Critical F-value 2.039 2.323 2.077 2.577 2.106
Panel B: Degree of
polynomial==3
ESSr 1011.609 274.041 430.051 15.230 103.324
ESSur 1006.335 251.969 422.535 11.018 100.363
J 10 10 10 10 10
K 4 4 4 4 4
N 322 41 147 28 106
(J-K,N-J) (6,312) (6,31) (6,137) (6,18) (6,96)
G 0.273 0.453 0.406 1.147 0.472
Critical F-value 2.128 2.409 2.165 2.661 2.195
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Table 4.5: Regression Discontinuity Design for Testing Private Sector Firms’ Bank Financing
This table reports the main regression used to test the effect of the election event on the firms’ access to bank loans. Panels A and C report
the regression results, for the Chinese and Indian firms respectively, with the standard error being estimated using the Huber-White sandwich
estimators to capture heteroscedasticity. Panels B and D report the regression results, for the Chinese and Indian firms respectively, with the
standard error being estimated by the use of the cluster option. The dependent variable Bank loans/sales was measured by total long term
and short term bank loans divided by sales. The receipt of the election event effect was denoted by the dummy variable Election dummy.
Election dummy took the value of 1 if the PPP investment year was equal to or more than 2008 (or 2009) for the Chinese (or the Indian)
private sector firms. Y r was calculated by normalizing PPP investment year by the value 2008 to ensure the threshold is at 0. Y r ∗Y r captured
the effects of quadratic polynomials. The observations were clustered into years. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Panel A: Chinese firms – Regression with The total sample PPP & politically PPP & nonpolitically non-PPP & politically non-PPP & nonpolitically
heteroskedasticity standard errors connected firms connected firms connected firms connected firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Election dummy 0.117 -0.916 2.380 -0.021 0.426
(0.167) (-0.616) (1.094) (-0.056) (1.070)
Yr -0.125 -0.099 -0.583 -0.044 -0.070*
(-0.869) (-0.319) (-1.561) (-0.632) (-2.010)
Yr*Yr 0.029 0.083 -0.008 -0.016 -0.010
(0.725) (0.944) (-0.110) (-0.940) (-1.424)
Constant 1.677** 3.768** -0.030 1.009** 0.163
(2.869) (2.807) (-0.038) (3.269) (1.496)
R-squared 0.017 0.058 0.198 0.033 0.161
N 187 70 32 45 40
Panel B: Chinese firms – Regression with The total sample PPP & politically PPP & nonpolitically non-PPP & politically non-PPP & nonpolitically
cluster-consistent standard errors connected firms connected firms connected firms connected firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Election dummy 0.117 -0.916 2.380 -0.021 0.426
(0.310) (-0.951) (1.681) (-0.088) (1.349)
Yr -0.125 -0.099 -0.583** -0.044 -0.070**
(-1.440) (-0.485) (-2.526) (-1.158) (-2.436)
Yr*Yr 0.029 0.083 -0.008 -0.016* -0.010*
(1.229) (1.720) (-0.154) (-1.833) (-2.044)
Constant 1.677** 3.768** -0.030 1.009*** 0.163
(4.647) (4.616) (-0.055) (4.916) (1.588)
R-squared 0.017 0.058 0.198 0.033 0.161
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N 187 70 32 45 40
Panel C: Indian firms – Regression with The total sample PPP & politically PPP & nonpolitically non-PPP & politically non-PPP & nonpolitically
heteroskedasticity standard errors connected firms connected firms connected firms connected firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Election dummy 0.725* 3.014* 0.488 -0.861 0.302
(1.758) (1.737) (0.886) (-0.961) (0.795)
Yr -0.034 -0.001 -0.039 0.146 -0.009
(-0.434) (-0.002) (-0.382) (1.096) (-0.123)
Yr*Yr -0.028** -0.034 -0.023 -0.055** -0.009
(-2.173) (-0.663) (-1.206) (-2.251) (-0.604)
Constant 0.832*** 0.804 1.008*** 1.726** 0.432**
(4.571) (1.200) (4.154) (2.353) (2.851)
R-squared 0.039 0.252 0.018 0.231 0.020
N 322 41 147 28 106
Panel D: Indian firms – Regression with The total sample PPP & politically PPP & nonpolitically non-PPP & politically non-PPP & nonpolitically
cluster-consistent standard errors connected firms connected firms connected firms connected firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Election dummy 0.725*** 3.014** 0.488 -0.861 0.302
(5.144) (2.762) (1.716) (-0.994) (0.932)
Yr -0.034 -0.001 -0.039 0.146 -0.009
(-1.159) (-0.003) (-0.709) (1.250) (-0.143)
Yr*Yr -0.028** -0.034 -0.023 -0.055* -0.009
(-4.399) (-0.733) (-1.691) (-2.148) (-0.824)
Constant 0.832*** 0.804* 1.008*** 1.726* 0.432**
(7.217) (2.253) (5.274) (2.175) (3.571)
R-squared 0.039 0.252 0.018 0.231 0.020
N 322 41 147 28 106
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Figure 4.4: Chinese Firms: Graphs for Regression Discontinuity Design
Figure 4.5: Indian Firms: Graphs for Regression Discontinuity Design
positive and significant, indicating that after the election event, access to bank loans is 72.5%
higher for private sector firms in the post election period, relative to those in the pre-election
year. The coefficient of the quadratic term Y r ∗ Y r is negative and significant, implying that
firms’ bank financing in the years around the election event is 2.8% higher than those far
away from this event. Moreover, when I consider different groups that made up my total
sample, with these groups being categorized by PPP and political connections (Columns 2
to 5), it becomes clear that PPP and politically connected firms witness the positive and
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significant coefficient of the variable Election dummy on the firms’ bank financing (Column
2). On average, after the election result comes out, PPP firms with political connections have
3.014 times higher bank lending than those before the election event. These other three groups
experience insignificant results (Columns 3 to 5). This is consistent with my hypothesis that
PPP-partnering private firms with political connections have opportunities to achieve more
bank financing in the election event when their supported government maintain their power.
This again confirms the privilege of PPP politically connected firms over other private sector
firms in India.
Moreover, there is a plausible explanation for the different effects of the election event
in China and in India. Although in China, there may have been a change in leaders, the
Communist Party of China still maintains its power and dominate its government. Hence, the
preference with its political ties may not change much during election events. However, India
seems to be more democratic, with multiple parties and alliances competing for the election.
As a result, the failure of the incumbent government may sweep out the previous preference of
this government’s politically connected firms. By contrast, the incumbency advantage of the
current government may enhance the preferential banking financing for politically connected
firms during the election event.
4.5.5 Robustness Tests
My main findings suggest that the SLH is supported in China whereas the PCH is supported
in India. I further investigate the validity of these findings through a series of robustness tests.
First, I tested how higher bank lending, which results from engaging in PPP projects and
political connections, as indicated in the previous analysis, influenced firm level credit risk.
I regressed the probability of default (as a measurement of credit risk) on firms’ bank lend-
ing (Bank loans/sales), political-connected status (Political connection), PPP engagement
(PPP ) and their interactions. The results are reported in Table 4.6. As reported in Panel A of
Table 4.6, in the case of Chinese PPP firms, there is no significant relationship between bank
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lending and the probability of default. However, in the case of the Indian PPP firms, as shown
in Panel B of the table, for the total sample in Column 1, higher bank lending is more sensi-
tive to default probability. This is evident from the positive and significant coefficient of the
three-way interaction PPP*Political Connection*Bank loans/sales. More importantly, when
I divided the sample firms into high-q and low-q group, the significant result of this 3-way
interaction is only seen in the low-q group firms. This lends further support to the view that
the Indian PPP firms with political connections allocate higher bank lending to low-growth
firms that have a higher probability of default. This lends support to the PCH in India.
Second, I used the election event as the exogenous shock to re examine the effect of political
connection on the firms’ credit risk. I initially conducted the RDD to investigate whether the
election event (the treatment effect) would lead to a significant change in the firms’ credit
risk. The results are reported in Table 4.7. Panels A and C report the regression results, for
the Chinese and Indian firms respectively, with the standard error being estimated using the
Huber-White sandwich estimators to capture heteroscedasticity. Panels B and D report the
regression results, for the Chinese and Indian firms respectively, with the standard error being
estimated by the use of the cluster option. For the total sample, the Chinese firms experience
insignificant results. In the case of the Indian firms, the probability of default (as a proxy of
credit risk) increase significantly under the impact of the election event. When I divided the
total sample of the Indian firms into four groups at different combinations of PPP engagement
(PPP or non-PPP firms) and political ties (politically connected or not), significant results are
only witnessed in politically connected PPP firms, as indicated in Columns C and D.
Then, to confirm the dark side of the election event, I linked the bank lending with the credit
risk. I used the RDD with the election event as the treatment effect to explore whether there
was any relationship between the increase in the bank lending and credit risk. The results are
reported in Table 4.8. As indicated in Panels C and D, politically connected PPP firms’ bank
lending in the Indian market has a positive effect on the probability of default of these firms
in the post election event period. This is evident from the positive and significant interaction
term between Election dummy and Bank loans/sales in the subgroup of Indian firms which
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Table 4.6: The Effects of PPPs and Political Connections on the Sensitivity of Bank Financing on
Credit Risk
This table presents the effects of PPPs and political connections on the sensitivity of bank financing
on credit risk. Panel A and B report the results of the Chinese firms and Indian firms respectively.
The probability of default was estimated by the combined credit risk model in the Thomson Eikon
database, Bank loans/sales was measured by total long term and short term bank loans divided
by sales. PPP was a dummy variable, which took value 1 for firms invested in PPP projects, or
else zero for firms which were matched by industry and firm size. Political Connection (Pol) was
a dummy variable that took 1 for firms whose chair and executive directors who were formerly or
currently officers in the government, the parliament or the military (Chen et al., 2011). ***,**,*
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Chinese firms
The probability of default The total sample High-q group Low-q group
(1) (2) (3)
Bank loans/ sales 0.092 -0.605 0.214
(0.818) (-1.023) (1.137)
PPP -0.053 -0.428 0.077
(-0.659) (-1.116) (0.608)
PPP*Bank loans/sales -0.074 0.541 -0.205
(-0.643) (0.860) (-1.078)
Political connection -0.053 -0.543 0.045
(-0.610) (-1.431) (0.371)
Political connection* Bank loans/sales -0.0135 0.801 -0.199
(-0.109) (1.340) (-0.985)
PPP*Political connection 0.165 0.737* 0.007
(1.482) (1.830) (0.045)
PPP*Political connection*Bank loans/sales -0.004 -0.782 0.188
(-0.030) (-1.232) (0.930)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.190 0.715* 0.026
(1.469) (1.855) (0.250)
R-squared 13.955 38.075 23.363
N 124 54 54
Panel B: Indian firms
The probability of default The total sample High-q group Low-q group
(1) (2) (3)
Bank loans/ sales 0.242*** 0.027 0.699***
(7.333) (1.525) (10.599)
PPP 0.174** 0.048 0.493***
(3.282) (1.264) (5.662)
PPP*Bank loans/sales -0.235*** 0.021 -0.715***
(-6.384) (0.781) (-10.416)
Political connection -0.028 -0.017 0.159
(-0.248) (-0.199) (0.560)
Political connection* Bank loans/sales -0.259** -0.002 -0.819**
(-3.057) (-0.022) (-2.441)
PPP*Political connection -0.178 -0.129 -0.452
(-1.332) (-1.358) (-1.407)
PPP*Political connection*Bank loans/sales 0.373*** 0.097 0.931**
(4.258) (0.922) (2.743)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.031 0.130*** -0.247
(-0.135) (4.890) (-0.986)
R-squared 32.487 72.448 58.535
N 297 132 127
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Table 4.7: Regression Discontinuity Design for Testing Private Sector Firms’ Credit Risk under the Effect of the Election Event.
This table reports the regression that was used to test the effect of the election event on the firms’ credit risk. Panels A and C report the regression
results, for the Chinese and Indian firms respectively, with the standard error being estimated using the Huber-White sandwich estimators to
capture heteroscedasticity. Panels B and D report the regression results, for the Chinese and Indian firms respectively, with the standard error
being estimated by the use of the cluster option. The dependent variable The probability of default was estimated by the combined credit
risk model in the Thomson Eikon database. The receipt of the election event effect was denoted by the dummy variable Election dummy.
For the Chinese firms, Election dummy took the value of 1 if the PPP investment year was equal to or more than 2008. For the Indian
firms, Election dummy took the value of 1 if the PPP investment year was equal to or more than 2009. Y r was calculated by normalizing
PPP investment year by the value 2008 (or 2009) for the Chinese (or the Indian) firms to ensure the threshold is at zero. Y r ∗Y r was to capture
the effects of quadratic polynomials. The observations were clustered into years. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Panel A: Chinese firms – Regression with The total sample PPP and politically PPP and nonpolitically Non-PPP and politically Non-PPP and nonpolitically
heteroskedasticity standard errors connected firms connected firms connected firms connected firms
The probability of default Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t
Election dummy 0.018 -0.026 -0.126 0.022 0.081
(0.256) (-0.156) (-1.358) (0.184) (0.586)
Yr 0.011 0.025 0.033 0.009 0.010
(0.531) (0.524) (1.066) (0.261) (0.282)
Yr*Yr -0.007 -0.014 -0.012 -0.006 -0.014**
(-1.163) (-1.180) (-1.438) (-0.688) (-2.089)
Constant 0.171** 0.239 0.207** 0.165 0.146*
(3.003) (1.661) (2.663) (1.619) (1.829)
R-squared 2.726 6.188 23.163 5.225 20.308
N 142 48 18 33 30
Panel B: Chinese firms – Regression with The total sample PPP and politically PPP and nonpolitically Non-PPP and politically Non-PPP and nonpolitically
cluster-consistent standard errors connected firms connected firms connected firms connected firms
The probability of default Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t
Election dummy 0.018 -0.026 -0.127 0.022 0.081
(0.332) (-0.197) (-1.334) (0.184) (0.937)
Yr 0.011 0.025 0.033 0.009 0.010
(0.851) (0.802) (1.148) (0.320) (0.379)
Yr*Yr -0.007 -0.014* -0.012 -0.006 -0.014*
(-1.486) (-2.138) (-1.553) (-0.833) (-1.810)
Constant 0.171** 0.239** 0.207** 0.165 0.146*
(3.848) (2.397) (2.561) (1.803) (2.023)
R-squared 2.726 6.188 2.316 5.225 20.308
N 142 48 18 33 30
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Panel C: Indian firms – Regression with The total sample PPP and politically PPP and nonpolitically Non-PPP and politically Non-PPP and nonpolitically
heteroskedasticity standard errors connected firms connected firms connected firms connected firms
The probability of default Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t
Election dummy 0.110* 0.228* 0.119 0.005 0.071
(1.909) (1.750) (1.405) (0.087) (0.595)
Yr 0.003 0.011 0.001 -0.002 0.004
(0.176) (0.331) (0.059) (-0.155) (0.096)
Yr*Yr 0.010** 0.009 0.007* -0.005* 0.016*
(2.445) (1.089) (1.666) (-1.862) (1.688)
Constant 0.149*** 0.102 0.186*** 0.118** 0.133*
(4.118) (1.352) (3.672) (2.926) (1.778)
R-squared 3.656 22.762 5.864 10.874 2.241
N 301 39 135 25 102
Panel D: Indian firms – Regression with The total sample PPP and politically PPP and nonpolitically Non-PPP and politically Non-PPP and nonpolitically
cluster-consistent standard errors connected firms connected firms connected firms connected firms
The probability of default Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t
Election dummy 0.110 0.228** 0.119 0.005 0.071
(1.579) (4.781) (1.306) (0.088) (0.577)
Yr 0.003 0.011 0.001 -0.002 0.004
(0.134) (0.859) (0.058) (-0.175) (0.078)
Yr*Yr 0.010** 0.009 0.007 -0.005 0.016**
(3.023) (1.311) (1.599) (-1.853) (2.798)
Constant 0.149*** 0.102** 0.186** 0.119** 0.133
(5.265) (2.963) (4.750) (3.799) (1.695)
R-squared 3.656 22.762 5.864 10.874 2.241
N 301 39 135 25 102
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Table 4.8: Regression Discontinuity Design for Testing the Sensitivity of Bank Financing on Credit Risk under the Effect of the Election Event.
This table indicates the sensitivity of private sector firms’ bank lending on credit risk (measured by the probability of defaults). The dependent
variable The probability of default was estimated by the combined credit risk model in the Thomson Eikon database. The receipt of the
election event effect was denoted by the dummy variable Election dummy. For the Chinese firms, Election dummy took the value of 1 if the
PPP investment year was equal to or more than 2008. For the Indian firms, Election dummy took the value of 1 if the PPP investment year
was equal to or more than 2009. Y r was calculated by normalizing PPP investment year by the value 2008 (or 2009) for the Chinese (or the
Indian) firms to ensure the threshold is at zero. Y r ∗ Y r was to capture the effects of quadratic polynomials. Bank loans/sales was measured
by total long term and short term bank loans divided by sales. Panels A and C report the regression results, for the Chinese and Indian firms
respectively, with the standard error being estimated using the Huber-White sandwich estimators to capture heteroscedasticity. Panels B and
D report the regression results, for the Chinese and Indian firms respectively, with the standard error being estimated by the use of the cluster
option. The observations were clustered into years. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Chinese firms – Regression with The total sample PPP and politically PPP and nonpolitically Non-PPP and politically Non-PPP and nonpolitically
heteroskedasticity standard errors connected firms connected firms connected firms connected firms
The probability of default Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t
Election dummy 0.070 0.008 -0.147 0.134 0.036
(1.327) (0.067) (-1.519) (1.645) (0.217)
Bank loans/ sales -0.001 -0.011 0.037** 0.098 0.072
(-0.168) (-0.956) (2.925) (1.279) (0.828)
Election dummy* Bank loans/sales 0.014 0.028 -0.022 -0.082 0.020
(1.501) (1.681) (-1.557) (-0.991) (0.135)
Yr -0.024** -0.028* 0.046 -0.004 0.010
(-2.377) (-1.897) (1.371) (-0.159) (0.264)
Yr*Yr 0.001 0.001 -0.013 -0.002 -0.010
( 0.558) (0.403) (-1.467) (-0.361) (-1.326)
Constant 0.104** 0.163 0.188** 0.042 0.116
(3.043) (1.607) (2.453) (0.913) (1.311)
R-squared 12.678 17.575 41.799 26.852 18.183
N 124 50 18 30 26
Panel B: Chinese firms – Regression with The total sample PPP and politically PPP and nonpolitically Non-PPP and politically Non-PPP and nonpolitically
cluster-consistent standard errors connected firms connected firms connected firms connected firms
The probability of default Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t
Election dummy 0.070 0.008 -0.147 0.134 0.036
(1.363) (0.066) (-1.551) (1.544) (0.330)
Bank loans/ sales -0.001 -0.011 0.037** 0.098 0.072
(-0.169) (-1.119) (2.869) (1.346) (0.915)
Election dummy* Bank loans/sales 0.014 0.028 -0.022 -0.082 0.020
(1.359) (1.661) (-1.662) (-1.298) (0.153)
Yr -0.024** -0.028** 0.046 -0.004 0.010
(-4.186) (-3.071) (1.454) (-0.185) (0.474)
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Yr*Yr 0.001 0.001 -0.013 -0.002 -0.010
(1.573) (1.235) (-1.546) (-0.449) (-1.412)
Constant 0.104** 0.163* 0.188* 0.042 0.116*
(3.662) (1.880) (2.393) (1.160) (2.189)
R-squared 12.678 17.575 41.799 26.852 18.183
N 124 50 18 30 26
Panel C: Indian firms – Regression with The total sample PPP and politically PPP and nonpolitically Non-PPP and politically Non-PPP and nonpolitically
heteroskedasticity standard errors connected firms connected firms connected firms connected firms
The probability of default Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t
Election dummy 0.069 0.238* 0.132 0.019 -0.028
(0.861) (1.704) (1.390) (0.181) (-0.144)
Bank loans/ sales 0.034* -0.025 0.036* -0.015 0.152
(1.845) (-0.524) (1.818) (-1.447) (1.088)
Election dummy* Bank loans/sales 0.047 0.142** -0.029 -0.040 0.089
(1.316) (2.799) (-1.177) (-0.865) (0.360)
Yr -0.002 -0.067** 0.003 0.002 0.005
(-0.109) (-2.325) (0.158) (0.128) (0.131)
Yr*Yr 0.009** -0.003 0.007 -0.008** 0.018*
(2.206) (-0.508) (1.648) (-2.313) (1.906)
Constant 0.116** 0.0121 0.162** 0.157** 0.057
(2.707) (0.127) (2.843) (2.808) (0.593)
R-squared 17.411 82.200 6.185 26.587 24.178
N 297 39 133 25 100
Panel D: Indian firms – Regression with The total sample PPP and politically PPP and nonpolitically Non-PPP and politically Non-PPP and nonpolitically
cluster-consistent standard errors connected firms connected firms connected firms connected firms
The probability of default Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t
Election dummy 0.069 0.238** 0.132 0.019 -0.028
(0.649) (2.538) (1.292) (0.156) (-0.111)
Bank loans/ sales 0.034** -0.025 0.036** -0.015 0.152
(3.870) (-0.765) (4.153) (-1.304) (0.865)
Election dummy* Bank loans/sales 0.047 0.142** -0.029 -0.040 0.089
(0.996) (3.394) (-1.537) (-0.787) (0.227)
Yr -0.002 -0.067** 0.003 0.002 0.005
(-0.112) (-4.281) (0.150) (0.120) (0.127)
Yr*Yr 0.009** -0.003 0.007 -0.008* 0.018**
(2.694) (-0.472) (1.470) (-2.125) (3.320)
Constant 0.116*** 0.012 0.162** 0.157** 0.057
(4.123) (0.189) (5.026) (2.669) (0.664)
R-squared 17.411 82.199 6.185 26.587 24.178
N 297 39 133 25 100
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engage in PPP projects and political connections. The other subgroups witness insignificant
results. This further supports the negative effect of bank lending in the Indian market.
Finally, the sign and significance of the treatment effects for the regression with het-
eroskedasticity standard errors (as indicated in Panels A and C of Tables 4.5) are mostly
the same as those with cluster-consistent errors (as indicated in Panels B and D of Tables 4.5).
According to Lee and Card (2008), with the assumption of the two identical standard errors
from the two estimators of the data from the right (the treatment) and the left (the control)
of the threshold (the election event), the results from the cluster-consistent errors were then be
used for inference. The case of two identical standard errors happened in my study if the source
of the estimated standard errors was independent of the election event. There is every chance
that private sector firms’ bank financing is also influenced by seasonality. Haggard et al. (2008)
study the political economy of private sector development and explore the Soviet-style season-
ality of investment in which the investments are low in the first quarter, reaching mini peaks
in June and September, and dramatically increasing in the last quarter. Likewise in India,
Bhole (2004) indicates the seasonal variations in bank credit with the increased bank financing
in the busy season (October to March) and the decreased bank financing in the slack season
(April to December). Consequently, the seasonality of bank financing, which is independent of
the election event may lead to identical standard errors of two estimators before and after the
election event. This idea is consistent with the view of Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004) that
the Medicare coverage may be influenced by a quarter of births more than usual due to health
differences in season of birth.
In relation to robustness tests, it is also assumed that there are few chances where these two
standard errors are independent due to some unobservable effects before and after the election
event. This results in biased estimators of the treatment effects. Accordingly, Lee and Card
(2008) propose the procedure to inflate the standard errors. The idea of this method applied
to my study is that the firm observation data was collapsed into the year-cells to calculate the
mean square error of the cell size-weighted regression and average cell variance. The difference
between these two terms could be added to the sampling variance to re-estimate the signifi-
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Table 4.9: Chinese Firms: The Robustness Tests for Regression Discontinuity Design
This table reports the results of the adjusted variance, standard errors, and the t-test of the main treatment effects (the effects of Election dummy
on Bank loans/sales). The firm observation data was collapsed into the year-cells to calculate the mean square error of the cell size-weighted
regression and average cell variance. The difference between these two terms were be able to added to the sampling variance to re-estimate the
significant of the treatment effects.
Year Mean Standard errors Frequency Variance Residual from cell-sized Weighted variance of the mean
Bank loans sales weight regression residual from the regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: The total sample
2003 3.738 6.551 21 42.920 3.024 1.027
2004 1.103 1.123 17 1.261 2.639 0.633
2005 2.283 3.586 27 12.862 2.312 0.772
2006 2.674 3.891 26 15.139 2.043 0.580
2007 1.670 2.265 28 5.129 1.831 0.502
2008 1.838 1.818 21 3.306 1.793 0.361
2009 1.833 2.118 14 4.487 1.697 0.216
2010 0.788 0.518 5 0.268 1.658 0.074
2011 1.824 2.725 19 7.428 1.677 0.286
2012 1.612 1.534 9 2.352 1.754 0.148
Sum 187 95.152 4.599 Term (1)=sum of (7)
0.509 Term (2)=sum of (5)/sum of (4)
4.090 Added variance= Term(1)-Term(2)
8.321 Adjusted variance= Original variance + 2*Added variance
2.885 Adjusted standard errors= Sqrt(Adjusted variance)
0.040 Adjusted t-test for treatment effects
= Original Coefficient/Adjusted SE
Panel B: PPP and
politically connected firms
2003 7.623 9.338 8 87.180 6.348 4.606
2004 1.794 1.733 5 3.002 5.499 2.160
2005 4.974 5.281 9 27.892 4.816 2.982
2006 5.416 4.797 11 23.011 4.300 2.906
2007 3.355 3.114 9 9.699 3.951 2.007
2008 2.490 1.819 9 3.308 2.852 1.046
2009 3.550 2.299 6 5.287 2.836 0.690
2010 1.151 0 1 0 2.987 0.127
2011 3.750 3.411 8 11.636 3.3051 1.248
2012 3.103 0.888 4 0.789 3.790 0.826
Sum 70 171.805 18.593 Term (1)=sum of (7)
2.454 Term (2)=sum of (5)/sum of (4)
16.139 Added variance= Term(1)-Term(2)
33.205 Adjusted variance= Original variance + 2*Added variance
5.762 Adjusted standard errors= Sqrt(Adjusted variance)
-0.159 Adjusted t-test for treatment effects
= Original Coefficient/Adjusted SE
Panel C: PPP and
nonpolitically connected firms
2003 4.091 3.000 3 9.001 2.689 0.678
2004 0.918 0.490 5 0.240 2.176 0.740
2005 1.557 1.007 6 1.015 1.648 0.509
2006 1.159 0.658 3 0.433 1.104 0.114
2007 0.956 1.688 6 2.848 0.545 0.056
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2008 3.544 4.404 2 19.396 2.350 0.345
2009 0.351 0 1 0 1.760 0.097
2010 0.641 0.379 2 0.143 1.153 0.083
2011 0.431 0.108 3 0.012 0.531 0.026
2012 0.238 0 1 0 -0.106 0.001
Sum 32 33.089 2.649 Term (1)=sum of (7)
1.034 Term (2)=sum of (5)/sum of (4)
1.615 Added variance= Term(1)-Term(2)
4.832 Adjusted variance= Original variance + 2*Added variance
2.198 Adjusted standard errors= Sqrt(Adjusted variance)
1.083 Adjusted t-test for treatment effects
= Original Coefficient/Adjusted SE
Panel D: non-PPP and
politically connected firms
2003 1.089 1.284 3 1.650 0.840 0.047
2004 0.792 0.852 6 0.726 0.936 0.117
2005 1.020 0.743 6 0.552 1.001 0.134
2006 0.818 0.536 7 0.287 1.036 0.167
2007 1.258 0.984 7 0.968 1.038 0.168
2008 1.097 0.464 5 0.215 0.988 0.108
2009 0.869 0.391 3 0.153 0.928 0.057
2010 0.753 0.867 2 0.751 0.836 0.031
2011 0.614 0.461 4 0.212 0.714 0.045
2012 0.659 0.490 2 0.240 0.559 0.014
Sum 45 5.755 0.888 Term (1)=sum of (7)
0.128 Term (2)=sum of (5)/sum of (4)
0.760 Added variance= Term(1)-Term(2)
1.581 Adjusted variance= Original variance + 2*Added variance
1.257 Adjusted standard errors= Sqrt(Adjusted variance)
-0.017 Adjusted t-test for treatment effects
= Original Coefficient/Adjusted SE
Panel E: non-PPP and
nonpolitically connected firms
2003 0.283 0.431 7 0.186 0.274 0.0132
2004 0.440 0 1 0 0.290 0.002
2005 0.236 0.280 6 0.078 0.287 0.012
2006 0.147 0.173 5 0.030 0.265 0.009
2007 0.338 0.284 6 0.080 0.224 0.008
2008 0.723 0.443 5 0.196 0.589 0.043
2009 0.351 0.204 4 0.042 0.509 0.026
2011 0.228 0.115 4 0.013 0.293 0.009
2012 0.268 0.004 2 0.000 0.156 0.001
Sum 40 0.626 0.123 Term (1)=sum of (7)
0.016 Term (2)=sum of (5)/sum of (4)
0.107 Added variance= Term(1)-Term(2)
0.248 Adjusted variance= Original variance + 2*Added variance
0.498 Adjusted standard errors= Sqrt(Adjusted variance)
0.855 Adjusted t-test for treatment effects
= Original Coefficient/Adjusted SE
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Table 4.10: Indian Firms: The Robustness Tests for Regression Discontinuity Design
This tables reports the results of the adjusted variance, standard errors, and the t-test of the main treatment effects (the effects of Election dummy
on Bank loans/sales). The firm observation data was collapsed into the year-cells to calculate the mean square error of the cell size-weighted
regression and average cell variance. The difference between these two terms were able to be added to the sampling variance to re-estimate the
significant of the treatment effects.
Year Mean Standard errors Frequency Variance Residual from cell-sized Weighted variance of the mean
Bank loans sales weight regression residual from the regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: The total sample
2004 0.112 0.129 9 0.017 0.306 0.003
2005 0.574 0.882 11 0.779 0.522 0.009
2006 0.803 1.008 41 1.016 0.683 0.059
2007 0.649 0.660 36 0.436 0.789 0.070
2008 0.901 1.007 20 1.015 0.838 0.044
2009 1.580 2.372 30 5.627 1.557 0.226
2010 1.582 2.813 52 7.913 1.495 0.361
2011 1.173 1.848 58 3.414 1.377 0.341
2012 1.352 1.709 51 2.921 1.203 0.229
2013 0.897 1.105 14 1.221 0.973 0.041
Sum 322 24.357 1.383 Term (1)=sum of (7)
0.076 Term (2)=sum of (5)/sum of (4)
1.307 Added variance= Term(1)-Term(2)
2.634 Adjusted variance=Original variance + 2*Added variance
1.623 Adjusted standard errors= Sqrt(Adjusted variance)
0.447 Adjusted t-test for treatment effects
= Original Coefficient/Adjusted SE
Panel B: PPP and
politically connected firms
2005 0.130 0.052 2 0.003 0.260 0.003
2006 0.494 0.207 5 0.043 0.499 0.030
2007 0.808 0.776 5 0.602 0.669 0.055
2008 0.634 0.119 3 0.014 0.771 0.043
2009 4.881 5.141 4 26.426 1.819 0.323
2010 2.779 3.067 9 9.408 1.784 0.698
2011 4.122 3.734 7 13.946 1.680 0.482
2012 4.529 1.449 4 2.100 1.508719 0.222
2013 2.080 2.200 2 4.839 1.269 0.079
41 57.381 1.935 Term (1)=sum of (7)
1.400 Term (2)=sum of (5)/sum of (4)
0.536 Added variance= Term(1)-Term(2)
2.262 Adjusted variance=Original variance + 2*Added variance
1.504 Adjusted standard errors= Sqrt(Adjusted variance)
2.004** Adjusted t-test for treatment effects
= Original Coefficient/Adjusted SE
Panel C: PPP and
nonpolitically connected firms
2004 0.172 0.138 5 0.019 0.63 0.014
2005 0.924 0.984 4 0.968 0.799 0.017
2006 1.174 1.268 20 1.608 0.920 0.115
2007 0.825 0.777 15 0.604 0.994 0.101
2008 0.941 0.894 9 0.800 1.024 0.064
2009 1.490 1.298 14 1.685 1.496 0.213
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2010 1.732 3.443 22 11.853 1.434 0.308
2011 0.882 1.083 26 1.172 1.327 0.311
2012 1.322 1.666 26 2.777 1.174 0.244
2013 1.184 0.961 6 0.923 0.976 0.039
147 22.408 1.426 Term (1)=sum of (7)
0.152 Term (2)=sum of (5)/sum of (4)
1.274 Added variance= Term(1)-Term(2)
2.629 Adjusted variance=Original variance + 2*Added variance
1.621 Adjusted standard errors= Sqrt(Adjusted variance)
1.859* Adjusted t-test for treatment effects
= Original Coefficient/Adjusted SE
Panel D: non-PPP and
politically connected firms
2004 0 0 2 0 -0.386 0.002
2005 0.001 0 1 0 0.257 0.000
2006 0.661 0.682 3 0.465 0.791 0.013
2007 0.571 0.640 4 0.410 1.213 0.040
2008 2.745 1.935 2 3.743 1.525 0.032
2009 0.982 1.036 5 1.073 0.864 0.025
2010 0.802 0.512 4 0.262 0.955 0.025
2011 0.913 0.011 3 0.000 0.934 0.018
2012 1.014 0.138 3 0.019 0.803 0.013
2013 0.017 0 1 0 0.562 0.002
28 5.972 0.170 Term (1)=sum of (7)
0.213 Term (2)=sum of (5)/sum of (4)
-0.043 Added variance= Term(1)-Term(2)
0.665 Adjusted variance=Original variance + 2*Added variance
0.815 Adjusted standard errors= Sqrt(Adjusted variance)
-1.056 Adjusted t-test for treatment effects
= Original Coefficient/Adjusted SE
Panel E: non-PPP and
nonpolitically connected firms
2004 0.075 0.101 2 0.010 0.259 0.001
2005 0.589 1.106 4 1.222 0.328 0.004
2006 0.385 0.535 13 0.286 0.380 0.018
2007 0.389 0.397 12 0.158 0.415 0.020
2008 0.362 0.263 6 0.069 0.432 0.011
2009 0.299 0.350 7 0.123 0.733 0.036
2010 0.938 1.866 17 3.482 0.715 0.082
2011 0.614 0.739 22 0.547 0.680 0.096
2012 0.747 1.162 18 1.350 0.626 0.067
2013 0.255 0.269 5 0.072 0.555 0.015
106 7.319 0.348 Term (1)=sum of (7)
0.069 Term (2)=sum of (5)/sum of (4)
0.279 Added variance= Term(1)-Term(2)
0.662 Adjusted variance=Original variance + 2*Added variance
0.814 Adjusted standard errors= Sqrt(Adjusted variance)
0.371 Adjusted t-test for treatment effects
= Original Coefficient/Adjusted SE
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cant of the treatment effects. Tables 4.9 and 4.10 report the results of the adjusted variance,
standard errors, and t-test of the main treatment effects (the effects of Election dummy on
Bank loans/sales). For the Chinese firms, as indicated in Table 4.9, all the results of adjusted
t-test experience the insignificant effects of the election event. However, for the Indian firms,
the results of the adjusted t-tests still witness the positive and significant treatment effects in
PPP firms, especially for those with political connections, as seen in Panel B and C of Table
4.10. Therefore, the robustness tests for the Indian firms still confirm my finding that PPP-
partnering private firms with political connections can have opportunities to achieve more bank
financing in the election event when their supported government maintains its power.
4.6 Conclusion
My study tests whether political connections increase private sector firms’ access to bank loans
in economies that face capital constraints due to lower institutional development. In addition
to that, my study tests whether such preferential access associated with political connections
improves social welfare by encouraging firms that have high-growth opportunities but which are
facing underinvestment problems. In other words, my study tests the Social Lending Hypoth-
esis (SLH), which claims that bank loans that are influenced by political connections enhance
the efficient allocation of capital resources by encouraging banks to invest in high-risk social
ventures.
Existing literature does not lend any support to the SLH. On the contrary, most of the
evidence suggests that political connections lead to welfare loss as politicians engage in corrup-
tive practices by allocating excess bank funds to less deserving projects for their own private
benefits. However, one caveat of the existing studies is that most the studies are based on
general corporate bank loans samples that may not be directly aligned with the social interests
of the government. Hence, these studies are testing political corruption in general, rather than
directly testing the SLH.
My study contributes to the literature by using a sample of Public Private Partnership
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(PPPs) projects that has a clear social alignment, as the government engages with the private
sector to efficiently manage government resources as part of a national-building exercise. Hence,
I argue that the SLH can be better tested by using PPP engaged private sector firms as the
treatment group and comparing these with matched non-PPP competing private sector firms
as the control group. In this context, I hypothesize that the relatively high bank loan that is
made available to the politically connected PPP treatment group rather than to the matched
non-PPP politically connected control group, can throw better light on the SLH. In addition
to that, I also test whether higher loans result in possible overinvestment and thus reflect the
negative effects of political connections that are cited in the current literature.
I use PPP private sector firms, along with a control group of non-PPP private sector firms
in China and India for testing the SLH. China and India, being the first and second largest
emerging economies, provide an ideal setting for my analysis. I find that politically connected
PPP private sectors firms receive, on average, higher bank loans than their politically connected
and matched non-PPP private sector firms. However, the firms’ benefits of higher bank loans
through political connections are seen mainly in China. In the case of the Indian market,
political connections lead to the overinvestment of private sector firms that have higher access
to bank loans. Thus, the SLH is partially supported in my study.
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Chapter 5
Public–Private Partnerships and Insti-
tutional Quality: Cross-Country Analy-
ses
5.1 Introduction
Countries around the world are facing a serious and enormous infrastructure gap that is hinder-
ing socio-economic global development.1 Given the increasing public deficit and the constraints
on commercial debt as a consequence of recent financial crises, Public–Private Partnerships
(PPPs) have become increasingly important, given their key role in alleviating the deficiencies
in various types of infrastructure.
Due to differences in the origin of PPPs and in growth rates, economic conditions, financial
development and liberalization, however, countries around the world are at different stages
of PPP development. While almost all developing economies are in the early stage of PPP
development and are focusing on establishing an official PPP legal framework, some developed
economies (i.e. the United Kingdom [UK] and Australia) are already at the advanced stage of
PPP market maturity with sophisticated models and diverse private funds. Interestingly, high-
level economic, financial and institutional development do not always ensure the attraction of
higher fund flows from the private sector.2 Recently, according to KPMG (2015), increasing
numbers of PPP investments have taken place in emerging markets that are going through huge
1It has been estimated that about US$ 57 trillion is needed for infrastructure investment from 2013 to 2030
to keep up with the projected global GDP growth (Dobbs et al., 2013). This amount is 60% more than all the
value of investment in infrastructure over the past 18 years.
2The private sector firms refer to those firms participating in PPP projects as partners relative to the public
sector led by governments.
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economic and infrastructure growth rates, despite their associated risk of expropriation (e.g.
Latin America and Asia). In contrast, in some previously leading developed markets such as
the UK and other European economies, PPP deals have plunged. Therefore, the importance of
institutional quality in the success of PPP projects remains an unanswered question. My study
attempts to fill this void by examining the relationship between institutional quality and PPP
benefits to partnering private sector firms. In addition, by taking advantage of my research
setting, I aim to provide fresh insights into the relationship between the legal environment and
the firms’ capability of accessing external financing.
In addressing the ways that institutional quality has influenced firms’ corporate finance,
previous literature has emphasized the traditional “law–finance–growth” nexus of Porta et al.
(1997, 1996) in which high institutional quality leads to high financing capabilities. The most
supported view in the empirical literature is that the development of the financial system
and the strong protection of private property rights alleviate capital constraints and enhances
external financing (e.g. Beck et al., 2003; Berkowitz et al., 2015; Claessens and Laeven, 2003;
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Wurgler, 2000). However, the study of Pistor et al.
(2000) is one of the few initial attempts to investigate this nexus in transition economies, and it
shows a distinct feature in which political connections may play a role in obtaining preferential
external financing. Since then, there has been increasing support for what has been known as
the “political tie” hypothesis. The rationale for this hypothesis is that firms seek for political
connections to get government-back support and then overcome their difficulties in accessing
bank lending in the context of asymmetric information, poor protection of private properties,
expropriation and discrimination. Therefore, given the mixed evidence, it is difficult to gauge
whether the different levels of benefits received by firms in PPPs across economies are explained
by the law–finance–growth nexus or the political tie hypothesis (Chen et al., 2014; Claessens
et al., 2008; Cull et al., 2015; Faccio et al., 2006; Faccio, 2010; Khwaja and Mian, 2005).
The main aims of my study are to investigate the nature and benefits of PPP private sector
firms, to ascertain whether PPPs help private sector firms alleviate capital constraints across
economies, and to identify whether there is any relationship between institutional quality and
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PPP benefits to partnering private sector firms. While previous PPP analyses, which focus on
PPP deal flows and use case studies on PPP project-level performance, explore the efficacy of
PPPs for the public sector (Hodge and Greve, 2009), my study provides new insights from the
private sector’s perspective on the benefits of PPPs for partnering firms. To my best knowledge,
this is the first empirical cross-country study on how PPPs influence partnering private sector
firms in the corporate finance dimension.
My study provides significant implications for both public and private sectors in under-
standing the key performing factors in successful PPPs. Rather than focusing on the public
sector in a single country as commonly examined by past researchers, my study contributes
to the PPP literature by focusing on PPP private sector firms in the inter-country analysis.
Furthermore, by providing a unique setting and adopting robust empirical models, my study
extends the corporate finance literature on the benefits of these unique contractual agreements
for private sector firms in order to gauge the debate between the law–finance–growth nexus vs.
the political tie hypothesis. Hence, I attempt to explain the firms’ financing capabilities and
how these may affect the success of PPP projects. Moreover, my study provides new guidance
on the direction and viability of PPP private sector firms in relation to their level of PPP
market maturity and institutional quality.
My study on PPPs provides an ideal setting for disentangling the law–finance–growth nexus
and the political tie hypothesis. The previous literature adopts a general corporate investment
argument, which may not align with political preference, to test the effects of a legal framework
on the financing of firms. My argument, developed through a PPP lens, provides a better
platform in which political connections have the potential to be more active. There is a clear
motivation for the private sector to attempt to secure political ties in order to be granted PPP
projects from the government, and then be rewarded with more costless government assets
and government guarantees compared with its competing counterparts. Political connections
may help partnering private sector firms run PPP projects smoothly in the context of large,
high-risk infrastructure projects, since partnering firms can get preferential treatment for land
acquisition and can easily access bank lending. Moreover, my analysis on PPP firms has been
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conducted across nine countries at varying degrees of institutional quality, from a higher level
of institution aiming to improve stability, accountability and equality between the public and
private sector to a lower level of an institution based on political connections or government-
backed support for firms’ development. Therefore, this allows me to examine whether the
law–finance–growth nexus or the political tie hypothesis is more plausible in explaining private
sector firms’ financial benefits.
I used a sample of 625 PPP partnering private firms that covers the years from 1980 to
2015 and straddles nine economies at varying degrees of economic and PPP development.
These economies also compose a majority of the global PPP market. For example, in 2015,
the economies’ total PPP deal and investment value accounted for about 75.43% and 67.03%
correspondingly (IJGlobal Database, 2015). I find that the nature of firms that undertake PPP
investments varies. Private sector firms in economies with low institutional quality opt for PPPs
to alleviate capital constraints commonly attributed to underinvestment; in contrast, those in
economies with high institutional quality opt for PPPs to solve the problem of overinvestment
caused by abundant cash flow. In the long run, the benefits of lower capital constraints through
PPP investment are more pronounced in the economies with high institutional quality. Hence,
when explaining why private sector firms undertake PPP investments, the law–finance–growth
hypothesis appears to be more plausible than the political tie hypothesis.
The remainder of my chapter is organized into four sections. Public–Private Partnership
development stages are presented in Section 5.2. The literature review and hypotheses devel-
opment are discussed in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 provides the descriptions of the data and
the empirical methodology. The empirical findings are presented in Section 5.5. Section 5.6
concludes my study.
5.2 Public–Private Partnership Development Stages
PPPs started in the early 17th century through French concession and developed a strong pres-
ence in the UK and the US as well as throughout Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries (Grimsey
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and Lewis, 2007). In developing countries, PPPs emerged later, from the 1990s onwards, and
were concentrated in the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) emerging economies which
account for nearly 50 % of total PPP investment in developing countries (World Bank Group,
2012a).
Due to the different origin and growth of PPPs in different economies, countries around
the globe are at different stages of PPP sophistication and activity. Eggers and Startup (2006)
classify PPP market maturity as having three levels: high, medium and low, based on the
completeness of policy framework, the sophistication of PPP models, the development of the
PPP marketplace and capital market to finance PPPs, and the expandability of sectors and
government support for PPPs.
As shown in Figure 5.1, adapted from Eggers and Startup (2006), many countries are still
at the early stage of PPP market maturity, including the BRIC economies, South Africa,
Mexico and some European countries like Belgium, Hungary and Denmark. These countries
are in the phase of establishing an adequate policy framework, building a PPP marketplace
and facilitating proper transactions. Meanwhile, economies such as the US, Canada, Japan
and Germany have approached the higher stage (Stage Two) of PPP market maturity with
new hybrid models, an expanded PPP marketplace and new funding sources in the financial
markets. The UK and Australia have achieved the most advanced stage of PPP market maturity
with innovative, sophisticated and flexible PPP models and more diversified private funds and
financial assets to develop (Eggers and Startup, 2006).
Recently, however, the global PPP deal flow has not corresponded exactly with the PPP
market development curve. The mature market has witnessed a surge in PPP deals in Canada
and Australia, along with the US, the country projected to be the next PPP player. The main
factors driving this trend are strong potential growth, high investment, political stability, and
commitment from these nations. By contrast, the UK, the preceding dominator of PPPs, has
experienced a decline in PPP deal flow due to its previous peak of investment, anti-private
finance options and negative press release. As indicated in Figure 5.2 adapted from KPMG
(2015), the average annual number of PPP deals between 2010 and 2014 was approximately
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Figure 5.1: PPP Market Maturity across Different Economies
This figure illustrates PPP market maturity across different economies depending on the completeness
of the policy framework, the sophistication of PPP models, the development of PPP marketplace and
capital market to finance PPPs, and the expandability of sectors and government support for PPPs.
It is sourced from Eggers and Startup, 2016, (p.6)
half that of the preceding five years. The same plunge of PPP deals can be seen in other
countries in Europe such as Portugal, Spain and Ireland. By contrast, emerging economies are
taking advantages of this decline to attract seasoned investors from the mature market and are
experiencing a surge in PPP deals, with China, India and Brazil at the top of PPP investment
destination (see KPMG (2015)).
5.3 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
There is a considerable body of literature studying the relationship between the law, the legal
environment and finance. Porta et al. (1996, 1997) investigate the legal determinant of external
financing across 49 countries. They find that countries with poor investor protection, both in
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Figure 5.2: Change in PPP Deals across Countries from 2006-2010 to 2011-2014
This figure, adapted from KPMG (2015), illustrates the changes of PPP deals in terms of average
number of deals per annum and average deal value
terms of legal rules and the quality of enforcement, have more ownership concentration and
smaller capital markets (both equity and debt markets). This results in fewer chances for
firms to access external financing. By classifying countries according to the origin of their
laws, it appears that countries with French civil law have the weakest investor protection
and less developed capital markets, compared with the common law countries which have
better institutions and less corrupt governments (Porta et al., 1996, 1997). Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1998) assess the ability of firms to grow beyond their internal resources in
30 developed and developing countries and highlight that the effectiveness of legal institutions
and financial systems is important in securing external financing for firm growth. Wurgler
(2000) investigates the relationship between the development of financial markets and capital
allocation across 65 countries and states that countries with more informative stock markets,
less state ownership and stronger protection of minority investors enhance the efficiency of
capital allocation. Similarly, Claessens and Laeven (2003) argue that a less developed financial
sector and weaker property rights reduce a firm’s access to external financing and hinder asset
allocation effectiveness. Hence, firms in countries with poor protection of properties tend to
allocate more capital to fixed assets rather than intangible assets since weak property rights limit
the ability to secure returns of intangible assets from other competitors. Barasa et al. (2017)
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and Tebaldi and Elmslie (2013) argue that stronger institutional quality, in terms of regulatory
quality, rule of law and control of corruption, enhances a firm’s possibility of extracting value
from its resources (i.e. internal Research and Development expenditure, human capital and
managerial experience) for innovation.
Beck et al. (2003) explore the importance of the legal origin and legal environment on firms’
corporate finance by examining two channels: the “political” and the “adaptability” channels.
On one hand, the political channel focuses on the relationship between state rights and private
property rights and argues that the higher degree to which private investors are protected, the
better implications for financial development (see also Wurgler, 2000). On the other hand, the
adaptability channel emphasizes how legal traditions adapt with changing conditions and fil the
gap between economic needs and the legal system’s capabilities. The results indicate that while
the political channel focuses on the State’s power, the adaptability channel enhances financial
development by relating the process of law making and law adjustment to evolving conditions
(Beck et al., 2003; Wurgler, 2000). While the studies above indicate how institutional quality
can determine the capability of achieving external financing, Pistor et al. (2000) investigate this
relationship in transition economies. A distinct feature is observed in the transition economies:
that is, the ability to access external financing is determined not only by the strength of private
property rights but also by the strength of residual state ownership and political intervention.
Allen et al. (2005) study the law–finance–growth nexus in China and find that poor protec-
tion of minority investors leads to a weak external financial market and slow firm growth for
state-owned enterprises and listed firms. In contrast, Chinese private firms, who may use other
financing channels that are based on reputation and political relationships, thus challenge the
traditional law–finance–growth nexus of Porta et al. (1997, 1996). More importantly, a grow-
ing body of literature indicates that political connections positively influence firms’ access to
financing especially in developing countries, and argues that in economies with poor protection
of private property rights and high corruption, political connections act as an alternative chan-
nel to achieve preferential external financing (e.g. Chen et al., 2014; Claessens et al., 2008; Cull
et al., 2015; Faccio et al., 2006; Faccio, 2010; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Li et al., 2008).
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In summary, previous studies faced difficulty in teasing out whether the benefits of private
sector firms across economies, in terms of reducing capital constraints, could be attributed to
one of the following: the traditional law–finance–growth nexus of Porta et al. (1997, 1996)
in which high institutional quality leads to high financing capability or the political tie effect
where politically connected firms receive preferential financing within a low institutional quality
framework. My study on PPPs provides me with an ideal setting to resolve this problem.
The previous literature on the relationship between institutional quality and PPPs focuses
on discovering what factors associated with institutional quality drive the choice of PPP projects
and ensure their success; therefore, their findings are based on country-level analyses. For exam-
ple Hovakimian (2009) studies the determinants of Public–Private Partnerships in developing
countries between 1990 and 2003 based on the World Bank’ Private Participation in Infras-
tructure (PPI) database. Hovakimian (2009) argue that higher institutional quality, such as
stable, less-corrupt economies and effective rules of law results in more PPP projects. In other
research, Chan et al. (2010); Hwang et al. (2013) and Zhang (2005) identify the critical suc-
cess factors for PPPs that are associated with institutional quality, such as political stability,
government support and a reasonable legal framework. My study concentrates on firm-level
analyses, from other perspectives, aims to explore how institutional quality can bring benefits
to partnering private sector firms. My hypothesis follows the traditional law–finance–growth
theory by (Porta et al., 1996, 1997, eg) in the expectation of achieving a positive relationship
between legal environment and capability of accessing external financing.
Research question: Does the relationship between institutional quality and PPP project
benefits to partnering private sector firms?
Hypothesis 8 The benefits of lower capital constraints of partnering private sector firms
through PPP investments are more significant in mature economies with better institutional
quality.
Hypothesis 9 The benefits of increasing partnering private sector firms’ value through PPP
investments are more significant in mature economies with better institutional quality.
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5.4 Data and Methodology
5.4.1 Data
My cross-country sample contains PPP-partnering private sector firms in nine economies. It
comprises five developed countries (namely the UK, Australia, Canada, the US and Japan) and
the four BRIC emerging and developing countries (namely Brazil, Russia, India and China).
Representing more than 67% of the value of global PPP deals, these countries are top leading
markets for PPPs and representative of the main trends in the recent global infrastructure
market (KPMG, 2015).
The nine economies chosen range across all three levels of PPP market maturities, and thus
ensures the variation of institutional quality in my sample. For instance, while the high PPP
maturity countries comprise the UK and Australia, and the countries with medium maturity
consist of the US, Canada and Japan, it is important to note that all emerging markets fall
into the low PPP maturity category, consisting of Brazil, China, India and Russia.
I created a comprehensive database by integrating several data sources. For the BRIC
emerging economies, information on PPP projects and a list of partnering private sector firms
were sourced from the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Project
database. For the developed countries, such data were sourced from Infrastructure Australia,
Her Majesty’s (HM) Treasury in the UK, the National Council for PPPs and Federal Highway
Administration in the US, the Canadian Council for PPPs and Japan’s Private Participation
in Infrastructure (PPI)/Public–Private Partnership (PPP) Association.3 Information related
to the financial data of partnering private firms was obtained from Datastream. Institution
quality-related indicators were sourced from the Worldwide Governance Indicators created by
Kaufmann et al. (2011), and country-controlled variables were sourced from the World Bank
database.4
3See Appendix D for more details.
4See Appendix A for more details.
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To reduce a potential identification problem, a control group of competing non-PPP firms
was created for each PPP private sector firm in each country, by applying the propensity-
score matching technique. I obtained one-to-one matched firms according to firm size and
industry (based on the FTSE/Dow Jones Industrial Classification Benchmark). I used the
nearest-neighbour matching method to capture the bias in the estimated treatment effects
when matching PPP firms and non-PPP firms. Due to the limited availability of matched
non-PPP firms in the same industry, especially those in the early 1980s and 1990s, my study
used the matching with replacement method.
My analysis focused on both the short-term (the year of PPP announcements) and the
long-term (the five-year post-PPP investment period). In addition to providing me with an
understanding of the nature of firms that engage in PPPs in the short-term, the analysis also
enabled me to investigate the effects of PPP investment on the firms’ investment–cash flow
sensitivity relationship in the long run.
My initial sample included 1,162 listed non-financial firms (625 PPP partnering private
sector firms and 537 matched non-PPP firms) over the period 1980–2015. After excluding
the firms that did not have sufficient financial information, my final sample consisted of 1,137
firms from nine countries over the sample period, including 614 treatment firm-years and 523
control firm-years in the PPP investment year. For a long-term post-PPP analysis, owing to the
exclusion of overlapping PPP investments during five-year periods and the limited availability
of data in the upcoming years, my study was left with 1,513 firm-year observations, including
763 treatment firm-years and 750 control firm-years.
Figure D15 reports the proportion of PPP-partnering private sector firms for each country
and each industry in my sample. As shown in Figure D1, India is the country with the most
PPP private sector firms in the sample (34%), followed by China (27%). In terms of indus-
try classification, the construction and material industry exhibits the highest number of the
observations, following by the electricity and the gas and water industries.
5See in Appendix D
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5.4.2 Methodology
Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity
Following Fazzari et al. (1988) and Hovakimian (2009), I ran the following regression to estimate
the differences in investment–cash flow sensitivity between the PPP and non-PPP firms:
Investmentit = α + β1Cash flowit + β2PPP + β3Cash flowit × PPP
+ f(Firm− level control variables) + f(Country − level control variables)
+ δi + δt + i.Industry + i.Country + it
(5.1)
In Equation (5.1), Investment was measured by the changes in gross fixed assets divided
by the previous year’s fixed assets. Cash flow was the income before extraordinary items,
depreciation, and amortization, scaled by the previous year’s fixed assets.
The PPP dummy took value 1 for private sector firms investing in PPPs (a treatment
group) and zero for competing non-PPP private sector firms (a control group):
PPP =
 1 if firms participate in PPPs (the treatment group)0 if firms do NOT participate in PPPs (the control group) (5.2)
An interaction between Cash flow and PPP dummy was used to capture the differences
in investment–cash flow sensitivity between the two groups.
Following Hovakimian (2009), I used a list of firm-level control variables, Size, Age,
Leverage, and Tobin′s q,6 that were expected to affect investment–cash flow sensitivity.
Country-level control variables included Log GDP and Credit to private sector. I included
Log GDP to control the biases arising from the differences in market size across countries and
Credit to private sector to control the capital availability to the private sector in the economy.
Masulis et al. (2011) argue that the different level of available capital in different economies
6The explanation of these variables is provided in Section 3.3.3. Methodology of Chapter 3.
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can influence how firms overcome their financial constraints.7 To deal with unobservable fixed
effects, δi, δt were used to capture firm fixed-effects and year fixed-effects respectively, while
i.Industry, i.Country were the generated industry dummies and country dummies used to
control industry and country effects.8
Disentangling the Cause for Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity: Underinvestment
or Overinvestment
One potential interpretation problem associated with investment–cash flow sensitivity is that
it can be attributed to either underinvestment or overinvestment. I addressed this issue by
clearly distinguishing between the underinvestment and overinvestment issues. Firms with high
investment opportunities (high Tobin’s q) may suffer more information asymmetries and have
less pledged assets, resulting in high dependence on internal cash flow (Myers and Majluf, 1984;
Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005). Meanwhile, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), managers
tend to overinvest free cash flow to pursue their pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits of larger
firm size. Firms with low growth opportunities (low Tobin’s q) have more overinvestment
problems due to the shortage of projects with positive net present value (NPV), leading to high
investment–cash flow sensitivity.
I used Tobin’s q to capture investment opportunities. I then followed Dawson and Richter
(2006) to interpret the three-way interaction PPP ∗ Tobin′s q ∗ Cash flow. I first ran the
regression:
7Instead of using Credit to private sector as a measurement of capital availability, I also followed Masulis
et al. (2011) to use alternative indicators of capital availability, such as Credit to domesticmarket capitalization
and Domestic savings toGDP of World Bank Group (2016a), Political Stability of Kaufmann et al. (2011) or
Financial freedom of Heritage Foundation (2016). The sign and the significance of the main results remain
the same.
8Appendix A provides detailed definitions of all the variables.
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Investmentit = α + β1Cash flowit + β2PPP + β3Tobin
′s q + β4Cash flowit × PPP
+ β5Cash flowit × Tobin′s q + β6PPP × Tobin′s q + β7PPP × Tobin′s q × Cash flowit
+ f(Firm− level control variables) + f(Country − level control variables)
+ δi + δt + i.Industry + i.Country + it
(5.3)
Subsequently, to distinguish between the overinvestment and underinvestment problem,
I first computed slopes of Investment on Cash flow, where the moderator variables PPP and
Tobin’s q were held constant at different combinations of high and low values. Then I compared
these slopes and tested whether their differences were significant from zero in predicting the
Investment variable. I conducted the Bonferroni correction to reduce the probability of type I
errors by calculating the adjusted-p value. The adjusted-p value was measured by dividing the
critical p-value by the number of simultaneous tests (Dawson and Richter, 2006; Miller, 1966).
This procedure generated a total of six pairs of slopes:
Pair 1: (PPP and high Tobin’s q) - (PPP and low Tobin’s q)
Pair 2: (PPP and high Tobin’s q) - (Non-PPP and high Tobin’s q)
Pair 3: (PPP and low Tobin’s q) - (Non-PPP and low Tobin’s q)
Pair 4: (Non-PPP and high Tobin’s q) - (Non-PPP and low Tobin’s q)
Pair 5: (PPP and high Tobin’s q) - (Non-PPP and low Tobin’s q)
Pair 6: (PPP and low Tobin’s q) - (Non-PPP and high Tobin’s q)
In order to correctly interpret the results on whether the differences in investment–cash flow
sensitivity in PPP firms were caused by underinvestment or overinvestment, I focused on the
first three pairs (i.e. Pair 1 to 3). These pairs allowed me to assess differences in investment–
cash flow sensitivity of PPP firms with varying degree of investment opportunities (as in Pair 1),
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and to compare PPP firms with their non-PPP counterparts in the same degree of investment
opportunities (as in Pairs 2 and 3). 9
Role of Institutional Quality on Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity of Private Sector
Firms Across Different Economies
To explain why there are differences in the nature and benefits of PPP private sector firms
across different economies, I first followed the traditional law–finance–growth theory origi-
nated by Porta et al. (1996) and Porta et al. (1997) to examine the positive role of in-
stitutional quality on the reduction of private sector firms’ capital constraints. Six institu-
tional quality variables of Kaufmann et al. (2011), namely Accountability, Political stability,
Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, Control of corruption, and the
variable FreedomfromCorruption of Heritage Foundation (2016) were used.10 The model
specification is
Investmentit = α + β1Cash flowit + β2PPP + β3Institutional quality + β4Cash flowit × PPP
+ β5Cash flowit × Institutional quality + β6PPP × Institutional quality
+ β7PPP × Institutional quality × Cash flowit + f(Firm− level control variables)
+ f(Country − level control variables) + δi + δt + i.Industry + i.Country + it
(5.4)
Again, I computed slopes of the variable Investment on the variable Cash flow and generated
9The interpretation of these pairs is provided in Section 3.3.3. Methodology of Chapter 3. A visual inter-
pretation is illustrated in Figure 3.2 and 3.3 of Chapter 3.
10These institutional-quality variables enabled me to explore whether the benefits of private sector firms in
highly corrupt economies can offset the disadvantages of low institutional quality. Faccio (2006) indicates that
the incidence of political connections is associated with regulatory environment and corruption. There is every
chance that in the economies with low institutional quality, especially in terms of poor protection of private
properties, and in terms of corruption, expropriation and discrimination, private sector firms seek political
connections. This enables the firms to take advantage of government-backed support for achieving external
financing (Bai et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008; Firth et al., 2009). Within my setting, PPPs can provide private
sector firms with a greater platform to access preferential financing, since the PPP contract mechanism allows
the government to allocate government pledgeable assets, government subsidies or even state-owned banking
financing (La Porta et al., 2002; Engel et al., 2010).
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six pairs of slope difference.
Pair 1: (PPP firms in high institutional quality ) - (PPP firms in low institutional quality)
Pair 2: (PPP firms in high institutional quality) - (Non-PPP firms in high institutional
quality)
Pair 3: (PPP firms in low institutional quality) - (Non-PPP firms in low institutional
quality)
Pair 4: (Non-PPP firms in high institutional quality) - (Non-PPP firms in low institutional
quality)
Pair 5: (PPP firms in high institutional quality) - (Non-PPP firms in low institutional
quality)
Pair 6: (PPP firms in low institutional quality) - (Non-PPP firms in high institutional
quality)
If there were significant results on the slope differences when I kept the variable Institutional
quality constant, as indicated in Pair 2 and Pair 3, this suggested that the differences of capital
constraints between PPP private sector firms and their non-PPP counterparts were attributed
to the impacts of institutional quality.
5.4.3 Descriptive Analysis
Table 5.1 reports the results of descriptive statistics to compare PPP private sector firms and
their non-PPP competing counterparts. The analyses were conducted in the PPP years and
five-year post-PPP period. The main aim was to explore how the treatment and control groups
varied and to ascertain whether this variation explained the cross-economy and cross-market
maturity differences.11
In the PPP investment years, for the total sample, as shown in Panel A of Table 5.1, larger,
11Note that all the developing markets fall into the low maturity category, while high and medium maturity
groups consist of only developed economies.
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older, better-valued firms with high sale growth, relative to their matched firms, opts for PPPs.
However, in consideration of the development of economies and PPP market maturity, as
highlighted in Panels B, C, D and E, the nature of PPP private sector firms varied across
different economies. The results of Panel C reveal that firms in the high maturity PPP market
follow the general trend in which larger and older firms choose to invest in PPP projects. These
firms experience higher investment and cash flow compared with their non-PPP counterparts. In
comparison, such patterns are not observed in the medium maturity PPP market. As shown in
Panel D, there is a slight difference between PPP and non-PPP firms in terms of Capex/sales,
indicating that firms in the medium maturity market with less investment intensity opt for
PPPs. In the low maturity market consisting of only developing economies, the noticeable
feature is that firms with high investment opportunities opt for PPPs (see Panel E).
I now turn to the post-PPP analyses. In the developed economies with the high maturity
PPP market, compared with non-PPP firms, PPP private sector firms maintain better financial
positions in the long run, in terms of higher Investment, Cash flow, Size, and Age. It is
interesting to note that they are even rewarded with higher leverage after participating in PPP
projects. On the contrary, PPP firms in the medium maturity market do not witness much
pronounced change.
However, in the long run, for PPP firms in the developing economies (i.e. the low maturity
market), a newly added feature is their lower leverage compared with that of their non-PPP
counterparts. Given that Leverage is calculated by total debt divided by total assets, the
lower leverage of PPP firms may be attributed to changes in debt or equity. I investigate this
interesting finding further and the results indicate that in the post-PPP period, both debt
and equity are increasing in volume, but the growth rate of equity increases more than those of
debt, resulting in lower leverage for PPP private sector firms. The plausible rationale is that the
higher growth of equity may be attributed to the increase in government ownership in private
sector firms as a consequence of PPPs. Therefore, the result implies that PPP investments help
private sector firms increase the volume of debts in the low maturity market.
To disentangle the cross-sectional variation of PPP benefits, Table 5.2 compares the char-
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Analysis – PPP & Non-PPP Firms in the PPP Year and the Five-Year
Post-PPP Period – Cross-Country Sample
This table provides the mean firm-level characteristics of the sample firms, the difference of means
between PPP firms and non-PPP firms along with t-test. Note that all the developing economies fall
into the low maturity category, while high and medium maturity groups consist of only developed
economies. The mean value is reported for the years during which firms have PPP projects and
during the firms’ five-year post-PPP period. Investment was measured by the changes in gross fixed
assets, divided by the previous year’s fixed assets. Cash flow denoted income before extraordinary
items, depreciation, and amortization, divided by the previous year’s fixed assets. Size (firm size) was
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage is calculated by total debt divided by
total assets. Age was measured from the year of the firm’s incorporation. Tobin′s q was measured by
the market-to-book value of total assets. Capex/sales was calculated by capital expenditure divided
by sales in order to measure investment intensity. Sale growth was measured as the average growth
over three years in net sales to capture growth opportunities. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
in the PPP year in the five-year post-PPP
Variable PPP Non-PPP Difference PPP Non-PPP Difference
Panel A: The total sample
Investment 0.840 0.752 0.088 0.472 0.520 -0.048
Cash flow 0.751 0.580 0.171 0.636 0.552 0.084
Size 6.245 6.104 0.141*** 6.439 6.213 0.226***
Age 12.103 11.243 0.860* 16.349 15.004 1.345***
Tobin’s q 1.706 1.394 0.312* 1.168 1.271 -0.103***
Capex/sales 0.681 0.308 0.373 0.151 0.364 -0.213
Sale growth 46.680 28.971 17.709** 24.928 15.601 9.327**
Leverage 0.423 0.410 0.013 0.412 0.418 -0.006
N 614 523 763 750
Panel B: Developed Economies
Investment 0.567 0.231 0.336 0.531 0.548 -0.017
Cash flow 0.802 0.476 0.326* 0.701 0.526 0.175
Size 6.474 6.284 0.190** 6.496 6.264 0.232***
Age 20.140 17.464 2.676*** 20.134 18.528 1.606***
Tobin’s q 1.268 1.359 -0.091 1.215 1.288 -0.073**
Capex/sales 0.064 0.134 -0.070* 0.082 0.120 -0.039
Sale growth 9.600 5.364 4.236 10.889 8.551 2.338
Leverage 0.413 0.429 -0.016 0.428 0.409 0.019
N 157 153 478 481
Panel C: High Maturity
Investment 0.401 0.222 0.179* 0.503 0.193 0.310**
Cash flow 1.614 0.612 1.002** 1.298 0.273 1.025***
Size 6.450 5.915 0.535*** 6.391 5.711 0.680***
Age 18.465 12.209 6.256*** 16.049 12.583 3.466***
Tobin’s q 1.419 1.514 -0.095 1.332 1.319 0.013
Capex/sales 0.072 0.192 -0.120 0.146 0.182 -0.037
Sale growth 11.059 10.140 0.919 11.126 7.242 3.884
Leverage 0.399 0.354 0.045 0.433 0.341 0.092**
N 43 43 122 120
Panel D: Medium Maturity
Investment 0.630 0.235 0.395 0.541 0.663 -0.122
Cash flow 0.496 0.424 0.073 0.501 0.609 -0.108
Size 6.484 6.421 0.063 7.787 7.679 0.109
Age 20.772 19.518 1.254 21.534 20.504 1.030
Tobin’s q 1.210 1.306 -0.096 1.174 1.278 -0.104
Capex/sales 0.062 0.112 -0.050* 0.061 0.100 -0.039*
Sale growth 9.184 7.299 1.885 10.988 7.878 3.109
Leverage 0.419 0.457 -0.038 42.622 43.139 -0.517
N 114 110 356 361
Panel E: Low Maturity
Investment 0.941 0.529 0.412 0.372 0.469 -0.097
Cash flow 0.732 0.625 0.107 0.524 0.599 -0.075
Size 6.167 6.031 0.136** 6.341 6.118 0.223**
Age 9.341 8.670 0.671 10.000 8.703 1.297***
Tobin’s q 1.865 1.410 0.455** 1.087 1.237 -0.150*
Capex/sales 0.899 0.383 0.516 0.268 0.830 -0.562
Sale growth 60.115 39.330 20.785** 48.741 26.341 22.400*
Leverage 0.426 0.402 0.024 0.385 0.435 -0.051**
N 457 370 285 269
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Analysis – PPP-Partnering Private Sector Firms in Cross-Country Sample
This table provides the mean firm-level characteristics of the sample PPP firms in their corresponding institutional quality, and the difference of
means in different economies (developed– emerging) and in different market maturity (high-medium-low). Note that all the developing economies
fall into the low maturity category, while high and medium maturity groups consist of only developed economies. The mean value was reported
for the years that PPP firms engage in PPP investments (Panel A) and in the five-year post-PPP period. Investment was measured by the
changes in gross fixed assets, divided by the previous year’s fixed assets. Cash flow denoted income before extraordinary items, depreciation
and amortization, divided by the previous year’s fixed assets. Size (firm size) was measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage
was calculated by total debt divided by total assets. Age was measured from the year of the firm’s incorporation. Tobin′s q was measured by
the market-to-book value of total assets. Capex/sales was calculated by capital expenditure divided by sales to measure investment intensity.
Sale growth was measured as the average growth over three years in net sales to capture growth opportunities. ***,**,* indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Variable
Developed High Medium Low Difference
economies maturity maturity maturity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)-(4) (2)-(3) (3)-(4) (2)-(4)
Panel A:PPP year
Firm Characteristics
Investment 0.567 0.401 0.630 0.941 -0.374 -0.229 -0.311 -0.540
Cash flow 0.802 1.614 0.496 0.732 0.070 1.118*** -0.236 0.882
Size 6.474 6.450 6.484 6.167 0.307 -0.034 0.317*** 0.283**
Age 20.14 18.465 20.772 9.341 10.799*** -2.307 11.431*** 9.124***
Tobin’s q 1.268 1.419 1.210 1.864 -0.596* 0.209*** -0.654* -0.445
Capex/sales 0.065 0.072 0.062 0.899 -0.834 0.010 -0.837 -0.827
Sales growth 9.599 10.705 9.184 60.115 -50.516*** 1.521 -50.931*** -49.409*
Leverage 0.413 0.399 0.419 0.426 -0.013 -0.020 -0.007 -0.027
Institutional Quality
Political Stability 0.830 0.701 0.876 -0.766 1.596*** -0.175*** 1.642*** 1.467***
Regulatory Quality 1.426 1.755 1.546 -0.230 1.656*** 0.209*** 1.776*** 1.985***
Control of Corruption 1.699 1.939 1.610 -0.440 2.139*** 0.329*** 2.050*** 2.379***
Freedom from Corruption 1.417 1.753 1.290 -0.883 2.300*** 0.463*** 2.173*** 2.636***
Government Effectiveness 1.603 1.708 1.321 -0.043 1.646*** 0.387*** 1.364*** 1.751***
Rule of Law 1.516 1.690 1.451 -0.233 1.749*** 0.239*** 1.684*** 1.923***
N 157 43 114 457
Panel B: The five-year post-PPP period
Firm Characteristics
Investment 0.531 0.503 0.541 0.372 0.159 -0.038 0.169 0.131
Cash flow 0.700 1.298 0.501 0.524 0.176 0.797*** -0.023 0.774***
Size 6.496 6.391 6.531 6.341 0.155** -0.140* 0.190*** 0.050
Age 20.134 16.049 21.534 10.000 10.134*** -5.485*** 11.534*** 6.049***
Tobin’s q 1.215 1.332 1.174 1.087 0.128** 0.158*** 0.087** 0.245
Capex/sales 0.082 0.146 0.061 0.268 -0.186*** 0.085*** -0.207*** -0.122**
Sales growth 9.705 11.126 10.814 48.740 -39.035*** 0.312 -37.926*** -37.614**
Leverage 0.428 0.433 0.426 0.385 0.043** 0.007 0.041** 0.048*
Institutional Quality
Political Stability 0.845 0.807 0.858 -0.576 1.421*** -0.051** 1.434*** 1.383***
Regulatory Quality 1.377 1.704 1.536 -0.113 1.490*** 0.168*** 1.649*** 1.817***
Control of Corruption 1.662 1.970 1.557 -0.435 2.097*** 0.413*** 1.992*** 2.405***
Freedom from Corruption 1.403 1.797 1.272 -0.933 2.336*** 0.525*** 2.205*** 2.730***
Government Effectiveness 1.592 1.704 1.265 -0.151 1.743*** 0.439*** 1.416*** 1.855***
Rule of Law 1.481 1.700 1.407 -0.390 1.871*** 0.293*** 1.797*** 2.090***
N 478 122 356 285
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acteristics and corresponding institutional quality of PPP private sector firms across different
levels of economies (developed and emerging economies) and different PPP market maturity
(high, medium and low maturity). In the PPP investment years, as can be seen in Panel A
of Table 5.2, PPP firms in the developed markets (both in high and medium maturities) are
older, with lower sales growth than those in the developing market. Moving into the five-year
post-PPP period, as indicated in Panel B of Table 5.2, it is interesting that PPP private sec-
tor firms in the higher mature PPP market can obtain higher leverage but lower investment
intensity compared with those in the low maturity PPP market.
In terms of institutional quality in relation to different economies and market maturities,
the results support my conjecture that developed economies have higher institutional quality
than emerging economies. Also, such countries in the higher PPP maturity market enjoy higher
institutional quality.
Overall, the results highlight the nature of private sector firms opting for PPPs and how
they align with the maturity of PPP markets. In high maturity markets and highly developed
economies, firms in a better financial position than those of non-PPP firms are awarded PPP
projects; in low maturity markets, private sector firms with better growth opportunities tend
to be awarded PPP projects. In the long run, a more mature market provides PPP firms with
greater opportunities to increase their leverage.
5.5 Empirical Results and Discussion
5.5.1 Public–Private Partnerships and Investment–Cash Flow Sen-
sitivity
Table 5.3 analyses investment–cash flow sensitivity between PPP and non-PPP firms in the
PPP investment year and the five-year post-PPP period.
As shown in Column 1 of Table 5.3, overall, private sector firms experience higher
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investment–cash flow sensitivity relative to their non-PPP counterparts in the PPP investment
year. The coefficient of the interaction variable, PPP x Cash flow, is positive and significant.
In light of the results reported in Columns 2 to 5, however, it is obvious that such an effect is
more apparent in less mature markets. For instance, the investment–cash flow sensitivity for
PPP private sector firms in the medium maturity level is approximately 152.65 % (0.977/0.640)
higher than that for non-PPP counterparts, as shown in Column 4 of Table 5.3, and this is
economically significant. More importantly, the result of the low maturity economies witnesses
higher differences between PPP and non-PPP firms. In Column 5, although non-PPP firms
show negative investment–cash flow sensitivity (i.e. the negative coefficient of the variable
Cash flow), the interaction term between PPP and Cash flow is still positive and significant.
Overall, the results suggest that private sector firms with more capital constraints opt for PPPs,
and higher capital constraints of PPP firms are more pronounced in PPP firms in less mature
states.
Columns 6 to 10 report the results of the investment–cash flow sensitivity in the five-year
post-PPP period. In contrast to those reported in the PPP year, the coefficients of the variable
Cash flow are positively significant in all the models, indicating the positive sensitivity between
investment and cash flow among non-PPP private sector firms. Given the negative coefficient
of the interaction terms between PPP and Cash flow in almost all models (except in Column
8), the results confirm my predication that in the long run, PPP private sector firms experience
low capital constraints compared with their non-PPP counterparts. In terms of the magnitude
of the coefficients, the sensitivity of PPP private sector firms in the developed economies is
about 93.71% (-0.912/0.973) lower than that of their competing non-PPP firms (Column 7).
In contrast, the investment–cash flow sensitivity of PPP firms in the low (medium) maturity
group is about 36.1% (73.41%) lower than that of their non-PPP counterparts (Columns 9 and
10). The implication is that the benefits of lower capital constraints of private sector firms
through PPP investments are higher in the higher maturity state, which confirms the finding
of Table 5.2 that in the long run, PPP-partnering private sector firms in the higher maturity
state witness a higher leverage compared with those in emerging economies. The ability to
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Table 5.3: Cross-Country Analysis – Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity: PPP & Non-PPP firms in the PPP Year and the Five-Year Post-PPP
Period
This table compares investment–cash flow sensitivity between PPP firms and non-PPP firms. Note that all the developing economies fall into
the low maturity category, while high and medium maturity groups consist of only developed economies. Investment was measured by the
changes in gross fixed assets, divided by the previous year’s fixed assets. Cash flow denoted income before extraordinary items, depreciation and
amortization, divided by the previous year’s fixed assets. Size was measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage was calculated
by total debt divided by total assets. Age was measured from the year of the firm’s incorporation. PPP is a dummy variable, which took value
1 for firms invested in PPP projects or else zero for firms which were matched by industry and firm size. Tobin′s q (with one year lag) was
the market-to-book value of total assets to capture investment opportunities. Log GDP , Credit to Private Sector and Country dummies were
aimed to control for country-level effects. Industry dummies were aimed to control industry effects. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Investment
in the PPP year in the five-year post-PPP period
The total Developed High Medium Low The total Developed High Medium Low
sample economies maturity maturity maturity sample economies maturity maturity maturity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Cash flow -0.124 0.561*** 0.204** 0.640*** -0.228* 0.687*** 0.973*** 0.084** 1.339*** 0.277***
(-1.192) (3.099) (2.461) (2.944) (-1.859) (15.079) (14.172) (2.085) (15.317) (9.931)
PPP 0.237 0.358 0.211* 0.118 0.145 0.479* 0.678** 0.155 0.672* 0.028
(0.904) (1.593) (1.711) (0.455) (0.407) (1.899) (2.262) (1.046) (1.838) (0.261)
PPP * Cash flow 0.323*** 0.130 -0.058 0.977*** 0.525*** -0.601*** -0.912*** 0.007 -0.983*** -0.100*
(2.989) (0.661) (-0.679) (3.844) (3.969) (-8.277) (-8.618) (0.150) (-5.791) (-1.814)
Leverage 2.124*** 4.589*** -0.120 3.808*** -0.109 0.166** 0.126** 2.978*** 0.099 -0.430*
(3.439) (10.384) (-0.333) (7.683) (-0.114) (2.810) (2.150) (11.878) (1.533) (-1.665)
Age 0.022 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 0.025 -0.239* -0.517** -0.167 -0.645** -0.064
(0.959) (-0.640) (-1.352) (-0.567) (0.698) (-1.681) (-2.081) (-1.519) (-2.009) (-1.117)
Size -0.652*** -0.426** -0.088 -0.403 -0.649** -0.023 -0.014 0.010 -0.006 -0.032**
(-2.869) (-2.014) (-0.860) (-1.614) (-2.087) (-1.216) (-0.625) (0.917) (-0.221) (-2.810)
Tobin’s q -0.048 0.012 0.013 -0.042 -0.055 -0.031 0.020 -0.073** 0.117 0.007
(-1.192) (0.206) (0.854) (-0.391) (-1.129) (-0.780) (0.267) (-2.466) (0.950) (0.314)
Log GDP 0.312 0.026 0.027 -0.346 0.599 0.257 0.643 0.147 -0.240 0.677**
(0.433) (0.023) (0.060) (-0.237) (0.551) (0.418) (0.533) (0.242) (-0.128) (1.989)
Credit to Private Sector 0.006 0.005 0.001 -0.006 -0.006 0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.009
(0.545) (0.843) (0.365) (-0.759) (-0.231) (0.265) (0.473) (-0.838) (0.408) (-1.296)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 3.597 1.076 0.458 6.847 2.903 -1.675 -5.357 0.000 6.583 0.000
(0.411) (0.082) (0.091) (0.405) (0.224) (-0.232) (-0.384) (0.000) (0.284) (0.000)
R-squared 8.060 47.956 53.319 63.021 10.149 19.160 30.470 48.840 40.290 29.300
N 1,137 310 88 224 827 1,513 959 242 717 554
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access debt through PPP helps partnering firms to be less reliant on their internal cash flow,
which in turn improves their investment efficiency.
5.5.2 Underinvestment or Overinvestment
To disentangle the above differences of investment–cash flow sensitivity, Table 5.4 explores
whether the higher investment–cash flow sensitivity of PPP private sector firms can be at-
tributed to underinvestment or overinvestment. While Columns 1 and 2 report the results in
the PPP investment year. Columns 3 and 4 report the results in the five-year post-PPP period.
Again, I focus on Pairs 1 to 3 in each maturity state.
At the time engaging in PPP investment, for the total sample, Panel A of Table 5.4 shows
that the difference between PPP and non-PPP firms is significant at Pair 3 (PPP & low
Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & low Tobin’s q). This indicates that PPP private sector firms with
low investment opportunities experience a higher cash burden than non-PPP firms with low
investment opportunities. This provides support for the overinvestment hypothesis of Jensen
and Meckling (1976), stating that the higher investment–cash flow sensitivity of PPP private
sector firms may be caused by overinvestment. In other words, for the total sample, private
sector firms with overinvestment problems opt for PPPs.
In consideration of the various maturity states, Panels C to E reveal two interesting patterns.
First, in the low maturity state, in the PPP year, both underinvestment and overinvestment
problems drive private sector firms in emerging markets to opt for PPPs (see Pairs 2 and 3 in
Panel E). However, considering the magnitude of the slope differences, the subgroup of high-q
firms in Pair 2 exhibits a difference that is about three times higher than that of low-q firms
in Pair 3. In the medium maturity state, I see positively significant results at the low-q group
(see Pair 3 in Panel D), which implies overinvestment problems. Second, when I focus on Pair
1, in developed economies (i.e. high and medium maturities), PPP firms with high investment
opportunities can be seen to experience a lower cash burden in comparison to those with low
investment opportunities, indicating that overinvestment issues are more pronounced. On the
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contrary, the inverse result is observed in PPP firms in emerging economies, indicating that
underinvestment issues are more pronounced.
Overall, it appears that overinvestment problems drive private sector firms to opt for PPPs
in developed economies, whereas opting for PPPs in emerging economies are more likely driven
by underinvestment problems. This confirms the observations in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 that in
developed economies, firms with abundant cash flow opt for PPPs to solve their problems
of overinvestment. However, in emerging economies firms with more untapped investment
opportunities opt for PPPs to alleviate capital constraints caused by underinvestment.
In the five-year post-PPP investment, as shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.4, PPP
private sector firms with low growth opportunities (low Tobin′s q) in all PPP market maturity
experience a lower investment–cash flow sensitivity compared with their non-PPP counterparts,
given the negative and significant slope difference between PPP & low Tobin’s q and non-PPP
& low Tobin’s q. These results support the overinvestment hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling
(1976), suggesting that PPP firms across economies can lower their overinvestment problems
in the long run after participating in PPP projects.
It is worth mentioning that only PPP firms in developed economies with a medium maturity
PPP market can achieve a significantly lower investment–cash flow sensitivity in the high-q
group, as evident in the negative and significant slope difference in Pair 2 of Panel D. Compared
with those in the low maturity market in the five-year post-PPP period, this result suggests
that PPP firms in the developed economies with the medium maturity PPP market show an
ability to lower both underinvestment and overinvestment problems in the long run, which is
consistent with the results of Table 5.3 indicating that PPPs in the medium maturity PPP
market can lower more capital constraints compared with those in emerging economies.
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Table 5.4: Cross-Country Analysis – Reason for Differences in Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity -
PPP Firms & Non-PPP Firms in the PPP Year
This table uses a Slope Difference Test to show whether the differences between PPP firms and
non-PPP firms in investment–cash flow sensitivity are caused by underinvestment or overinvestment.
Note that all the developing economies fall into the low maturity category, while high and medium
maturity groups consist of only developed economies. PPP was a dummy variable which took value
1 for firms invested in PPP projects or else zero for firms which were matched by industry and firm
size. Tobin′s q (with one year lag) was aimed to capture investment opportunities. AdjustedP was a
Bonferroni adjusted p-value which accounted for the fact that there are six post-hoc tests. This was a
conservative adjustment by multiplying each of the p-values by the number of tests. ***,**,* indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
in the PPP year in the five-year post-PPP
Panel A: The total sample Coef. Adjusted P Coef. Adjusted P
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(PPP & low Tobin’s q) -0.002 5.892 0.265* 0.078
(PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & high Tobin’s q) -0.027 5.052 -0.708*** 0.000
(PPP & low Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & low Tobin’s q) 0.817*** 0.000 -0.383*** 0.000
(Non-PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & low Tobin’s q) 0.842*** 0.000 0.590*** 0.000
(PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & low Tobin’s q) 0.815*** 0.000 -0.119 1.422
(PPP & low Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & high Tobin’s q) -0.026 5.202 -0.973*** 0.000
Panel B: Developed economies Coef. Adjusted P Coef. Adjusted P
(PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(PPP & low Tobin’s q) -1.276*** 0.000 0.304 0.126
(PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & high Tobin’s q) -0.525 0.168 -2.280*** 0.000
(PPP & low Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & low Tobin’s q) 1.274*** 0.000 -0.555*** 0.000
(Non-PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & low Tobin’s q) 0.523 0.624 2.029*** 0.000
(PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & low Tobin’s q) -0.002 5.958 -0.251 0.156
(PPP & low Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & high Tobin’s q) 0.751** 0.018 -2.584*** 0.000
Panel C: High maturity Coef. Adjusted P Coef. Adjusted P
(PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(PPP & low Tobin’s q) -0.274*** 0.000 0.958*** 0.000
(PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & high Tobin’s q) -0.174 0.258 0.112 0.624
(PPP & low Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & low Tobin’s q) 0.341 0.162 -0.879*** 0.000
(Non-PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & low Tobin’s q) 0.240 0.768 -0.033 4.002
(PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & low Tobin’s q) 0.067 3.864 0.080 0.540
(PPP & low Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & high Tobin’s q) 0.101 1.734 -0.846*** 0.000
Panel D: Medium maturity Coef. Adjusted P Coef. Adjusted P
(PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(PPP & low Tobin’s q) -1.121** 0.024 0.801** 0.024
(PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & high Tobin’s q) -0.207 3.810 -2.168*** 0.000
(PPP & low Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & low Tobin’s q) 1.589*** 0.000 -0.403** 0.024
(Non-PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & low Tobin’s q) 0.674 0.618 2.566*** 0.000
(PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & low Tobin’s q) 0.467 1.734 0.398 1.008
(PPP & low Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & high Tobin’s q) 0.914** 0.048 -2.969*** 0.000
Panel E: Low maturity Coef. Adjusted P Coef. Adjusted P
(PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(PPP & low Tobin’s q) 2.140*** 0.000 0.303* 0.006
(PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & high Tobin’s q) 2.051*** 0.000 0.126 0.534
(PPP & low Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & low Tobin’s q) 0.781*** 0.000 -2.278*** 0.000
(Non-PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & low Tobin’s q) 0.869*** 0.000 -2.101*** 0.000
(PPP & high Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & low Tobin’s q) 2.921*** 0.000 -1.975*** 0.000
(PPP & low Tobin’s q)-(Non-PPP & high Tobin’s q) -0.089 2.772 -0.177** 0.012
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5.5.3 Role of Institutional Quality
Table 5.5 presents the results that I tested of the direct effects of institutional quality indicators
on private sector firms’ investment–cash flow sensitivity.12
At the time of engaging in PPP projects, as shown in Columns 1 to 3, PPP private sector
firms document a higher investment–cash flow sensitivity compared with their non-PPP firms
after controlling the effects of institutional quality, given the negatively significant interaction
term between PPP and Cash flow. In contrast, the significantly negative coefficients of PPP
*Cash flow*Institutional quality imply that PPP private sector firms in economies with higher
institutional quality experience lower investment–cash flow sensitivity.
In the five-year post-PPP period, PPP private sector firms benefit from lower investment–
cash flow sensitivity, as indicated by the negatively significant coefficients of the interaction
term between PPP and Cash flow. Moreover, PPP private sector firms in economies with
higher institutional quality experience more benefits from lower investment–cash flow sensitivity
compared with those in economies with lower institutional quality (i.e. the negatively significant
coefficients of the three-way interaction PPP * Cash flow *Institutional quality).
To explain these results, I follow Dawson and Richter (2006) to interpret three-way in-
teraction PPP*Cash flow*Institutional quality(IQ) by regressing the dependent variable
Investment on Cash flow when the moderate variables PPP and Institutional quality hold
constant at a high or low level. The results are reported in Table 5.6.
In the PPP investment year, as shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.6, there are positively
significant slope differences in Pair 3 in all the measures of institutional quality. On the contrary,
in the high institutional-quality state (Pair 2), the slope difference between PPP and non-PPP
firms is either negatively significant or not significantly different from zero. Therefore, this
confirms that in low institutional-quality economies, private sector firms with higher capital
constraints opt for PPPs.
12I report results of three indicators Political stability, Regulatory quality and Control of corruption. The
results of other indicators for institutional quality remain qualitatively the same.
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Table 5.5: Cross-Country Analysis – The Effects of Institutional Quality in the PPP Year and in
the Five-Year Post-PPP Period - Main Regression
This table reports the results of how institutional quality influence private sector firms’ investment–
cash flow sensitivity. Investment was measured by the changes in gross fixed assets, divided by the
previous year’s fixed assets. Cash flow denoted income before extraordinary items, depreciation, and
amortization, divided by the previous year’s fixed assets. Size was measured by the natural logarithm
of total assets. Leverage was calculated by total debt divided by total assets. Age was measured
from the year of the firms’ incorporation. Tobin′s q (with one year lag) was the market-to-book
value of total assets to capture investment opportunities. Political stability, Regulatory quality, and
Control of corruption were aimed to capture institutional quality. ***,**,* indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
in the PPP year in the five-year post -PPP period
Investment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PPP 0.658** 0.260 0.200 0.239 0.179 0.167
(2.465) (0.923) (0.732) (1.129) (0.574) (0.583)
Cash flow 0.010 -0.150 -0.030 0.396*** 0.474*** 0.509***
(0.094) (-1.428) (-0.276) (7.066) (6.471) (7.743)
Political stability -0.555 -1.098***
(-0.669) (-3.279)
Regulatory quality 0.928 -0.061
(0.846) (-0.134)
Control of corruption -0.098 -0.616
(-0.985) (-1.224)
Cash flow * PPP 0.432*** 0.326*** 0.357*** -0.275*** -0.280** -0.343***
(3.401) (2.940) (2.981) (-3.167) (-2.418) (-3.410)
Cash flow * Political stability 0.550*** 0.617***
(2.599) (8.199)
Cash flow * Regulatory quality 0.559** 0.247***
(2.325) (3.694)
Cash flow * Control of corruption 0.487*** 0.196***
(2.701) (3.613)
PPP * Political stability 0.973*** 0.405*
(3.043) (1.708)
PPP * Regulatory quality 0.368 0.296
(1.029) (1.111)
PPP * Control of corruption 0.048 0.298
(0.173) (1.490)
PPP * Cash flow * Political stability -1.550*** -0.647***
(-6.791) (-6.360)
PPP * Cash flow * Regulatory quality -0.690*** -0.348***
(-2.643) (-3.523)
PPP * Cash flow * Control of corruption -0.240 -0.263***
(-1.234) (-3.684)
Leverage 2.878*** 2.280*** 2.069*** 0.104** 0.120** 0.127**
(4.821) (3.623) (3.305) (2.272) (2.337) (2.431)
Size -0.600*** -0.652*** -0.647*** -0.245** -0.238* -0.245*
(-2.753) (-2.819) (-2.811) (-2.001) (-1.795) (-1.826)
Age 0.038* 0.027 0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020
(1.730) (1.154) (0.829) (-1.293) (-1.134) (-1.099)
Tobin’s q -0.048 -0.051 -0.054 -0.008 -0.026 -0.027
(-1.238) (-1.243) (-1.332) (-0.204) (-0.646) (-0.663)
Log GDP 0.308 0.519 0.771 0.178 0.242 0.293
(0.411) (0.655) (0.972) (0.314) (0.406) (0.489)
Credit to private sector 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.402) (0.554) (0.137) (0.279) (0.348) (0.071)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.215 -0.836 -2.045 0.141 -1.663 -1.019
(0.454) (-0.089) (-0.195) (0.021) (-0.240) (-0.145)
R-squared 19.661 8.994 9.844 30.080 23.480 23.200
N 984 984 984 1401 1401 1401
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Table 5.6: Cross-Country Analysis – The Effects of Institutional Quality in the PPP Year and the Five-year Post-PPP Period - Slope Difference
Test
This table uses Slope Difference to show whether the differences between PPP firms and non-PPP firms in investment–cash flow sensitivity are
influenced by Institutional Quality. PPP was a dummy variable which took value 1 for firms invested in PPP projects or else zero for firms
which are matched by industry and firm size. IQ variables were the variables that indicated institutional quality, including Political stability,
Government effectiveness, and Regulatory quality. Adjusted P was a Bonferroni adjusted p-value which accounted for the fact that there are
six post-hoc tests. This was a conservative adjustment achieved by multiplying each of the p-values by the number of tests. ***,**,* indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
in the PPP year in the five-year post-PPP
Panel A: Political stability Coef. Adjusted P Coef. Adjusted P
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(PPP & high IQ)-(PPP & low IQ) -1.659*** 0.000 -0.046 4.038
(PPP & high IQ)-(Non-PPP & high IQ) -1.229*** 0.000 -0.986*** 0.000
(PPP & low IQ)-(Non-PPP & low IQ) 1.343*** 0.000 0.033 4.686
(Non-PPP & high IQ)-(Non-PPP & low IQ) 0.913* 0.054 0.974*** 0.000
(PPP & high IQ)-(Non-PPP & low IQ) -0.316 1.140 -0.012 5.466
(PPP & low IQ)-(Non-PPP & high IQ) 0.430 0.174 -0.940*** 0.000
Panel B: Regulatory Quality Coef. Adjusted P Coef. Adjusted P
(PPP & high IQ)-(PPP & low IQ) -0.206 1.314 -0.159 0.960
(PPP & high IQ)-(Non-PPP & high IQ) -0.384 1.110 -0.838*** 0.000
(PPP & low IQ)-(Non-PPP & low IQ) 0.704*** 0.000 -0.290* 0.066
(Non-PPP & high IQ)-(Non-PPP & low IQ) 0.883 0.120 0.389*** 0.000
(PPP & high IQ)-(Non-PPP & low IQ) 0.498 0.144 -0.449*** 0.000
(PPP & low IQ)-(Non-PPP & high IQ) -0.179 3.018 -0.679*** 0.000
Panel C: Control of Corruption Coef. Adjusted P Coef. Adjusted P
(PPP & high IQ)-(PPP & low IQ) 0.496*** 0.006 -0.146 0.930
(PPP & high IQ)-(Non-PPP & high IQ) 0.075 4.794 -0.860*** 0.000
(PPP & low IQ)-(Non-PPP & low IQ) 0.558*** 0.006 -0.286* 0.060
(Non-PPP & high IQ)-(Non-PPP & low IQ) 0.979** 0.042 0.428*** 0.000
(PPP & high IQ)-(Non-PPP & low IQ) 1.054*** 0.000 -0.432*** 0.000
(PPP & low IQ)-(Non-PPP & high IQ) -0.421 0.720 -0.714*** 0.000
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After the five-year participation in PPPs, as indicated in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.6,
for firms in economies with high institutional quality, PPP private sector firms experience a
significantly lower investment–cash flow sensitivity compared with their non-PPP counterparts
(see Pair 2). A similar pattern is also observed for economies with low institutional quality
(See Pair 3), though the level of significance is much weaker.
The above results reveal two important implications. First, the benefits of lower capital
constraints through PPP investment are more pronounced in the context of high institutional
quality. Second, in the low level of institutional quality, while the PPP private sector firms also
experience a deduction in capital constraint which is consistent with the political tie hypothesis,
the effect is lower than it is for PPP firms from a high institutional quality context. This pro-
vides strong support for the law–finance–growth hypothesis. In other words, the law–finance–
growth hypothesis is more plausible for explaining the benefits of lower capital constraints of
private sector firms through PPP investments. In this mechanism, the strong protection of pri-
vate sector properties in the high institutional quality environment can offset the disadvantage
of a high barrier to exploiting preferential financing from political connections and corruption.
5.5.4 Robustness Tests
To assess whether the law–finance–growth nexus can outperform the political tie benefits, I
conducted tests on whether institutional quality can enhance the benefits of PPPs in terms of
firm value, as a robustness check.
Following Maury (2006) and Masulis et al. (2011), a Difference-in-Difference technique was
utilized by regressing measures of firm value (Tobin′s q or Return on Assets ROA) on the vari-
able PPP (a dummy variable is equal to 1 for PPP firms, otherwise is 0), the variable PostPPP
(is equal to 1 if the period is in the five-year post-PPP investment year and is 0 otherwise), their
interaction terms (PPP * PostPPP ) and control variables (i.e. Size, Leverage, Capex/sales,
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Sale growth, Age, Market risk).13 The baseline regression was:
Firmvalue variables (Tobin′s q or ROA) = α + β1PPP + β2PostPPP + β3PostPPP ∗ PPP
+ f(Firm− level control variables) + f(Country − level control variables)
+ i.Industry + i.Country
(5.5)
The main variable of interest was the interaction term between PPP and PostPPP , β3. It
captured change in firm value for PPP-partnering private sector firms relative to that of the
firms’ non-PPP counterparts subsequent to the PPP investment period.
I first ran the baseline regression separately for the group of countries with corresponding
high, medium and low PPP market maturity. I then used the Chow test to test the significance
of differences of the coefficient (β3) on the interaction term between PPP and PostPPP .
Table 5.7 reports the results with a dependent variable Tobin′s q as the measurement of
firm value.14 Among the economies with various development states, only in the developed
economies with the medium maturity PPP market, PPP private sector firms experience signif-
icant higher firm value compared with their non-PPP counterparts subsequent to PPP invest-
ments. To compare the subsamples using the Chow test, the results show that the coefficients
on the interaction terms are significantly different only for those in between the medium and
low PPP maturity market (Prob > F = 0.036). This robustness result confirms the dominance
of the law–finance–growth nexus over the political tie hypothesis in explaining the effects of
the institutional quality on corporate finance. However, it should be noted that private sector
firms in the medium maturity PPP market appear to be able to achieve better gains from PPP
investments in terms of solving capital constraints and enhancing firm value, even when com-
pared with those in the high maturity PPP market. This reflects and explains the general trend
in global PPP deal flow: that is, deal flow shifts from the traditional high maturity market to
13See Appendix A for variable definition
14I also used Return on Assets (ROA) as a dependent variable. The conclusion is qualitative the same.
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Table 5.7: Cross-Country Analysis – Firm Value: PPP & Non-PPP Firms in the Five-year Pre and
Post-PPP Period
This table uses a Difference-in-Difference technique to compare the change in firm value of PPP-
partnering private sector firms with that in their non-PPP counterparts between five-year post and
pre-PPP investments.The dependent variable Tobin′s q was measured by the market-to-book value of
total assets. Size was measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage was calculated by
total debt divided by total assets. Capex/sales was calculated by capital expenditure divided by sales
to measure investment intensity. Sale growth was measured as the average growth over three years in
net sales to capture growth opportunities. Age was measured from the year of the firm’s incorporation.
Market risk was calculated by estimating the market model (one factor) on the monthly returns of
firms in the previous five years. PPP was a dummy variable which took value 1 for firms invested in
PPP projects or else zero for firms which are matched by industry and firm size. Post PPP was a
dummy variable which took value 1 for firms in the five-year post-PPP period or else zero for those in
the five-year pre-PPP period. Log GDP , Credit to private sector and Country dummies were aimed
to control for country-level effects. Industry dummies were aimed to control industry effects. ***,**,*
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Tobin’s q The total Developed Developed economies Emerging-
sample economies High Medium Low
maturity maturity maturity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PPP 0.070 0.045 0.545 -0.052 -0.130
(0.437) (0.296) (1.008) (-0.371) (-0.357)
Post PPP -0.151 -0.174* -0.573* -0.122 0.000
(-1.560) (-1.846) (-1.713) (-1.551) (0.001)
PPP x Post PPP 0.032 -0.032 0.478 0.111** 0.234
(0.269) (-0.272) (1.203) (2.127) (0.770)
Size -0.644*** -0.011 -0.793** 0.244** -0.871***
(-8.924) (-0.096) (-2.135) (2.250) (-8.488)
Capex/sales 0.474*** 1.805*** 2.116*** 0.167 0.159*
(6.671) (13.563) (9.205) (0.591) (1.676)
Sale growth -0.178*** 0.280* 0.331 0.167 -0.130**
(-4.521) (1.900) (0.504) (1.400) (-2.363)
Leverage 0.455*** 0.327*** -0.142 0.353*** 0.241
(3.321) (2.658) (-0.230) (3.633) (0.420)
Age 0.710*** 0.524* 0.649 0.202 0.838*
(2.974) (1.958) (0.728) (0.834) (1.897)
Market risk -0.095 -0.031 0.202 -0.075 -0.115
(-1.212) (-0.376) (0.850) (-0.995) (-0.682)
Log GDP 0.611** 0.299 -0.794 0.680* 0.364
(2.007) (0.704) (-0.556) (1.707) (0.721)
Credit to Private Sector 0.003 0.003 0.019* 0.002 -0.010
(1.312) (1.498) (1.706) (1.301) (-1.446)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -2.743 -2.420 12.826 -8.440* -2.338
(-0.775) (-0.499) (0.818) (-1.686) (-0.653)
Test of Difference in β3 (Chow test)
(2)-(5) 0.361
(3)-(4) 0.486
(4)-(5) 0.036**
(3)-(5) 0.817
R-squared 10.320 20.810 25.070 19.750 25.420
N 2,327 1,643 377 1,266 684
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the medium maturity market, in which partnering private sector firms can operate with better
growth potential, and more importantly, they can gain higher political commitments. These
results are also in line with the idea of Eggers and Startup (2006) who claim that, in additional
to strong public engagement, those firms in the medium maturity market can have golden op-
portunities to learn from their trailblazers’ success and failure to establish more tailored PPP
models that are able to cope with uncertainty in institutional environments as well as in their
contract incompleteness.
5.6 Conclusion
PPPs have become increasingly common and crucial for addressing the growing infrastructure
gap in the world. PPPs come with the benefit of readily pledged government assets that can help
the private sector invest in large infrastructure projects without increasing their investment–
cash flow sensitivity.
In this chapter, I tested whether this inherent benefit reduced the underinvestment problem,
which was evident from the reduction in the investment–cash flow sensitivity of private sector
firms. To test this conjecture, I used the sample of 625 PPP partnering private firms that cov-
ered the years from 1980 to 2015 and straddled nine economies with varying degrees of economic
and PPP development. I also attempted to understand whether changes in investment–cash
flow sensitivity were driven by underinvestment or overinvestment. This is important as any
reduction in the investment–cash flow sensitivity does not guarantee reduction in the under-
investment problem. If the reduction is experienced mainly by a subgroup of firms with low
growth opportunities, then it reflects a potential overinvestment problem.
In addition to that, my study aims to understand the influence of institutional quality
on PPP benefits to partnering private sector firms. The existing literature remains inclusive
about whether the law–finance–growth nexus or the political tie hypothesis is more dominant
in explaining firms’ financial benefits under the effects of institutional quality. One limitation
of existing studies is that they use general corporate investment which may not be directly
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aligned with political interference in some cases.
My study contributes to the literature by using the sample of Public–Private Partnerships
in which political intervention has more opportunities to be activated. This is because securing
political connections helps the private sector successfully award large government infrastructure
projects and receive numerous government guarantees to operate smoothly high-risk assets. As
a consequence of this, my study finds that the nature of firms that undertake PPP investments
varies. While private sector firms in economies with low institutional quality opt for PPPs
to alleviate capital constraints commonly attributed to underinvestment, those in economies
with high institutional quality opt for PPPs to solve the problem of overinvestment caused by
abundant cash flow. In the long run, the benefits of lower capital constraints through PPP
investment are more significant in economies with high institutional quality. I conducted the
robustness tests by using firm value as the measurement of private sector firms’ benefits from
PPPs. The results again confirm that the law–finance–growth hypothesis seems to be more
pronounced than the political tie hypothesis for supporting the argument that the private
sector firms gain financial benefits through PPP investments.
In summary, my research highlights that PPP investments made by private sector firms are
generally perceived as value enhancing investments by investors. However, the real benefits
associated with reduced reliance on internal cash flows, and consequently, the reduced underin-
vestment problem of private sector firms and increased firm value are not that straightforward.
Such benefits are affected by the extent to which institutional quality exists in an economy. My
research provides new guidance on the direction and viability of PPP-partnering private sector
firms in varying degrees of market maturity and institutional quality.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Overview of the Thesis
Countries around the world have experienced tremendous economic growth thanks to their mas-
sive urban and industrial development and their active role in global supply chains that bring
back numerous benefits to partnering economies. However, the dark side is that this enormous
growth comes with a huge infrastructure gap that challenges each government’s possibility to
hunt down sufficient financial resources in order to fulfil the demand of its economic advance-
ment. Given the limited resources coming from public finance and the failure of privatization
programs, Public–Private Partnerships have emerged as an optimal synergy to bridge the in-
frastructure gap. PPPs come with specialized roles of partnering private firms by developing
and operating infrastructure projects and, more importantly, providing private finance and
other embedded institutional finance to compensate for the deficiency of public resources. In
exchange for these supportive roles, PPPs, unlike their non-PPP counterparts, provide partner-
ing private sector firms with more costless government assets and other government guarantees.
This ensures that the partnering private sector can run their high-risk infrastructure projects
smoothly. Nevertheless, these firms have been facing serious transaction costs to obtain the
right to award highly competitive projects, especially in highly corrupt economies. They also
have been faced with low actual revenue, cost and time overruns due to high information asym-
metries at the initial stage of the projects and in the follow-up to unexpected results that hinder
the firms’ efficiency.
China and India command the lion’s share of PPP projects, composing approximately 20%
of total investment value in developing countries but also in the top countries with a high
number of canceled projects. Therefore, PPPs have not been attractive enough for private
186
sector firms, and only 15% and 40% of infrastructure funding has come from the private sector
in China and India respectively (Wilkins et al., 2014; High Level Committee on Financing
Infrastructure, 2012). In order to attract PPP participation from private sector firms, it is
crucial to investigate the firms’ motives and the subsequent benefits that PPPs can provide.
PPPs are sustainable only if the private sector finds sufficient incentives to offset their capital
constraints in high risk ventures like PPPs.
My study examines PPPs from the private sector’s perspective and to understand whether
PPPs– which have seen a nine-fold increase in emerging markets in the last ten years– assist
in fulfilling the intended purpose of eliminating financial constraints faced by private sector
firms. My study also uncovers whether a high reliance on government brings benefits to PPP
partnering private sector firms by explaining PPPs’ investment efficiency in relation to under-
investment and overinvestment. More importantly, my study further tests the Social Lending
Hypothesis (SLH) to examine whether such government preferential treatment for high bank
lending to the private sector also improves the social welfare by encouraging banks to effi-
ciently allocate capital to those with high growth opportunities. In a broader view, such a
contrasting influence of government support suggests the mediating role of political settings in
enhancing/hindering PPP benefits. PPPs provides a strong platform of social venture in which
seeking for political connections in the context of weak institutions is more crucial for awarding
and running projects smoothly in a high risk environment. Subsequently, my study attempts
to explain how institutional quality influences PPP benefits. My study is able to reconsider
which of the law–finance–growth or political tie hypotheses is more pronounced as a way of
explaining the motivations that encourage private sector firms to engage with PPPs and the
firms’ requirement to ensure their commitments and future success.
My thesis consists of an introduction with the research motivation, the research objectives
and the contributions (Chapter 1); a comprehensive literature review of theories and extant
literature on the effects of PPPs and their related factors (Chapter 2); an empirical study on
how PPPs influence partnering private sector firms’ investment efficiency and market valuation
to accomplish the first research objectives (Chapter 3); a close analysis of PPP private sector
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firms’ access to bank loans to examine how political connections play their roles in mediating
PPP gains and losses for partnering private firms and social welfare (Chapter 4); a detailed
examination of how institutional quality influences PPPs’ benefits (Chapter 5); and a summary
of the empirical findings of my study and the key contributions, implications, limitations and
the possibilities my study offers for future research (Chapter 6).
6.2 Research Findings
First, my study examines whether PPPs benefit partnering private sector firms in terms of
increasing firm market valuation and reducing capital constraints in the two largest emerging
economies, namely China and India.
In consideration of firm market valuation, my study, by using the event study with the
sample of 138 and 124 PPP announcements (1988–2013) in China and India respectively, reveals
that in both of these economies investors react positively to PPP announcements issued by
partnering private sector firms. This leads to an enhancement of the firms’ market valuation,
with the positive cumulative abnormal returns from the (-10,+10) event window being 1.87%
and 2.11% in China and India, respectively. My robustness tests, conducted by using the Barber
and Lyon matched-firm approach, further confirm that the PPP announcements add value to
partnering private sector firms relative to their matched non-PPP counterparts in the same
industry. Overall, investors may consider PPP announcements issued by partnering private
firms as good news, leading to increased firm value.
When studying investment–cash flow sensitivity, my study, by using 169 and 215 firm-
year observations in China and India respectively, explores the variance in the nature of firms
that undertakes PPP projects varies. Compared to non-PPP counterparts, in China, older
and highly valued firms with higher cash inflow engage in PPPs while in India, younger and
cash-constrained firms with higher debt burdens opt for PPPs. This indicates that unlike in
China, PPP investments in India are mainly driven by an underinvestment problem. In the
long run, PPP involvement reduces investment–cash flow sensitivity in both countries’ private
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sector firms; however, the reduced capital constraint is more pronounced in China. Hence,
these findings show that PPPs help partnering firms be less reliant on their internal cash flow
to finance their investments. I further confirm these findings by exploring how private sector
firms’ participation in PPPs leads to an increase in accessing external financing in terms of
bank loans.
Second, my study attempts to uncover the underlying determinants of PPP benefits for
partnering private sector firms. As PPP projects involve the public sector, my results show
that a high reliance on the government, in the form of government investments, political con-
nections and contractual agreements, is beneficial for the Chinese private firms as this grants
them a deduction in their overinvestment problems. In contrast, a high dependency on the gov-
ernment is detrimental to the Indian firms as it imposes more overinvestment problems on these
firms than it does on their non-political counterparts. The contrasting results of government
reliance suggest the distinct feature of the political system that may influence firms’ bene-
fits through PPPs. I investigate this conjecture by showing that the Chinese PPP firms have
lower investment–cash flow sensitivity when regulatory quality improves. Given that regulatory
quality is measured by the ability of the government to promote the private sector (Kaufmann
et al., 2011), this result lends support to my findings on the positive effects of high reliance on
government in China. In the case of India, accountability and government effectiveness matter
in reducing capital constraints of PPP partnering private firms. Given that accountability is
measured as having freedom of expression and the ability to nominate one’s own government
(Kaufmann et al., 2011), the results are consistent with the idea that the political setup in India
– democracy – is mirrored in the Indian firms as well. Overall, the results show the important
role of institutional quality when explaining the benefits of PPP firms, and this leads to my
further cross-country analysis on how institutional quality influence PPP benefits.
Third, my study aims to examine the effects of institutional quality on partnering private
sector firms. By using a sample of 625 PPP partnering private firms from nine countries
(1980–2015) at varying degrees of economic development and PPP markets (i.e. Australia, the
United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Japan, China, India, Brazil and Russia), I find
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a variance in the motivation of firms that undertakes PPP investment. While private sector
firms in economies with low institutional quality opt for PPPs to alleviate capital constraints
attributed to underinvestment, those in economies with high institutional quality opt for PPPs
to solve the problem of overinvestment caused by abundant cash flow. In the long run, the
benefits of low capital constraints and increased firm value through PPP investments are more
pronounced in the economies with high institutional quality. Hence, my study contributes to
the extant debate on the role of institutional quality by stating that the law–finance–growth
hypothesis is more plausible than the political tie hypothesis for understanding why private
sector firms undertake PPP investments.
6.3 Research Contributions to the Literature
First, my study contributes to the emerging literature on the development of PPPs and their
related impacts on partnering parties. Previous literature focuses on an exploration of the
efficacy of PPPs from the public sector’s perspective by examining whether PPP projects out-
perform the traditional public procurement in terms of achieving government financial benefits
and improving the social welfare as a whole (e.g. Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011; Tang et al.,
2010). My study aims at understanding the influence of PPPs on partnering private sector
firms. There are currently a few existing studies that explore the advantages of PPPs for the
private sector in terms of reducing political risk and regulatory hurdles, and improving future
demand guarantees (Engel et al., 2010; UNESCAP, 2011). My study adds another corporate
finance dimension to that literature by considering on how PPPs affect the financial constraints
and performance of PPP-invested private firms in comparison with their non-PPP firms com-
petitors.
Second, my study contributes to the extant literature on corporate investment decisions and
investment efficiency originated by Fazzari et al. (1988); Jensen (1986) and Myers and Majluf
(1984) and more recently developed by Moshirian et al. (2017); Pindado et al. (2011) and Cleary
et al. (2007). While previous literature emphasizes two different channels, investment asymme-
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tries and agency problems, that may distort investment behaviors, my study on PPPs departs
from these studies by adding another channel: that is, the conflict between the government
(as a regulator, asset and capital provider) and partnering private firms (as constructors and
operators) in which the government may use free cash flow generated to pursue political/social
purposes at the expense of its private partners.
Third, my study contributes to the previous debates on partnering private sector firms and
their reliance on government support by disentangling the rationale for changes in investment
efficiency caused by underinvestment or overinvestment, which is influenced by the issue of
government intervention. I argue that the distinct role of government support depends on
the varying degree of government ownership of a firm as a whole, the role of state equity
participation in a firm’s single project, political connection, and more importantly, the political
set-up. Furthermore, in addition to the previous studies that mainly focus on what macro-level
factors drive the choice of PPP contract mechanisms such as in Bajari et al. (2008), my study
provides insight into the influence of the government via contract mechanisms to partnering
private sector firms. My study also identifies several determinants of contract mechanism,
namely the types of projects that have different levels of private ownership, contract awarding
methods and private firms’ revenue sources with varying degrees of demand risk guaranteed by
the government. Therefore, it further adds to the extant literature on ownership structure and
risk transfer by arguing that ownership and risk allocation not only depend on the ability of
the party who manage it well at a low cost, as discussed in Cooper (2005), but ownership and
risk allocation also relates to the political setting. The unitary polity encourages ownership
and risk to be allocated to the government while the federalism system prefers ownership and
risk to be transferred to the private sector.
Fourth, my study contributes to the extant literature by providing a better platform from
which to reexamine the SLH and the extant debate on whether either the law–finance–growth
nexus or the political tie hypothesis is more plausible in explaining financing conditions. The
previous literature uses the sample of general corporate investments that are not aligned with
the social interests of the government. They posit that attaining political connections to easily
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access external financing may lead to social loss as related politicians engage in corruptive
practices, which supports the ”Political Corruption” view point such as in Dinc¸ (2005) and
Khwaja and Mian (2005). Hence, these authors are testing political corruption in general
rather than directly testing the SLH. In contrast, my study provides a PPP sample with a
clearer social alignment in which the government cooperates with the private sector to manage
the large social infrastructure projects as part of national building exercises. As a result, the
preferential treatment extended by the government that enables private firms to access bank
loans may improve social welfare as well since it can lead to an efficient allocation of resources.
The approach I take in my study provides a better setting to test the SLH. Moreover, the
PPP sample provides a platform in which political connection can be more active since the
private sector need to seek government-backed support for the smooth running of large, risky
infrastructure projects. As a result, my study has a better setting to gauge whether the
law–finance–growth or the political tie nexus is more pronounced. If PPP financial benefits
are more profound in firms that have high institutional quality (with better protection of
private properties from public expropriation and corruption), the law–finance–growth nexus is
supported. Otherwise, if these benefits are more significant in low institutional quality which
encourages political elite, the political tie hypothesis is supported.
Last but not least, to my best knowledge, my study is the first to examine the effects of PPPs
on partnering private sector firms in the corporate finance dimension. Despite the emergence
and dominance of PPPs in emerging economies, previous studies mainly focus on case studies in
developed economies. Given the distinct institutions and development of developed economies
and emerging economies, this may lead to generalization problems. My study uses a PPP
sample from the two largest emerging economies, China and India, each of whom commands
the lion’s share of PPP projects with active private sector participation. Therefore, it has
implications for evaluating the influence of PPPs in emerging markets, for testing the intended
purposes of reducing capital constraints for the private sector and bridging infrastructure gaps
for social welfare. More importantly, by using a cross-country analysis of nine economies at
varying degree of institutional quality, which composes more than 67% of the global PPP deal
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value (IJGlobal Database, 2015), my study further compares PPP associated benefits between
developed and emerging economies. Hence, it sheds light on the direction and viability of PPPs
in different stages of economic and institutional development.
6.4 Implications and Recommendations
For PPP-invested private firms, participating in PPPs has been increasingly common as one
of strategic investment decisions, apart from diversification, Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A),
or Research and Development (R&D). Since PPPs involve large and long-term projects, the
increasing number of cancelled projects and, more importantly, the low average return on
capital, for example just 6% to 8% compared with around 10% for equity investment in China
(Ma, 2016), may limit the appeal of PPPs to the private sector. In the meantime, earlier
literature has mainly focused on case studies looking at single PPP project-level data rather
than PPP partnering firms as a whole. Therefore, my thesis on firm-level study has implications
for partnering private firms by drawing out both financial benefits and associated risks that
PPPs bring to firms. This may help the private sector take into account some added critical
financial issues in their attempt to secure PPPs over other investment opportunities and answer
their question on whether private sector firms engage with PPPs based on the set of assessment
criteria in corporate finance. For instance, in addition to the traditional measurement of project
success, net present value (NPV), private sector firms should evaluate other incentives of PPPs,
such as firm market valuation, investment efficiency through investment–cash flow sensitivity
and access to bank lending. Moreover, my thesis suggests the kinds of support private sector
firms should require from governments to ensure their commitment to PPPs and future success.
For example, equity participation from governments or other government support as a result
of political connections should aim at achieving mutual benefits between governments and the
private sector. For the private sector, securing government support should be exercised to
fulfil the intended purposes of reducing underinvestment, rather than being detrimental to
firms by overinvesting their free cash flow to pursue the government’s preferred political/social
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purposes. To cite another example, for sustainable long-run benefits, the private sector should
prefer, and require from the governments, an institution that provides strong protection for
the sector’s private properties rather than being over-reliant on political ties which may induce
expropriation risk.
From the perspective of governments, given the private sector’s lack of strong commitment
towards PPPs, governments are attempting to establish an institutional structure that promotes
private sector firms engagement and benefits. For example, this can be seen in the following
publications: “Several opinions of the state council on encouraging and guiding the healthy
development of private investment” issued in May 2010 in China (Wang et al., 2012) or the
“National Public Private Partnership policy of India” (World Bank Group, 2012b). However,
although the aim of these publications is to provide an overview of PPP regulations, with an
emphasis on some strategic institutions, the feasibility of these institutions in the real world
would still need to be tested. The findings on institutional quality in my thesis suggest some
governance features the government should prioritize in their attempt to encourage private
sector participation. In other words, my thesis suggests the benefits that governments can
promote and the costs that governments can help to manage in PPPs. As in China, private
sector firms may get more benefits in terms of reducing investment–cash flow sensitivity and
increasing market valuation when the government focuses its policies and regulations on pro-
moting private sector development (in time of high regulatory quality). By contrast, in India,
when the government promotes high accountability which aims at encouraging freedom and
independence from political pressures, this may help the private sector obtain more benefits
in positive market reaction when announcing new PPP projects. Additionally, my thesis has
implications for governments in deciding which firms are most attracted to PPPs and what
criteria government should use to make those decisions. In the case of China, the attracted
PPP firms are large, mature, highly valued with small debt burden, while in India, the opposite
is true as PPP firms are young with a high leverage. More over, my thesis suggests the kinds
of resources governments can provide to firms to ensure their commitment and future success.
For example, the Chinese government can help private firms lower the overinvestment problems
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that arise between managers and shareholders by increasing the government’s role as an equity
investor in PPP projects and combining this with its role as a regulatory controller. In the case
of India, when governments award PPP projects to private sector firms, this can help the firms
solve their capital constraints; however, this impact is only possible when firms do not engage
with political connections; otherwise firms’ capital constraints may become inversely increased
due to overinvestment problems. Finally, my findings on the Social Lending Objectives through
the political connection channel has implications for governments in terms of how they might
re examine their allocation of bank lending. In the case of PPP firms in China, preferential
treatment for politically connected firms leads to social gains since banks efficiently allocate
capital to firms with high growth opportunities. In India, however, high access to bank loans
through government bank support is allocated to low investment opportunity firms, which may
lead to overinvestment and social losses.
Finally, as my study on PPPs involves firm market valuation, it has implications for investors
in response to PPP announcements and the investors’ diversification strategy. My findings
suggest that PPP announcements may bring abnormal return relative to the market and the
matched non-PPP firms. The abnormal return may be even more pronounced in the politically
connected firms in China, but there is no difference in India. However, the window for positive
average abnormal return may differ between the Chinese and Indian markets. For the PPP
Chinese firms, the window ranges from t=-8 to t=+8, while in India, the window is smaller,
about (-3,+3). Moreover, since PPPs involve foreign investors, my study on institutional quality
has implications for investors’ choice of investment time and destination. My findings suggest
that investors may gain a better return at the time of increased ratings on regulatory quality
in China; however, this is not the case in India. Investing in Indian PPP firms may offer a
better return for investors at a time of increased ratings on accountability. In general, on one
hand, there are PPP firms that operate in an economy whose institutions are focused on the
protection of private properties. On the other hand, there are PPP firms who do business in an
economy that aims at promoting political elites and government-backed support. In the long
run, an investment in the firms that protect private properties may offer better gains.
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6.5 Limitations and Future Research
According to Grimsey and Lewis (2007), infrastructure is divided into hard and soft infrastruc-
ture. My study focuses on hard infrastructure (i.e. energy, information and communication
technology, transport, water and sewerage). Additionally, hard infrastructure is further classi-
fied into economic infrastructure (e.g. energy, technology and transport) and social infrastruc-
ture (e.g. water, sewerage, schools, hospital, housings, childcare) (Grimsey and Lewis, 2007).
As mentioned above, my study covers all economic infrastructure and a large portion of social
infrastructure, namely water and sewerage. The main rationale for this scope is that such hard
infrastructure involves large, risky and long-term PPP projects that demand more expertize
and engagement from the private sector. More importantly, compared with social infrastructure
that provides services to households, hard infrastructure is considered to be essential to business
and industry, hence playing a crucial role to infrastructure and economic growth. Therefore,
my empirical results validate the benefits of PPP for partnering private firms, especially in
developing economies. However, given the new investment trend in infrastructure in developed
economies– that is, the transfer from hard to soft infrastructure (e.g. financial institutions, so-
cial and community services), and from economic to social infrastructure (e.g. housings, school,
hospital)– there is an opening for further research to follow this trend and focus on whether
the characteristics of soft and social infrastructure can modify private sector firms’ financial
benefits through PPPs. There is also scope for future studies to compare the viability of PPPs
for private firms in terms of economic infrastructure as opposed to in social infrastructure.
This would help the government form separated institutions and policies for either economic
or social infrastructure in its attempt to encourage the private sector to participate in PPPs.
Since PPPs involve governments as both regulators and project participants, my study aims
to explore government inference as a core determinant of PPP benefits for the private sector,
through various channels (i.e. firm equity participation, project ownership, political connec-
tions, contract mechanisms, institutions). This has implications for how governments frame
legal frameworks, encouragement policies and contract clauses with the private sector. There is
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room for further research to focus on other factors, such as culture contexts and diversity, en-
vironmental and social factors. For example, PPPs involve large infrastructure projects, which
may provoke strong social objection due to land acquisition or other expropriation. This social
factor has the potential to influence completion time and transaction costs. Another area for
future research relates to large PPP projects may involve the exploitation of natural resources
that affect the environment (e.g. energy or water and sewerage projects). How PPP partnering
firms behave in response to these consequences, in light of their business culture and sense of
their corporate social responsibility is still questionable. Such factors may also determine PPP
benefits and PPP firms’ engagement, but these are less-explored in the existing literature and
warrant further investigation.
6.6 Concluding Remarks
PPPs have emerged to fill the infrastructure gap, given the failure of public finance and pri-
vatization programs. However, PPPs have received low engagement from the private sector.
This poses a challenge for government attempting to sustain this model. In this circumstance,
most previous studies align with the public sector’s perspective to explore whether PPPs bring
more benefits to governments than the conventional public procurement, and there is incon-
clusive evidence of the advantages and disadvantages that PPPs afford the private sector. My
study fills this research gap by offering a less-explored angle of research into PPP engagement.
Aligning my study with the private, rather than the public sectors point of view, I examine
whether PPPs– which witnessed a nine-fold increase in emerging markets in the last decade–
accomplish the intended purpose of reducing capital constraints faced by the private sector.
One of my main findings is that PPPs help partnering private sector firms become less reliant
on their internal cash flow and better able to access bank loans when financing for their invest-
ment in both China and India. Also, investors responded positively to PPP announcements,
which generate abnormal returns to PPP-invested firms over their non-PPP counterparts. My
study further explores government-related determinants of PPP benefits and finds that a high
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dependency on governments, in terms of public equity participation, political connection and
contract mechanism, is beneficial to the Chinese PPP firms but detrimental to the Indian firms.
This is because a higher reliance on the government helps the Chinese PPP firms decrease their
underinvestment and overinvestment problems, while such synergy increases overinvestment
in the case of the Indian firms. With regard to social welfare, such a higher reliance on the
government leads to social gains in China, since the preferential treatment for politically con-
nected firms also causes the efficient allocation of bank financing to firms with high growth
opportunities. By contrast, political connections may lead to social loss in India. The contrast-
ing findings suggest the need for further research on how the difference in institutional quality
mediates PPP benefits. In regard to firms that opt for PPPs, I find that there is a variance in
the motivation and consequent benefits that the firms enjoy, depending on the firms’ level of
institutional quality. While firms in low-quality institutions opt for PPPs to alleviate capital
constraints attributed to underinvestment, those in economies with high institutional quality
choose PPPs to solve the problem of overinvestment made by abundant cash flow. In the long
run, the benefits of lowering capital constraints and improving firm value are more pronounced
in economies with high institutional quality.
Therefore, my study contributes to the emerging literature on PPPs in the corporate finance
dimension, and it complements the extant literature on corporate investment decisions and
investment efficiency. It also adds to the current debate on the role of government reliance,
ownership structure and risk transfer. Moreover, it contributes to the previous examination of
the Social Lending Objectives and the extant debate between the law–finance–growth nexus
and the political tie hypothesis in terms of which one offers the more plausible explanation of
financial benefits. My study also has implications for PPP-invested private firms, governments
and investors attempting to sustain and maximize PPP benefits. It concludes by opening room
for future studies, including an exploration of the nature and viability of PPPs in social or soft
infrastructure and an examination of other determinants of PPP benefits (e.g. social, cultural
and environmental factors).
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Appendix
A Variables Definition
Firm-level variables Definition
1. Investment The changes in gross fixed assets, divided by the previous year’s fixed assets
2. Cash flow Income before extraordinary items, depreciation and amortization, divided by
the previous year’s fixed assets
3. Size The natural logarithm of total assets
4. Leverage Total debt divided by total assets
5. Age Measured from the year of a firm’s incorporation
6. Tobin’s q The market value of assets (market capitalization + liabilities’ market value) divided
by the book value of assets (common stock’s book value + liabilities’ book value)
7. ROA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization scaled by average total assets
8. Capex/sales Capital expenditure divided by sales to measure investment intensity
9. Sale growth The average growth over three years in net sales to capture growth opportunities
12. Market risk Calculated by estimating the market model on the monthly returns in the previous five years
Institution quality variables Definition
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1. Accountability Perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting
their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media
2. Political stability Perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence
3. Government effectiveness Perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies
4. Regulatory quality Perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and
regulations that permit and promote private sector development
5. Rule of law Perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society,
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence
6. Control of corruption Perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty
and grand forms of corruption, as well as ”capture” of the state by elites and private interests
7. Public uncertainty A dummy variable taking value 1 when PPPs enter into contracts in the year of general election, else zero
Country-level variables Definition
1. Log GDP The natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product in the US dollars
2. Credit to private sector Financial resources that financial corporations provide the private sector (measured as % of GDP)
215
B Sensitivity Test for Determinants of Wealth Effects Arising from PPP Announcements
Table B2: Chinese Firms: Barber and Lyon Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Reliance on the Government and Institution Quality
This table presents the effect of government support and institution quality on the cumulative abnormal return of PPP firms. BLCAR01, the
dependent variable, was the Barber and Lyon cumulative abnormal return of day 0 and day +1. ***,**,* indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
BLCAR01 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Firm-characteristic variables
Cash flow -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.00001 -0.00001 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001
(-0.07) (0.10) (-0.27) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.59) (-0.31) (0.28) (0.21) (-0.05)
Leverage -0.0183 -0.0257 -0.0185 -0.0213 -0.0294 -0.0034 -0.0396 -0.0424* -0.0180 -0.0287
(-0.85) (-1.00) (-1.03) (-0.82) (-0.90) (-0.09) (-1.43) (-1.76) (-0.60) (-1.17)
Size -0.0102 -0.0086 -0.0111 -0.0104 -0.0068 -0.0186 -0.0058 -0.0132 -0.0120 -0.0072
(-0.91) (-0.66) (-1.08) (-0.93) (-0.45) (-1.04) (-0.49) (-1.18) (-0.84) (-0.56)
Age -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.00001 -0.0005
(-0.15) (-0.26) (-0.24) (-0.13) (-0.34) (0.35) (-0.54) (-0.16) (0.01) (-0.48)
Tobin’s q 0.0068** 0.0065** 0.0086*** 0.0069** 0.0074*** 0.0065*** 0.0073*** 0.0077*** 0.0072*** 0.0075***
(2.58) (2.16) (3.39) (2.40) (2.92) (2.67) (2.70) (3.09) (2.91) (3.24)
Panel B: Government involvement variables
Public equity -0.0178
(-0.70)
Political connections 0.0013*
(1.71)
Panel C: Institution quality variables
Public uncertainty -0.0293***
(-2.74)
Accountability -0.0407**
(-1.80)
Political stability 0.0481
(0.96)
Government effectiveness 0.0699
(1.32)
Regulatory quality 0.0771***
(3.11)
Rule of law -0.0212
(-0.46)
Control of corruption -0.0404
(-1.32)
Constant 0.0751 0.0737 0.0831 0.0786 -0.0066 0.1430 0.0548 0.1190** 0.0744 0.0378
(1.31) (1.16) (1.52) (1.25) (-0.07) (1.31) (0.88) (1.90) (0.88) (0.61)
R-squared 5.69 6.03 8.37 5.8 6.34 6.4 7.02 7.54 6.13 6.41
N 124 124 124 121 117 117 117 117 117 117
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Table B3: Chinese Firms: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns, Reliance on the Government and Institution Quality
This table presents the effect of government support and institution quality on the cumulative abnormal return of PPP firms. BAH01, the
dependent variable, was the buy-and-hold abnormal return of day 0 and day +1. ***,**,* indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
BAH01 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Firm-characteristic variables
Cash flow -0.00002 0.0001 -0.0002 0.00002 0.00001 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.00002
(-0.03) (0.14) (-0.24) (0.03) (0.02) (0.62) (-0.33) (0.34) (0.25) (-0.03)
Leverage -0.0147 -0.0221 -0.0150 -0.0173 -0.0281 0.0003 -0.0389 -0.0400 -0.0141 -0.0264
(-0.66) (-0.84) (-0.81) (-0.64) (-0.85) (0.01) (-1.40) (-1.67) (-0.46) (-1.04)
Size -0.0105 -0.0089 -0.0114 -0.0106 -0.0060 -0.0188 -0.0052 -0.0135 -0.0123 -0.0069
(-0.94) (-0.69) (-1.12) (-0.95) (-0.40) (-1.05) (-0.45) (-1.22) (-0.86) (-0.53)
Age -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0005
(-0.12) (-0.23) (-0.20) (-0.10) (-0.39) (0.37) (-0.60) (-0.14) (0.04) (-0.50)
Tobin’s q 0.0073** 0.0070** 0.0091*** 0.0074** 0.0079*** 0.0070*** 0.0078*** 0.0082*** 0.0076*** 0.0080***
(2.54) (2.15) (3.36) (2.37) (2.88) (2.64) (2.68) (3.04) (2.86) (3.22)
Panel B: Government involvement variables
Public equity -0.0176
(-0.70)
Political connection 0.0026*
(1.70)
Panel C: Institution quality variables
Public uncertainty -0.0304***
(-2.82)
Accountability -0.0482**
(-2.22)
Political stability 0.0475
(0.95)
Government effectiveness 0.0789
(1.41)
Regulatory quality 0.0811***
(3.16)
Rule of law -0.0196
(-0.42)
Control of corruption -0.0448
(-1.47)
Constant 0.0746 0.0732 0.0830 0.0789 -0.0247 0.1420 0.0501 0.1210* 0.0751 0.0319
(1.32) (1.17) (1.55) (1.26) (-0.26) (1.30) (0.82) (1.94) (0.89) (0.52)
R-squared 5.88 6.2 8.67 5.98 6.62 6.58 7.43 7.84 6.32 6.66
N 124 124 124 121 117 117 117 117 117 117
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Table B4: Indian Firms: Barber and Lyon Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Reliance on the Government and Institution Quality
This table presents the effect of government support and institution quality on the cumulative abnormal return of PPP firms. BLCAR01, the
dependent variable, was the Barber and Lyon cumulative abnormal return of day 0 and day +1. ***,**,* indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
BLCAR01 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Firm-characteristic variables
Cash flow 0.0158*** 0.0156*** 0.0169** 0.0148*** 0.0166*** 0.0140*** 0.0158*** 0.0159*** 0.0115*** 0.0114***
(3.04) (3.17) (2.60) (2.75) (4.23) (4.17) (3.08) (2.93) (2.87) (3.21)
Leverage -0.0578*** -0.0606*** -0.0559*** -0.0579** -0.0669*** -0.0675*** -0.0576*** -0.0587*** -0.0840*** -0.0789***
(-2.77) (-3.03) (-2.82) (-2.15) (-3.13) (-4.90) (-2.63) (-3.03) (-6.72) (-7.75)
Size 0.0159 0.0182** 0.0152 0.0163 0.0165* 0.0146* 0.0160* 0.0159* 0.0188*** 0.0179***
(1.65) (2.05) (1.54) (1.52) (1.86) (1.96) (1.69) (1.66) (3.45) (3.12)
Age -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0006
(-0.24) (-0.38) (-0.19) (-0.13) (-0.29) (-0.35) (-0.28) (-0.29) (-1.00) (-0.69)
Tobin’s q -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0010*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0007*** -0.0007***
(-2.98) (-3.19) (-3.04) (-3.03) (-4.03) (-3.23) (-3.35) (-3.16) (-3.13) (-3.61)
Panel B: Government involvement variables
Public equity -0.0196
(-1.48)
Political connection -0.0124***
(-5.45)
Panel C: Institution quality variables
Public uncertainty 0.0112
(1.18)
Accountability 0.2070*
(1.89)
Political stability -0.0765
(-1.53)
Government effectiveness -0.0060
(-0.12)
Regulatory quality -0.0241
(-0.54)
Rule of law -0.0797***
(-3.98)
Control of corruption -0.0962**
(-2.07)
Constant -0.0952* -0.1090** -0.0926* -0.0970 -0.1810** -0.1730*** -0.0957* -0.1030** -0.0998*** -0.1440***
(-1.76) (-2.19) (-1.71) (-1.61) (-2.08) (-2.92) (-1.83) (-2.49) (-2.96) (-6.25)
R-squared 8.66 9.52 9.34 9.71 10.72 12.24 8.67 8.8 12.17 11.71
N 98 96 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98
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Table B5: Indian Firms: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns, Reliance on the Government and Institution Quality
This table presents the effect of government support and institution quality on the cumulative abnormal return of PPP firms. BAH01, the
dependent variable, was the buy-and-hold abnormal return of day 0 and day +1. ***,**,* indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
BAH01 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Firm-characteristic variables
Cash flow 0.0159*** 0.0157*** 0.0169*** 0.0148*** 0.0166*** 0.0141*** 0.0159*** 0.0159*** 0.0116*** 0.0116***
(3.15) (3.29) (2.69) (2.84) (4.40) (4.33) (3.16) (3.04) (2.99) (3.34)
Leverage -0.0591*** -0.0619*** -0.0573*** -0.0592** -0.0680*** -0.0685*** -0.0588*** -0.0599*** -0.0847*** -0.0796***
(-2.81) (-3.07) (-2.86) (-2.18) (-3.14) (-4.97) (-2.65) (-3.07) (-6.48) (-7.42)
Size 0.0163* 0.0186** 0.0156 0.0167 0.0169* 0.0150** 0.0164* 0.0163* 0.0192*** 0.0183***
(1.70) (2.11) (1.59) (1.57) (1.92) (2.03) (1.75) (1.72) (3.48) (3.15)
Age -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0006
(-0.27) (-0.42) (-0.22) (-0.16) (-0.32) (-0.39) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-1.03) (-0.72)
Tobin’s q -0.0009*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0009*** -0.0010*** -0.0009*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0007***
(-2.96) (-3.18) (-3.02) (-3.02) (-4.03) (-3.21) (-3.35) (-3.14) (-3.10) (-3.56)
Panel B: Government involvement variables
Public equity -0.0192
(-1.51)
Political connection -0.0125***
(-5.69)
Panel C: Institution quality variables
Public uncertainty 0.0109
(1.20)
Accountability 0.2010*
(1.85)
Political stability -0.0744
(-1.56)
Government effectiveness -0.0095
(-0.20)
Regulatory quality -0.0241
(-0.56)
Rule of law -0.0779***
(-4.23)
Control of coruption -0.0932**
(-2.15)
Constant -0.0979* -0.112** -0.0954* -0.0998 -0.1810** -0.1730*** -0.0987* -0.1050** -0.1020*** -0.1450***
(-1.82) (-2.26) (-1.78) (-1.67) (-2.10) (-3.04) (-1.91) (-2.57) (-3.06) (-6.39)
R-squared 8.95 9.81 9.61 10.03 10.94 12.41 8.97 9.09 12.37 11.87
N 98 96 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98
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C Sensitivity Test for Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivity Analysis
Table C6: Chinese and Indian Firms – Sensitivity Test: Sale Growth is Used as Proxy for Investment Opportunities
This table presents the sensitivity test in which I used Sale growth (instead of Tobin’s q) as a proxy for investment opportunities. Sale growth
was measured by the changes in net sales divided by the previous sales. ***,**,* indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
Investment China China China China China India India India India India
Cash flow 0.216*** 0.928** 5.478*** 3.075** 0.127** -0.086 0.407*** 0.089 -0.267 -0.252
(381.238) (2.395) (11.834) (2.476) (2.591) (-0.754) (9.013) (0.214) (-1.608) (-1.437)
Size -0.868 -0.048 -0.020 -0.152 0.279* 0.131 0.105** 0.079 0.010 0.096**
(-1.481) (-0.592) (-0.271) (-1.562) (1.975) (0.424) (2.649) (1.067) (0.092) (2.307)
Leverage 1.116 0.003 1.153 1.551 0.950 1.498* 0.158 -0.017 -0.252** -0.244**
(0.628) (0.010) (1.348) (1.639) (1.360) (1.920) (1.059) (-0.060) (-2.421) (-2.116)
Age 0.070 -0.010** -0.017 0.021 -0.030** 0.031 -0.015** -0.023** -0.017 -0.036***
(1.110) (-2.244) (-1.109) (1.264) (-2.626) (0.659) (-2.687) (-2.314) (-1.460) (-3.752)
Sale growth 0.003* -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002** -0.001 0.008 0.001* 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(1.717) (-0.491) (-6.430) (-2.935) (-1.086) (0.894) (1.804) (1.157) (1.401) (-0.135)
PPP -0.138 0.213 -1.461*** 0.025
(-0.335) (1.469) (-4.390) (0.214)
PPP * Cash flow -0.230*** -0.787** 2.496*** -0.116
(-21.464) (-2.192) (4.284) (-0.335)
Public equity 3.834*** -0.369**
(10.914) (-2.262)
Public equity * Cash flow -13.485*** 2.3662***
(-11.262) (3.246)
Political connection 0.423 -0.369*
(1.425) (-1.760)
Political connection * Cash flow -3.006** 1.438*
(-2.386) (1.983)
Public uncertainty -0.608* -1.097***
(-1.861) (-3.900)
Public uncertainty * Cash flow 4.907*** 3.012***
(4.509) (3.906)
Constant 5.513* 0.504 -1.138* 0.052 -1.788* -1.597 -0.653*** -0.210 0.487 0.0247
(1.702) (1.267) (-1.665) (0.068) (-1.697) (-0.906) (-3.001) (-0.592) (0.612) (0.078)
R-squared 88.07 9.09 67.9 60.68 70.68 76.68 17.5 15.97 20.06 33.18
N 293 93 50 50 50 326 97 52 52 52
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D PPP Private Sector Firms in the Cross-Country Analysis
Figure D1: PPP Listed Private Sector Firms by Countries and Industries
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Table D7: Cross-Country PPP Data Sources
Country Organization Link
Australia Infrastructure Australia http://infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/
policy-publications/public–private-partnerships/index.aspx
The UK HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
private-finance-initiative-projects-2013-summary-data
The US
The National Council for PPPs http://www.ncppp.org/resources/case-studies
Federal Highway Administration http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/p3/project profiles/
Canada The Canadian Council for PPPs http://projects.pppcouncil.ca/ccppp/src/public/
search-project?pageid=3d067bedfe2f4677470dd6ccf64d05ed
Japan Japan PPI-PPP Association http://www.pfikyokai.or.jp/pfi-data/pfi-list g.html
China The World Bank PPI Project Database http://ppi.worldbank.org
India The World Bank PPI Project Database http://ppi.worldbank.org
Brazil The World Bank PPI Project Database http://ppi.worldbank.org
Russia The World Bank PPI Project Database http://ppi.worldbank.org
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